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General introduction
1

This thesis falls within the scope of labor economics, economic geography and urban eco-
nomics. It investigates labor market inequalities and determinants of the location of jobs, work-
ers and firms.
The issue of inequalities goes well beyond economics and there is much debate about how
much society should try to reduce them. But, although societies arbitrate differently between
an objective of equal opportunities and of equal situations, inequality is a shared concern. In-
deed, the United Nations goal number 10 is explicitly to “reduce inequality within and among
countries”. And numerous policies aim at reducing them : many countries have progressive
income taxation or a form of guaranteed minimum income for instance and there are also many
programs of international development assistance. Understanding the determinants of inequal-
ities is therefore crucial and it has been largely studied, but it is still a much debated topic. A
perfect example is the book from the economist Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century, which analyzed wealth and income inequality in Europe and the United States since
the 18th century, and has been a great sales success and at the same time much criticized. In-
come and wealth are not the only dimensions of inequalities; they are other important ones
regarding health for instance that also contribute to well-being inequalities. Nonetheless, in-
come inequalities are an essential component of inequalities and labor market inequalities are
a major determinant of income inequalities. Furthermore, space is an important and visible di-
mension of inequalities. Within cities, there are segregation issues between poor and wealthy
neighborhoods in developing countries as well as in developed countries. Urban policies have
been implemented for several decades to overcome this segregation. There are also inequalities
between cities or countries and economists seek to understand why some places develop more
than others, what are for example the conditions of success of clusters of innovation such as the
Silicon Valley. The potential benefits of agglomeration are numerous : knowledge spillovers,
labor market pooling, positive peer effects but the increasing concentration of people and wealth
in a few cities also raises concerns about the effect of congestion on health and on the environ-
ment. More generally, there is a lot of ongoing research on spatial externalities, either positive
or negative. The purpose of this work is to contribute to the understanding of some determi-
nants of labor market inequalities and, in particular, of spatial labor market inequalities, with
empirical studies on the French case.
Economic issues
The first part of this thesis investigates two determinants of the location of jobs and workers
using two public policies. In theoretical models, the location of jobs and workers is broadly a
result of equilibria on the labor market and on the housing market, which depend on transport
costs, relocation costs and local advantages. The first chapter studies a urban policy program
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and the second chapter deals with a transport infrastructure. Both of them are therefore dealing
with spatial equilibria, within cities in the first chapter and between cities in the second.
The first chapter analyses a place-based policy, the French Enterprise Zone program, which has
been implemented in the 1990’s after similar programs developed in the US and the UK. This
program grants very large tax exemptions to firms located in deprived urban neighborhoods.
These exemptions are conditioned on a local hiring condition : a share of the workforce of the
firms has to reside in the enterprise zone. Indeed the purpose of this program is to improve the
situation of the residents of these neighborhoods, by impacting spatial equilibria within urban
labor markets. This is done by giving advantages to these zones and it is therefore a form of
territorial affirmative action and has a redistributive aspect. This type of policies is also closely
related to the issue of spatial mismatch. The spatial mismatch hypothesis is based on the idea
that the deprived situation of residents of some places relatively to other places is due to spatial
phenomenons, and in particular to the fact that being far from jobs increases difficulties on the
labor market. The analysis of the French EZ program performed in the first chapter allows to
shed light on these urban labor markets mechanisms.
The second chapter studies French High Speed Rail line openings and the impact of a reduction
in travel time between cities on the spatial distribution of workers between different local labor
markets. It therefore gives elements on the way transport costs impact spatial equilibria between
cities or markets. Core models of economic geography have been dealing with transport cost
reduction and more generally trade barrier reduction. They model the equilibria between local
labor markets as result of agglomeration and dispersion forces. Transport cost is a dispersion
force : if it is costly for firms to transport goods, they locate closer to the demand for their
products to save on transport costs and they are therefore geographically dispersed if they serve
several markets. Krugman and Venables (1995) model describes the bell-shaped curve relation
between trade barriers and spatial inequalities. As transport cost decreases, first inequalities
increase between the core and the periphery and after a certain threshold, they start to decrease.
Therefore the effect of a decrease in transport cost on spatial inequality depends on the step
where is a given economy. Moreover, the effect of High Speed Rail might be specific since it
transports mainly people : it can also be seen as a communication cost. The economic geogra-
phy model of Duranton and Puga (2005) predicts that a decrease in communication cost leads
to an equilibrium where cities or local markets are specialized by industry to an equilibrium
where they specialize by functions. Since managers need less to be located close to the produc-
tion sites as the communication cost decreases, firms tend to prefer to locate their headquarters
in the same cities as other headquarters to take advantage of local agglomeration externalities
(proximity to suppliers of business services). Hence some agglomerations specialize in head-
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quarters and business services. High Speed rail line openings allow us to study the effect of a
decrease in communication cost on the organization of geographically dispersed firms.
The second part investigates the effect of labor market supply and demand forces on wage
inequalities and it uses the comparison with another developed economy, the US one, which is
likely to experience similar market forces. And, since education level is a strong determinant of
individual labor market achievement, it focuses on labor market inequalities by education level.
In the US, main explanations for the rise in wage inequalities between education levels since
the 1980’s relates to trade or technology. Since France experienced also both an increasing
openness to global trade and a dissemination of Information and Communication technology,
we expect to find similarities with the US trends if these explanations are relevant.
In order to understand dynamics of wage inequalities by education level over time and space,
the third chapter analyzes labor supply and demand by education level at the national level and
at the level of local labor markets. It presents new stylized facts for France and compares them
to the US.
The fourth chapter investigates one market factor, Skill-Biased Technical Change, that could
explain the observed dynamics. More precisely, it tests the assumption that Information and
Communication Technology leads to a computerization, which favored high-skilled workers,
using differences between local labor markets. Predictions of a model of Autor and Dorn (2013)
are tested on the French case. They model spatial equilibrums of local labor markets focusing
on high-skilled and low-skilled workers and the task content of jobs. In their framework, high-
skilled workers perform abstract tasks and are mobile between markets. Low-skilled workers
performed routine and manual tasks and are not mobile. The production of the good requires
abstract and routine tasks and they are complementary in the production function. The produc-
tion of services requires only manual tasks and has to be consumed locally. ICT is modeled as
a fall in the price of computers that can performed routine tasks. Hence ICT is complementary
to high-skilled abstract jobs and substitute to low-skilled routine jobs. Within this framework, a
fall in computer price has different impacts on local labor markets according to the local impor-
tance of routine tasks before the development of ICT and this gives testable predictions on the
local dynamics of job contents. This model focuses mainly on the “information” part of ICT
and its impact on job contents but the “communication” part can have an effect on labor market
equilibria and, in particular, on spatial equilibria. Indeed, in the second chapter, we analyze the
effect of a decrease in communication costs related to workers travel time but a similar reason-
ing holds with a decrease in communication costs induced by ICT, i.e it may lead to a functional
specialization of local labor markets. The fourth chapter therefore also investigates the effect of
this channel on local labor markets dynamics of job contents.
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Methods
Methods used in the first part are related to the Difference-in-Difference method. The idea
is basically to compare a group impacted by the policy, the treated group, to a non impacted
group, the control group. By assuming that the treated group would have evolved like the con-
trol group if the program had not been implemented, one can evaluate the effect of the program
on the treated group. For the enterprise zones program, the residents of the treated zones are
compared to residents of other priority zones that did not benefit from the program but were
very similar. For High Speed Rail line opening, we focus on the effect of rail travel time on
the spatial organization of the workforce within groups. More precisely, we study the impact of
travel time to the headquarters on remote affiliates. Our treated group are the affiliates for which
rail travel time to their headquarters decreased with HSR line openings between 1993 and 2011.
Our control group are affiliates of the same local labor market for which this travel time did not
change. It is a variation of the standard DD approach as we control for affiliate fixed effects
and local fixed effects interacted with time to control for local demand shocks. These methods
allow us to infer a causal effects of the studied policies.
The empirical approaches of the second part are quite different. Relationships between eco-
nomic outcomes are derived from theoretical models and then tested empirically. First an ag-
gregate labor supply and demand model by education level is estimated at the national level.
Using estimations of the supply and wages of high-educated workers relatively to low-educated
workers on the period 1967-2009, we infer trends of the demand for high-educated workers
relatively to low-educated workers. Then, using a theoretical model of local labor markets, we
also estimate the spatial dynamics of the demand for high-educated workers relatively to low-
educated workers. In the last chapter, we test predictions of a theory that models the effect of
computerization on spatial inequalities between high- and low-educated workers.
Results
From the empirical studies performed in this work, we can draw a few conclusions. The first
chapter gives an empirical evaluation of the French enterprise zone program. Enterprise zones
are a very popular tool in developed and developing countries but there is no consensus on their
efficiency. No clear conclusion can be drawn from existing studies. This is mainly due to the
fact that their effects are very complex and that the numerous existing programs have different
features. Empirical evaluation is therefore needed. In France, there has been one program since
1997. Previous research shows that firms created jobs as a response to the program but there
are almost no studies on the effect for residents. In particular, there is no result on the effect on
the social composition of the zone that might change if residents move in or out of the zones in
response to the program. We perform an analysis on the 1993-2007 period and show that there
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has been a significant effect of the EZ program on local unemployment. It first benefited local
residents but, with the strengthening of the local hiring condition, the social composition of the
zones changed : the share of residents with a high level of education increased. It hints that
workers were not very mobile in the short run, but that adjustments took place in the long run.
It also shows that spatial mismatch is not the only issue to explain the deprived situation of the
residents since bringing jobs closer was not enough to improve their situation. The first chapter
shows therefore that EZ programs can have an effect in the short run for residents but that, in
the long run, a new spatial equilibrium arises as workers move. So EZ programs reduce spatial
inequalities but in part through a displacement of workers and therefore they might not increase
global welfare.
The second chapter gives an estimation of the impact of rail travel time on firm management
and spatial organization. High Speed Rail infrastructure is very costly and there are almost no
empirical evaluation of its effect. With the increase of budgetary constraints, its utility is much
debated. The results show a decrease of the share of managers and an increase of production
occupations in affiliates which are related faster to their headquarters. There is also evidence
of an increase of the share of managers of the group in the headquarters, when average travel
time to affiliates decreases. This therefore shows that decreasing travel cost between local labor
markets leads to a centralization of high-skilled and support functions in central cities. This
might be an unexpected outcome for periphery cities which are often expecting positive returns
from HSR line openings. But this study is investigating only one specific aspect of the potential
effects of HSR and periphery cities might benefit form HSR lines through other channels.
The third chapter documents a decrease in wage inequalities by education level in France
between 1967 and 2009. It shows also, that, similarly to the US, a shift of the labor demand
towards high-educated workers occurred on that period but, that it was hidden by an important
increase in the supply of educated workers. As trends of the demand are similar between France
and the US, market factors common to both economies rather than institutional factors are likely
to be the cause of this shift. Moreover, the level of education is stabilizing and it is therefore
possible that wage inequalities by education increase in France in the future as they already do
in the US. This chapter also shows that, since at least the 1980’s, high-educated workers con-
centrated in local labor markets where their share in the workforce was already higher. And it
also shows that it is partly due to an increase in the demand for high-educated workers relatively
to low-educated in these local labor markets. For this reason, wage inequalities between educa-
tion groups decreased less in these markets. Because wage inequalities were lower there at the
beginning of the studied period, it leads to a spatial convergence of the local wage inequalities
by education up to now. However, should trends remain the same, a spatial divergence could
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occur similarly to the US. Future trends depends on how labor supply and demand by education
evolve. For supply, it depends mostly on individual education choices, on national and local
policies and on internal and external migrations. Future trends of labor demand are difficult to
predict but understanding its actual determinants or the ones of similar economies is helpful.
The fourth chapter shows that Information and Communication Technology had an impact
on the demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers. The assumption that
computer increases the demand for workers performing abstracts tasks and decreases the de-
mand for workers performing routine tasks is verified. It also shows that low-skilled workers
switch from jobs with routine tasks to in-person service jobs but also to unemployment, in par-
ticular low-skilled workers that were performing routine tasks of support such as clerical work.
This might be due to the fact that the demand for in-person service jobs did not increase in
the major agglomerations where clerical jobs disappeared, but in rural and touristic areas. This
chapter also shows very different patterns for production and support occupations, which are
consistent with the functional specialization tested with a very different approach in the second
chapter.
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Part I
Determinants of the location of jobs and
workers within and between local labor
markets : evidence from two French
public policies
9

Chapter 1
Do enterprise zones help residents ?
Evidence from France
11
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Introduction
Enterprise zone programs (hereafter EZ) were launched in the 1970s in the UK as a remedy
for deprived urban neighborhoods. Numerous programs have been implemented subsequently:
in the US since the 1980s and in France since the 1990s. They are based on more or less gener-
ous tax exemptions granted to firms located in chosen areas. They generally target labor and/or
capital expenditures. EZ programs are still quite popular (report on enterprise zones, 2013),
in particular among local politics, but they are costly and the urban problems they were meant
to solve are still pervasive decades later. In France for instance, in August 2012, outbreaks
of violence occurred in poor urban neighborhoods. More generally, the unemployment rate is
still much higher in these zones (24% in 2010 against 9.5% for the whole country, ONZUS
(2011)). An evaluation of these programs is therefore important from a public policy point of
view. But Neumark and Simpson (2014), Lynch and Zax (2011) and Ham et al. (2011) reviewed
the evidence on EZ, and found it difficult to arrive at a general statement about their efficiency,
although studies are quite numerous. EZ can in fact be evaluated on various dimensions as
they affect equilibria on both the labor and housing markets. Labor market outcomes from the
firm or the worker point of view, land prices and displacement effects are therefore all relevant
outcomes. For the French case, there are substantial evidence on firm outcomes and mixed ev-
idence on land prices. This paper provides new results on the effect of French EZ on the labor
market outcomes of those who reside in these zones. And it also provides results on displace-
ment and social composition effects that have not been much studied (some exceptions on US
enterprise zones are Freedman (2013) and Reynolds and Rohlin (2015)) but are quite crucial for
understanding the mechanism of EZ.
As pointed out by Neumark and Simpson (2014), EZ are specific among place-based policies
because their ultimate goal is to help people and not places. There is a redistributive aspect to
these programs since EZ are targeted at depressed areas (low income, high poverty rate, high
unemployment rate). The program implicitly assumes that bringing jobs closer to residents is a
solution to their deprived situation. The idea that too great a distance between jobs and residency
prevents some people from finding a job is known as the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Gobillon
et al. (2007)) and the purpose of EZ programs is to reduce spatial mismatch. But bringing jobs
into the zones might not be enough : the financial incentive may be enough to make firms move
into the area, but will they necessarily employ those living nearby? In particular, if the skills of
residents do not correspond to the needs of the firm? In other words, spatial mismatch might
not be the only reason for the difficulties experienced by the residents on the labor market; other
factors such as skills mismatch or discrimination could be responsible too. In that case and if
the cost of commuting to the zone is not too high, firms would keep on employing people from
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outside the zone. Briant et al. (2015) have indeed shown that the less isolated EZ attract more
firms : this is an important clue that the commuting possibilities may play a part in the success
of EZ. 1
To counteract this mechanism, some programs have a local hiring condition : exemptions are
granted only if a percentage of the workforce resides in the zone. The addition of this condition
is also an indirect indication that bringing firms into the zone is not enough, and thus that spatial
mismatch alone cannot account for the poor performance of residents on the labor market. The
presence of this condition may hinder firms from hiring outside the zone, but it may then raise
the incentives for workers with profiles different from those of the EZ to move into the EZ. In
fact, even without a local hiring condition, there is an incentive for workers who can potentially
work for the EZ firms to move into the zone, as they thus become cheaper hires for the EZ
firms. Gottlieb and Glaeser (2008) summarized this concern this way “place-based policies that
throw enough resources at a small community may indeed be able to improve the quality of
that place, but it is not obvious that the poorer residents of that community will benefit. Some
community-based policies may just lead employers to come to the area and hire new migrants.”
The next step in evaluation is therefore to try and find out whether workers did indeed change
their residency because of the program, or to put it differently, whether the social composition
of the zones changed.
Lastly, if there is an effect of EZ on the location of firms and/or residents, we would expect an
effect on land/real estate prices, as demand for space increases and its supply is quite inelastic.
Some papers even argue that in the long run all the subsidies will be taken into account in
land/real estate prices and will thus benefit land owners (Lynch and Zax, 2011, Gottlieb and
Glaeser, 2008, Kline and Moretti, 2014). So, when examining the impact of EZ on targeted
zones, general equilibrium effects should be taken into account, in particular, in the long run.
Another issue, related to general equilibrium effects across space, is the possibility of positive
or negative externalities on adjacent zones. The gains of the treated zones might be obtained at
the expense of their neighbors.
The French enterprise zone program was implemented in 1997, then renewed and extended
in 2004 and 2006. It grants very large tax exemptions to firms located in the enterprise zones
and it has a local hiring condition : the payroll exemptions are granted only if at least 20% of
the workers are residents of the enterprise zone, 33% after 2002. Most econometric evalua-
tions of French EZ used establishment level data and are thus concentrated on firm outcomes.
Rathelot and Sillard (2008), Givord et al. (2013), Mayer et al. (2013), Trevien et al. (2012) and
Briant et al. (2015) all studied business creations and/or firm employment located in the zones.
1The firms might also be motivated by the ease of reaching suppliers or customers.
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They found a small positive effect of the EZ on these outcomes for the 2004 program, and a
stronger effect for the one of 1997 (about 50 000 jobs after 5 years for 38 zones, (Trevien et al.,
2012)). Gobillon et al. (2012) partly address the issue of the impact on residents by studying
the unemployment exit rate of the EZ residents, controlling by their characteristics. But they
provided results for the Paris region, and at a broader spatial level than the zone itself (since
they observed only municipalities containing an EZ). Although they studied the 1997 EZ for
which the effect on firms was quite strong, the effect they found is both small and temporary
(10 jobs per semester per zone). Because of the local hiring condition, these results may appear
contradictory. This analysis complements and reconciles these results by showing that, while
there was a significant effect on the employment of residents, it was to some extent driven by an
effect on the social composition of the zones. We therefore both extend the results of Gobillon
et al. (2012) to the whole territory and provide new evidence on EZ effects on social composi-
tion of the targeted areas. The analysis shows that the program impacted not only the location
of firms but also the location of the residences of the workers and thus the social composition
of the EZ.
More precisely, the unemployment rate of residents of 1997 French EZ has significantly
decreased thanks to the program, and this effect strengthened when the local hiring condition
tightened. This hints that the higher unemployment rate in the EZ is probably caused more by
skills mismatch or discrimination than by spatial mismatch. Second, a significant part of the
effect was driven by composition effect, i. e. the unemployment rate of the residents decreased
because of an increase in the share of high-educated residents in the zones.
Section 1 presents the French enterprise zone program ; section 2 the evaluation strategy.
Results are presented in section 3. In section 4, some robustness checks are performed. Section
5 concludes.
1.1 The French program of enterprise zones
This section presents the design of the French EZ program and the characteristics of the
targeted zones before the start of the program.
1.1.1 The design of the program
The ”Pacte de Relance pour la ville” (Urban Stimulus Package) was enacted in 1996 (ef-
fective in 1997). It created 3 types of priority zones, roughly nested. First 751 ZUS (Zones
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d’Urbanisation Sensibles, sensitive urban zones) were defined. The choice was inspired by
previous urban programs and by qualitative criteria such as ”derelict housing stock” and ”un-
balance between residential and working zones.” Second, among these ZUS, 416 ZRU (Zones
de Redynamisation Urbaine, urban redynamisation zones) were then defined, and, third, from
that set 442 ZFU (Zones Franches Urbaines, urban enterprise zones, hereafter designated as
ZFU 1G) which were the most disadvantaged according to a synthetic index of deprivation.
This index was computed using the unemployment rate, the proportion of residents under 25
years old, the proportion of residents without a diploma of the zones and tax potential of the
hosting municipality.3. The ZFU program was renewed and extended to 41 new zones in 2003
(effective in January 2004, hereafter designated as ZFU 2G) and 15 in 2006 (effective in 2006,
hereafter designated as ZFU 3G) thus creating a second and third generation of ZFU. There are
thus today 100 ZFU. The map in figure 1.1 shows that the 3 generations of ZFU are located all
over the French territory in major urban areas and that an important share is located in the Paris
region.
The ZFU are the French equivalent of US and UK enterprise zones. Firms located in the
ZFU can benefit from large tax exemptions (corporate income tax, local business tax, payroll
tax) for 5 years. The payroll tax-exemption is fully granted to the portion of wage below 1.4
times the minimum wage and partially up to 2 times the minimum wage. These exemptions are
granted to firms with less than 50 employees, and to new firms as well as to firms already in
the zone before designation. As a comparison, firms in the ZRU benefit from exemptions for
only one year and only when they are new incomers. The ZRU are thus very lightly treated in
comparison to the ZFU (see figure 1.18 for a detailed comparison). There are no systematic
exemptions for the ZUS.
In 2002, apart from the creation of new ZFU, the program was also renewed for the existing
ZFU, and a progressive exit from the program was implemented : instead of a total halt of the
exemptions after 5 years, a degressive rate is applied to the exemptions over the following 3 to
9 years. A firm can thus be treated for up to 14 years.
Another key feature of the program is the fact that payroll tax exemptions are made condi-
tional on local hiring : a proportion of at least 20% of employees must be living in the zone for
the firm to benefit from payroll tax exemptions. The level of local residency needed to meet this
condition was extended to 33% in 2002 and 50% in 2012. In 2002, it was also extended to all
238 without French overseas territories
3The tax potential is defined as a theoretical product of local taxes in case the average national rate were applied
to the municipality for each of the local rates.
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Figure 1.1: Map of French enterprise zones
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residents of the ZUS who are located within the same urban unit4 as the ZFU. The residents of
a ZUS (or ZRU) who are in the same urban unit as a ZFU can therefore be directly impacted by
the program since 2002. Lastly the only jobs eligible for the payroll tax-exemption condition are
ones that employ workers on long-term contracts, a category that covers open-ended contracts
(CDI, ”contrat a` dure´e inde´termine´e”) and fixed-term contracts of more than 12 months.
1.1.2 Some descriptive statistics
In this part, we describe the 3 types of zone in 1990 before the start of the program and
compares them to the municipalities they belong too (hosting municipalities). We look into
some labor market characteristics and some characteristics used explicitly or implicitly in the
choice of the zones.
We compare in columns 1 and 2 of table 1.1 all the priority zones of the program to host-
ing municipalities. The unemployment rate in the priority zones is twice the one of hosting
municipalities. Residents are younger with an average age of 31 compared to 37 and a share
of residents under 25 of 47% against 41%. They are less graduated with a share of residents
without a degree of 57% compared to 50%.
”Derelict housing stock” is mentioned as a criteria in the designation of the zones. No direct
measure is available for the quality of housing but since these neighborhoods were famous for
large and old social housing, we compute the share of social housing. Indeed it is very important
and is an important feature of these zones. In the zones targeted by the program, more than 60%
of the population lives in social housing while it is only 15% in the hosting municipalities. We
can also measure the average number of persons per room living in a dwelling as a measure of
low housing quality and it is higher in the targeted zones than in the hosting municipalities.
The situation of young residents is often pointed out by media or politics as a factor for out-
break of violence in these neighborhoods. Indeed 15-25 year old residents of the priority zones
are less in studies or employment. Lastly, segregation issues are often linked to immigration
and integration issues in the public debate and these zones are indeed zones with a much higher
share of foreign residents with a nationality from outside the European Economic Community.5
Columns 3 and 4 of the table 1.1 present the same measures for ZRU and ZFU1G and they
are indeed the most deprived among the priority zones. ZFU1G are also much more populated,
4Urban units are defined by the INSEE (French national institute of statistics) as a municipality or a group of
municipalities forming a continuous built-up zone (no space of more than 200 meters between any two buildings)
and with at least 2000 inhabitants.
5In 1990, the members are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
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approximately 19 000 residents on average compared to roughly 7000 for the other zones, which
is due to the fact that having a population over 10 000 was a criteria to become a ZFU.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the different type of zones in 1990
Hosting
munici-
palities
ZUS ZRU ZFU1G
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average age 37 31 31 30
Share of under 25 year old 41% 47% 48% 50%
Share of men 45% 47% 47% 48%
Share of no diplomas 50% 57% 58% 60%
Unemployment rate 9% 18% 19% 20%
Unemployment rate of 15-25 year old 20% 28% 30% 31%
Share of 15-25 years old studying 54% 48% 48% 47%
Share of 15-25 years old not in employment nor studying 14% 20% 20% 21%
Share of foreigners from European Economic Community 2% 3% 3% 3%
Share of foreigners from outside EEC 4% 15% 15% 17%
Share of French by naturalization 3% 5% 5% 5%
Share of French by birth 84% 74% 75% 72%
Share of public housing 15% 63% 67% 68%
Number of persons per room of the dwelling 0.85 1.05 1.05 1.09
Average population size of a zone 6717 7221 19136
Source : 1990 Census
1990 European Economic Community definition is used : the members are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
1.2 Evaluation strategy
In this part, we review the economic theory related to EZ and describe the data and econo-
metric methodology used in order to evaluate the EZ program.
1.2.1 Theoretical background
The goal of EZ programs can be summarized as follows : reducing territorial inequalities
through an increase in economic activity and an improvement of the labor market situation of
residents of deprived neighborhoods. These programs can be viewed as a “territorial affirmative
action”, since they introduce a break in the equality of treatment between territories. In order
to evaluate them from a public policy point of view, it is therefore necessary to understand the
determinants of the inequalities between neighborhoods, the relevance to correct them from
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a welfare perspective and the efficiency of EZ program to achieve this goal. Determinants
of inequalities between neighborhoods can be divided into three main sources : exogenous
differences such as infrastructure or natural endowments, the effect of “space” or “distance” on
the labor and housing markets and social composition effects due to a sorting of residents or
firms. The three types of determinants seem relevant for the French case. First, there is a lack
of infrastructure in these deprived neighborhoods that could explain productivity differences.6
Gobillon and Selod (2007) found empirical evidence of the presence of spatial mismatch for
the Paris region, and descriptive statistics of the section 1.1.2 show that sorting by skills is also
an issue. Economic theory is a useful tool to understand mechanisms at play in EZ programs,
since they involve equilibria on the labor and housing markets. But, while there are numerous
empirical studies on enterprise zones, theoretical studies are much scarcer. The few theoretical
models that explicitly account for EZ programs and their impact on welfare (Busso et al. (2013),
Kline and Moretti (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2014)) deal mostly with the first source of the
territorial inequalities (exogenous local differences). Urban labor economics theory and the
spatial mismatch hypothesis shed light on the second one, while the sorting issue is not much
explored in relation with EZ, neither empirically nor theoretically. We present in this section
existing models or elements from theory as a guide to the following empirical evaluation.
Busso et al. (2013), Kline and Moretti (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2014) propose models
of urban labor markets, give some predictions on the effect of EZ programs and perform wel-
fare analyses. They all model an EZ program with a local hiring condition (as in the French
program). In these models, differences between neighborhoods are exogenous since they are
linked to some amenities.
More precisely, Kline and Moretti (2014) propose a standard spatial equilibrium model with-
out market imperfections which can be taken as a benchmark. Workers and land owners are
separate. Workers supply a unit of labor inelastically and they also rent inelastically a unit of
housing. They can choose their location of residence but commuting is not allowed and they
have heterogeneous preferences for some local amenities. Productivity of the production sector
depends on local amenities. In this framework, EZ exemptions increase the demand for workers
in the EZ and the new labor market equilibrium depends on how the supply of workers reacts.
The key parameters are therefore the mobility of workers (depending on the heterogeneity of
their taste for neighborhoods) and the elasticity of the housing supply (assumed to be exogenous
and depending on local characteristics). A result of Kline and Moretti (2014) analysis is that the
only case where there could be a welfare benefit is when workers are not mobile. In that case, no
jobs are created in the EZ and EZ credits translate into an increase in the EZ local wages since
6Note however that it could be considered as exogenous only in the short term.
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EZ labor demand increases and the labor supply is stable. In that case, since EZ exemptions are
funded by the whole economy, the program is equivalent to a redistributive policy from rich to
poor neighborhoods. On the contrary, if workers are sufficiently mobile and the housing supply
is not much elastic, EZ implementation leads to an increase in the number of workers and in
land rental rates in EZ neighborhoods and in a welfare loss as land owners ultimately benefit
from the program.
Busso et al. (2013) model is very similar (there are no market imperfections and differences
between zones are exogenous) but they allow workers to live and work in different places and
they introduce a commuting cost. Therefore workers can choose both their place of work and
residence. In this framework, results for the EZ and welfare analysis are quite similar to the
previous model but because of the commuting possibility the wages of workers living outside
the EZ and working in the EZ can also be impacted.
If these models, where there are no market imperfections and differences between zones are
linked to exogenous local amenities, are a good approximation of reality, we could empirically
observe an increase in population and in land prices if workers are mobile and an increase in
wages if they are not mobile. However it is not likely that there are no market imperfections
and, moreover, they are no unemployment in these models whereas EZ neighborhoods are often
chosen because of their high unemployment rate. Kline and Moretti (2013) propose another
model, close to Kline and Moretti (2014), but with some market imperfections under the form
of hiring costs that allow for unemployment. Note that differences between zones still derive
from differences in productivity due to local amenities. In this setting, hiring subsidies in zones
where productivity is low might increase their employment. In that case, EZ programs can be
seen as correcting market imperfections and might increase welfare, even with mobile workers.
In this type of models, there is an exogenous difference between the zones and EZ programs
try to correct it in an efficient way. But some specifically ”spatial” mechanism might also be
responsible for the spatial inequalities within cities. Urban labor economics dealing with job
search frictions within urban labor markets and specifically with the issue of spatial mismatch,
can also shed another light on EZ programs. Spatial mismatch can be viewed as a market im-
perfection but, contrary to the hiring cost in Kline and Moretti (2013), it is not uniform across
zones. Therefore no exogenous local differences are needed in this range of theoretical models
to obtain territorial inequalities at equilibrium. If EZ programs contribute to the reduction of
this “imperfection”, they may be able to increase welfare.
More precisely, urban labor markets theory models such as presented in Zenou (2009) assess
where employed and unemployed workers are located within cities at equilibrium. More com-
plex models also give results on wages. The central parameters in this literature are the elasticity
of housing supply, the commuting cost of workers, the relocation cost for workers (and firms)
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and the job search cost. There are in most models no specific differences between zones and
no heterogeneity between workers. The sorting of employed and unemployed workers arises
purely from the spatial equilibrium of the housing and labor markets. In this conceptual frame-
work, the fact that workers of segregated areas experience poor labor market situations because
of their distance to jobs is often related to the concept of spatial mismatch. Gobillon et al. (2012)
review in detail different mechanisms of spatial mismatch. Spatial mismatch can be related to
commuting cost and housing market discrimination. Some workers might be discriminated on
the housing market and if they live far from jobs and if commuting costs are too high, they re-
main unemployed. Another possible mechanism is that job search cost increases with distance,
producing some inefficiencies. On the firm side, employers might discriminate workers from
segregated areas because of prejudice or be reluctant to hire workers with long commute as it
may lower their productivity.
In this framework, EZ can be thought as a way to reduce spatial mismatch. Since, to our knowl-
edge, there is no theoretical model assessing the impact of EZ on spatial mismatch, it is difficult
to predict the general equilibrium and welfare effects but EZ should decrease spatial mismatch
and thus improve the EZ workers situation, maybe to the expense of other neighborhoods. As
in the previous models, EZ impacts probably depend on the mobility of workers and on the
elasticity of the housing supply. A major difference with the previous models is that differences
between zones are only the consequences of the distance to jobs and not of a lower productiv-
ity in the zone. The local hiring condition should, in principle, not be necessary to improve
the situation of the residents as it should be be more interesting for a firm to employ a local
resident rather that one that commutes. An exception might be when spatial mismatch is due
to discrimination against workers from segregated areas. In that case, a local hiring condition
might be necessary to overcome prejudice, at least in the short term. Many EZ programs have
a local hiring condition which means that policy-makers do not believe distance between jobs
and workers to be the only mechanism to explain the deprived situation of these neighborhoods.
Last, one major issue is the sorting of workers into neighborhoods. In previous models,
workers are homogeneous in skills but, in practice, workers from EZ neighborhoods are less
skilled and this might already explain an important part of the spatial differences. Indeed in
economic geography, sorting by skills explain an important part of spatial differences in wages
between labor markets (Combes et al. (2008)). Although equilibria are different within labor
markets because of the possibility to commute, sorting by skills could also be a major issue. The
effect of EZ in the case where differences is due to sorting by skills has not been modelized to
our knowledge. This might be due to the fact that in that case, EZ programs do not seem to be a
good instrument to correct inequalities between zones. It could be more efficient to improve the
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skills of local workers through education policies. Nonetheless in an empirical investigation,
this issue has to be taken into account.
From this selected review of EZ theoretical background, it appears that housing market out-
comes and displacement of workers are as much an issue as labor market outcomes when evalu-
ating EZ programs. To give elements on general equilibrium and welfare effects, the situation of
deprived neighborhoods should be analyzed in relation with the situation of neighboring areas;
the displacement of workers and firms and the housing prices should also be studied. Testing
the effect of the local hiring condition is also relevant as its effectiveness might give hints on the
underlying determinants of the deprived situation of the zones, especially regarding spatial mis-
match versus skill mismatch. Last evaluating short and long term effects seem highly relevant
as housing supply and mobility of workers effects are key and probably not immediate.
1.2.2 Data
As suggested by theory, we need to look at various dimensions to assess EZ programs. Previ-
ous studies on the French case have already shown that a significant number of jobs were created
by firms in the ZFU first generation (Trevien et al. (2012)) and second generation (Rathelot and
Sillard (2008)). The purpose of this evaluation is therefore to study the effects of the EZ pro-
gram on the residents of the zones. It is necessary to use data that includes information on the
location of the residences of the workers. The French Labor Force Survey is a survey conducted
at the main residence of households, and gathers fine geographical information (at the census
block level, finer than municipality). All household members aged 15 and over are interviewed.
The survey generates rotating panel data (dwellings are interviewed several times) and the sam-
ple is stratified and clustered. Areas of 40 dwellings (or 20 in cities of more than 100 000
inhabitants) are sampled, and all the dwellings in each area are surveyed.
From 1993 to 2002, surveys were annual and conducted in March. Each dwelling was in-
terrogated thrice. A third of the sample was renewed each year. The sample rate was 1/300
and there were thus approximately 75 000 dwellings per year. Since 2003, surveys have been
conducted every quarter. Each dwelling is interrogated 6 times and a sixth of the sample is
renewed each quarter. The sample rate has been raised to 1/600 and there are approximately
36 000 dwellings per quarter. Note that the unit of observations is the dwelling , hence when
people move in or out a dwelling, they also enter or exit the sample. The weights provided by
the producer (INSEE) are used for statistics and estimations.
This data set is of particular interest for this evaluation, as the geographical level is sufficiently
fine to identify the targeted zones, and it provides a great deal of information on the labor market
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situation of residents. The available geographical information allows to know if a dwelling is
located in a ZUS or in a one of the 3 generations of ZFU but the information about the ZRU
is available only in the data prior to 2002. A proxy for ZRU status is thus used which is the
fact of being a ZUS but not a ZFU and being located in a municipality containing a ZRU. Table
1.19 in appendix compares these ‘approximated ’ZRU and the actual ones in the 1990 Census
on various dimensions such as gender, age, share of people without diplomas, unemployment
and they are indeed almost identical.
Last, a comparison of the sample of ZUS and ZFU of the first generation (ZFU1G) in the
1999 LFS to the 1999 Census confirms that the LFS sample is representative along various
dimensions (see table 1.20 in appendix).
1.2.3 Outcomes of interest
Our first variable of interest is the EZ residents unemployment rate as this is a major labor
market outcome and reducing it is one of the main objectives of the program. In theoretical
models, when unemployment is not taken into account, effects for residents translate through
wages. In the empirical implementation, using wages raise selection issues as wages are ob-
served only for employed workers but we present nonetheless some evidence as a complement
to our main results on unemployment. We also present results on the share of long-term con-
tracts as exemptions are conditioned on them. Since theory states that if commuting is possible,
firms might employ residents from outside the zones, it is also useful to estimate the effect of
the program on the unemployment rate of both EZ residents and of non-residents within com-
muting distance of an EZ. For the latter, we use people living in a municipality hosting an EZ
but not in the EZ itself. This way, we can reasonably assume they can commute to the EZ.
In our empirical implementation, a major issue is to deal with the fact that workers are not
homogeneous as assumed by the existing theoretical model on EZ programs. A possibility is
to control for relevant observable characteristics. In that case, we are evaluating the effect of
the program controlling for composition effects. If the EZ program had no effect on the social
composition of the zones, it should not alter our estimates but mostly increase our precision.
But, if workers are sufficiently mobile, displacement is a major issue. Comparing results with
and without controls is therefore a first empirical way to assess the potential importance of
displacement effects. We use as control variables : gender, age, age squared, level of education,
nationality. For education, residents who finished their studies are split in 3 groups : low degrees
(up to junior high-school), medium degrees (low vocational and high-school degrees) and high
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degrees (college and university degrees). For nationality, the share of residents with a nationality
from outside the members of the European Economic Community is computed.7
In theoretical models, since workers are homogeneous, displacement effects translates into an
increase in population size and housing rental rates. Unfortunately, housing rental rates are not
available in our data set and the small size of our sample does not allow to estimate population
size level. And, in our case, workers are heterogeneous. We therefore anticipate that EZ might
not only attract more workers but also workers with different skills who might compete with
the “original” residents on the housing and labor markets. As they are not completely substitute
and do no occupy the same type of jobs, effects also depend on the type of jobs offered by
firms. Building a theoretical model taking into account the heterogeneity of skills is beyond
the scope of this paper but we can assess its empirical relevance. In addition to the comparison
of estimations with and without controls, we therefore directly estimate the effect of EZ on
the social composition of the zones. We use as outcomes of interest two major individual
determinants of labor market outcomes : education and age as a proxy for experience. This is a
second empirical way to assess the importance of the displacement of workers, a major concern
for EZ programs since it has welfare implications.
To further examine this question, we wish to distinguish, within the zone, the arriving, staying
and leaving residents. This information is not available, but thanks to the survey design, it
is possible to know if the residents were living in the same dwelling as the year before. A
new resident is therefore defined as someone who did not live in the same dwelling the year
before. This is only a proxy of what it would be useful to measure, as they might have arrived
from another dwelling in the same zone. However it is possible to know if they came from
another municipality; so they are split between the ones coming from within and from outside
the municipality. We can therefore study the share of new residents in the EZ and if their
observed characteristics changed because of the EZ programs.
Last, another way to shed light on the skill mismatch issue, is to look at the labor demand
side and study the qualification of the jobs occupied by residents. In the analysis, we separate
the occupations of residents working in the private sector into three groups based on the French
classification of occupations: high-skilled (executive jobs), medium-skilled (for example, mid-
level manager), low-skilled (employees and workers). Due to the number of observations, it is
the most detailed information we can use.
7More precisely, here the members of EEC in 1999 are used,except Finland that could not be isolated in the
data : Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom.
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1.2.4 Econometric strategy
The empirical strategy is based on a standard Difference-in-Difference method (hereafter
DD), implemented on the treated group (ZFU residents) and a control group that is described
in the next section. As the sample is clustered, it is very likely that errors for individuals of
the same area are correlated. To take into account the potential spatial correlations, data is
aggregated at the sampling area level as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). To deal with
the serial correlation problem due to the rotating panel pattern and take into account potential
heteroscedasticity, we can allow for a correlation between the errors of each sampling area and
compute a White style robust covariance matrix.8 In that case, the estimation of the variance of
the estimator does not require the number of observations of a sampling area to be the same.
Here, this is important as some sampling areas at the beginning and end of the period are
observed only once or twice (due to the sample design).
The model is then the following, with i indexing a sampling area, t the year (or year× quarter
after 2002), N the total number of sampling areas and IN the identity matrix. Y is the outcome
of interest (for instance the unemployment), ZFU is a dummy for being in a treated zone, γt is
a year (or year × quarter after 2002) fixed effect, λuu a urban unit fixed effect :
Yit = αZFUi + βZFUi ∗ 1t≥97 + γt + λuu + uit
with
V̂ ar(β̂) =
(
∑N
i=1 x̂i
′x̂i)−1(
∑N
i=1 x̂i
′ûi.ûi
′x̂i)(
∑N
i=1 x̂i
′x̂i)−1
N
The β coefficient in the linear regression gives the effect of the program under the hypoth-
esis that the difference between treated and control would have been constant over time in the
absence of treatment. The urban unit fixed effect allows to control for local specificities. Note
that in the case where there is only one type of zone (treated or control) in each urban unit, the
pre-treatment control ZFUi is redundant.
Regressions are estimated on the period 1993-2007.9 This means that the effect is estimated
8see Wooldridge (2009) for more details.
9Estimations on the period 1993-2011 have been performed and the results are similar. The 1993-2007 period
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up to 10 years out from the start of the program. The sample is restricted to the 15-65 year old
residents as the interest is mostly in labor market outcomes.
1.2.5 Choice of the control group
The validity of the estimation strategy strongly relies on the choice of a control group. This
section presents various possible choices.
Since the ZFU have been chosen from among the ZRU, which are very specific urban neigh-
borhoods, it makes sense to try to find a control group among the remaining ZRU, which are
more similar to them than other zones as seen in the descriptive statistics. The ZFU have been
chosen from among them as those most deprived by some social indicators (the synthetic index
mentioned earlier). By nature they were distinguished by a different level of deprivation, but
since all ZRU are zones of deprivation, we can also assume (and partly test) that their evolutions
were similar before designation and would have remained similar without the program. The es-
timated effect is thus the effect of becoming ZFU compared to ZRU. Only the first generation
of ZFU is evaluated here. There are too few observations of 3rd generation zones in the sample
and the placebo tests rejected control groups among the ZRU for the 2nd generation. There are
several ways to construct a control group from among the set of ZRU :
• First simply take all ZRU.
• ZRU which are too close geographically to the ZFU might be affected by the treatment.
A second approach excluding the ZRU that are in the same urban unit of a ZFU is thus
tested.
• Third, since there have been several waves of the program, the zones that became ZFU
later (in 2004 and/or 2006) could be used as a control group for the first generation. We
may assume that the ZFU of the subsequent generations will have common features with
those of the first generation. This is a standard strategy in the evaluation literature.
• Lastly, a very common approach in the literature is to use a propensity score matching
method : we estimate the probability of being treated according to some characteristics.
Each zone is assigned a score according to this model, and each treated zone is matched
to the non-treated zone with the closest score (closest neighbor method). We test this
is preferred as it excludes the 2008 crisis and also reduces the difference in number of years before and after
treatment.
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strategy using information about the zones from the census of 1990 (population size,
share of 15-25 year olds, unemployment rate, share of public housing) to find a match for
the ZFU1G among the ZRU that are not located in the same urban unit (see table 1.21).
In any case, observations of the ZRU which became ZFU later (2G or 3G) are excluded after
they turned into a ZFU (in 2004 and 2006). Moreover, because of the extension in 2002 of the
local hiring condition to all residents of the ZUS falling within the same urban unit as a ZFU,
the observations of ZRU in the same urban unit as a ZFU are excluded, but only after 2002 and
after the ZFU is created. As these cases are not too numerous, it is simpler and not too costly to
exclude them rather than keeping them and controlling for all these events.
We run placebo tests on the different control groups (see section 1.4.1) for various outcomes
and ZRU that are not in the same urban unit of a ZFU is the preferred control group. Although
our placebo tests show that treated and control group have similar trends before the treatment,
we still have to assume the trend would have remained similar without the program. It could be
argued that ZFU have been selected because of their expected reaction to treatment or because
of their expected economic trend. One limit of our strategy is that it does not control for this
potential dynamic selection. Since ZFU were chosen among ZRU with a synthetic index, in
principle, we could implement a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) estimation compar-
ing ZRU and the ZFU with close values of the index and argue that the fact to be just under or
above the threshold is exogenous. This could allow to get rid of the dynamic selection issue.
Unfortunately, the rule was not strictly applied and no clear information is available on other
considerations that might have entered in the process of ZFU designation. A fuzzy RDD strat-
egy might be possible but we do not have enough observations to implement this strategy. We
therefore prefer to rely on a DD strategy rather than a RDD strategy to estimate the effects of
the French ZFU program and assume that the trends of the control and treated groups would
have remained parallel if the program had not been implemented.
Our main outcomes of interest are computed for ZFU but we are also interested by the ZFU
effect on neighboring areas. Hence, we also apply the DD strategy to the zones belonging to the
municipality of a ZFU and we therefore need to choose a control group for them. We propose
to use the zones belonging to a municipality of the ZFU control group. We run placebo tests to
confirm the validity of this strategy.10
10Results are not presented but available upon request.
28
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Results on EZ unemployment rate and wages
This section presents the estimations of the effect of the program on residents’ unemployment
and wages and compares the result to previous studies.
The DD estimation shows a significant reduction – 11 percentage points – of unemployment
in the ZFU1G (column 1 in table 1.2) when its level is roughly 30% just before the start of the
program. As the only previous study (Gobillon et al., 2012) evaluating the effect on residents
focused exclusively on the Paris region and found a small significant effect, a regression is
estimated without the Paris region to check if this region is driving the results. The effect is
very close – 9.5 percentage points (column 3 in table 1.2) – and still significant, so results are
not driven only by the Paris region.
The effect of the program is also significant with control variables but smaller (column 2 and
4 in table 1.2). Although the coefficients are not significantly different (but it may be due to
a lack of power in the estimations), this hints that some composition effects might be at play.
This is investigated further in the next section.
Table 1.2: DD estimations for unemployment
Unemployment rate
(a) All areas (b) Without Paris region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZFU1G × post97 −0.110∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.059∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.095∗∗∗
(0.031)
−0.057∗∗
(0.025)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2669 2669 2481 2481
R2 0.312 0.462 0.319 0.455
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
The theoretical models presented previously give results either in term of unemployment or
wages. For wages, note that there is a selection issue here. If the new jobs due to the program
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have lower wages, the effect on wages will be negative although the wages of jobs not due to
the program might have increased. So the results must not be interpreted at an individual level
but as a description of the jobs occupied by residents. We use the log hourly wage in the private
sector and perform the same estimation than previously : there is an effect of the program on
wages (column (1) in table 1.3) but only slightly significant and it is not significant anymore
when excluding the Paris region (column (3)) or when adding control variables (columns (2)
and (4)). Results on the effect of the ZFU program on wages are for now not very conclusive.
Table 1.3: DD estimations for wages
Log of private sector hourly wage
(a) All areas (b) Without Paris region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZFU1G × post97 0.128∗
(0.067)
0.040
(0.039)
0.106
(0.072)
0.033
(0.043)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1270 1270 1186 1186
R2 0.41 0.625 0.42 0.622
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
According to theory, EZ has an affect on unemployment or wages if workers are not fully
mobile and/or if housing supply is quite inelastic. From the first results, we can conclude that
this is the case for the French EZ. It is quite plausible as there is a lot of social housing in
these areas which could explain both a low elasticity of housing supply and that workers are
not mobile. Indeed, since it is very difficult to get social housing in France, residents have
strong incentives not to move once they got one. Nonetheless, since the effect decreases when
some controls are added, some composition effects might have occurred, which implies some
mobility. Since, in the long run, mobility might be higher and housing supply more elastic and
since we estimate the effect of the program over a 10-year period, we next estimate whether
there is a time trend in the effect.
For unemployment, there is no significant time trend in the effect of the EZ program , whereas
for wages, a significant upward trend is estimated (table 1.4). Once more, as there is a selection
issue, results on wages have to be taken cautiously but, for now, this would mean that the effect
of program on the unemployment probability was stable during all the program whereas the
effect on wages was progressive. It suggests that workers are not very mobile and that first local
unemployed people are hired and then, as the labor demand keeps increasing and there is no
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Table 1.4: DD estimations for unemployment and wage, test of a time trend for the effect
Unemployment rate Log of private sector hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.085∗∗
(0.043)
−0.069∗∗
(0.035)
0.018
(0.086)
−0.048
(0.049)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.004
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
0.019∗
(0.011)
0.017∗∗
(0.007)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2669 2669 1270 1270
R2 0.312 0.462 0.415 0.628
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
more “employable” workers, local wages increase. This means that EZ effect translates into
wages when the labor supply is not elastic and is therefore consistent with Briant et al. (2015)
who found that firms created more jobs in spatially integrated EZ neighborhoods whereas the
impact of the program on local wages was only visible in the more isolated ones.
Local hiring condition
The first results seem consistent with a rather low mobility of workers. As stated previously,
this low mobility might be related to the housing market. Residents might be “trapped” in
these neighborhoods because of housing market equilibria. This is one of the mechanism of the
spatial mismatch hypothesis. In that case, the local hiring condition should not be necessary. If
the deprived situation of the residents on the labor market is due to distance to jobs, bringing
jobs closer to them should be enough to improve their situation. Therefore testing the effect
of the local hiring condition is a way to assess the importance of spatial mismatch in these
neighborhoods. A first way to do it is to use the change in the percentage of local hiring
required over the period of study and a second way is to study jobs with long term contracts as
it is also part of the requirement.
The local hiring condition was tightened in 2001 (effective in 2002) : it was raised from
20% to 33% and was extended to workers residing in all ZUS that were part of the same urban
unit as a ZFU. Column 1 in table 1.5 reproduces the previous estimations adding a dummy
for an additional specific effect after 2002. The effect on the unemployment rate is indeed
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Table 1.5: DD estimations for unemployment and wages, test of a local hiring condition effect
Unemployment rate Log of private sector hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.055∗∗
(0.028)
−0.052∗∗
(0.022)
−0.020
(0.072)
−0.024
(0.041)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.076∗∗
(0.030)
−0.011
(0.024)
0.206∗∗∗
(0.071)
0.104∗∗
(0.043)
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2669 2669 1270 1270
R2 0.314 0.462 0.416 0.627
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
stronger by 7.6 point of percentage since 2002. So the tightening of the local hiring condition
does appear to have had an effect. What is also striking is that when adding control variables
(column 2 in the table 1.5), there is no significant effect of the local hiring condition anymore.
It means that the additional effect on unemployment induced by the tightening of the local
hiring condition was mostly due to composition effects.11 In other words, during the first years
of the program, “original” residents got more jobs but with the tightening of the local hiring
condition, some change in the social composition of the zones occurred and the further decrease
in unemployment was due to an improvement of the composition of the zones in characteristics
relevant for unemployment status rather than an increase in the probability of finding a job for
the residents that would have lived there in the absence of the program.
For wages, when taking into account the tightening of the local hiring condition, a significant
positive effect of the program after 2002, with and without controls (20% and 10% respectively),
appears.Note that there is an initial negative effect on wages, which, although not significant,
might be due to some selection effect. At the start of the program, the selection effect may be
stronger with lower-wage jobs created and occupied by residents but after 2002, higher-wage
jobs are occupied by residents.
One of the requirements of the local hiring condition pertains to the type of labor contract.
Hence another way to test the effect of the program is to study its effect on jobs with a long term
11Note that 2002 is also the start of the progressive exit of the program of the firms that were present or created
in 1997, so this effect might be interpreted cautiously.
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Table 1.6: DD estimations for long term contracts
Share among 26-65 years old of private sector workers with long term contracts
ZFU1G × post97 0.060∗∗
(0.027)
0.059∗∗
(0.025)
0.033
(0.024)
0.042∗
(0.022)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.037
(0.028)
0.023
(0.026)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.257 0.374 0.258 0.374
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
Long term contracts : undetermined duration (CDI) or at least than 12 months. Short term contracts : duration inferior to 12 months.
contract. There is indeed a significant positive effect of 6% of the program on private sector
long term contracts share among the 26-65 year old residents (see table in figure 1.6).
When studying the effect of the tightening of the local hiring condition in 2002, estimations
on long term contracts lack power but using controls, the effects are stronger and significant be-
fore 2002 which seems consistent with the idea that the program had an effect for the “original”
residents mostly in the first years.
These set of results show that the local hiring condition has had an effect which means that,
without it, resident might have got less jobs or with less favorable contracts and so that spatial
mismatch was not the only cause of the high unemployment of these zones. Moreover, it also
shows that when the local hiring condition was strengthened, it did not benefit the “original”
residents so its efficiency to improve their situation was limited. Is it plausible that it could help
only the workers who were the most employable but it was not sufficient for workers with a
very low level of “employability”.
Sensitivity to the employment measure
The unemployment rate is one way to look at the effect of the program, but it depends on both
the number of jobs occupied by residents12 and their rate of participation in the labor force. So
we might want to look as well at the employment rate of residents. Moreover, for the 15-25
year olds the participation in the labor force is closely related to the completion of studies,
unemployment rate is not a good measure for this age group. A more relevant way to look at
12Note that it is not possible to determine whether the jobs are indeed located in the ZFU, but there is no reason
why job opportunities outside the zones would evolve differently between treated and control groups.
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this age interval is therefore to look at the share who is nor in employment nor studies. The
sample is therefore split at 25 years old and for the 26-65 year olds, we estimate the effect on
both the unemployment and employment rate.
Table 1.7: DD estimations for labor market outcomes : sensitivity analysis
26-65 year old unemployment rate
ZFU1G × post97 −0.109∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.069∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.054∗
(0.028)
−0.054∗∗
(0.023)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.077∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.022
(0.025)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2655 2655 2655 2655
R2 0.268 0.395 0.270 0.395
26-65 year old employment rate
ZFU1G × post97 0.108∗∗∗
(0.031)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.035
(0.025)
0.050∗∗
(0.021)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.046
(0.029)
0.038
(0.025)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.293 0.527 0.239 0.527
Share of 15-25 year olds not in employment nor studies
ZFU1G × post97 −0.055
(0.034)
−0.003
(0.021)
−0.020
(0.031)
−0.015
(0.022)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.051
(0.036)
0.019
(0.023)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2452 2452 2452 2452
R2 0.274 0.557 0.275 0.557
Share among 26-65 years old of private sector workers
ZFU1G × post97 0.069∗∗
(0.027)
0.063∗∗
(0.025)
0.035
(0.025)
0.045∗
(0.023)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.046
(0.029)
0.026
(0.026)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.238 0.378 0.239 0.379
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
The effect on the unemployment rate of the 26-65 year old residents is significant and of a
magnitude of approximately 11% without controls and 7% with controls (see table 1.7). The
result for their employment rate are similar. The results for the effect of the local hiring con-
dition on unemployment are also the same as for the 15-65 year olds. For the 15-25 year old
residents, there is no significant effect of the program. So it appears that the “youth” situation
on the labor market has not been improved by the program.
Moreover, another concern is this: at the same period some public jobs were massively cre-
ated for young people (“emplois jeunes”) and especially young people from these neighbor-
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hoods.13 The “emplois jeunes” program is the same across all ZFU and ZRU but it will be
reassuring that the effect of the EZ program examined in this paper is not driven by public jobs
of the 15-25 year olds. More generally, the program targets private sector firms, so it is interest-
ing to distinguish employment in the private versus the public sector, to check if the effect was
on private sector jobs. Although the program could have had an indirect effect on public jobs,
as the economic activity and the tax revenue of the municipalities increased. The effect of the
ZFU1G on the share of private sector workers among the 26-65 year olds is thus investigated to
assess a
direct” effect of the program. It is significant, around 6% (see table 1.7). It is lower than the
effect on the 26-65 year old employment rate although not significantly different. When using
control variables, estimations are much closer. So the effect of the program occurs mainly in
the private sector.
From these results, we conclude that our main results on resident’s employment are not too
sensitive to the chosen indicator : unemployment, employment or employment in the private
sector.
Magnitudes
Before assessing further the effects of the program, the size of the effect estimated here can
be compared to other results on the first generation of ZFU. First Trevien et al. (2012) estimated
that the program induced a creation of 41500 to 56900 jobs (estimates for the year 2001, 5 years
after the start of the program). According to an administrative report of 200214, there were 72
409 jobs in ZFU in December 2001 and among them 63 325 were exonerated. So it appears
that the majority of these jobs were due to the program.
But these jobs were not necessarily occupied by residents : only 25% of them were occupied
by residents (ratio available for 199915). If the ratio is assumed identical in 2001, this means
that there were roughly 16 000 jobs exonerated and occupied by residents of the ZFU. This is
an upper bound of the direct effect16 of the program for the residents, as there is no evaluation
of what portion of these jobs would have existed without the program.
13The “emplois jeunes” are specific jobs for people under 26 years old and a portion of the unemployed aged
26-30. They are created in the public or non-profit sectors and the remuneration is partially paid by the State. The
program was created in 1997 and ended in 2002. Only contracts already existing were maintained after 2002.
14a` la Ville (2002)
15a` la Ville (2002)
16This does not, however, take into account potential positive externalities : the program might also have in-
creased the number of non-exonerated jobs available to the residents through an increase in local economic activity
for instance.
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There are approximately 294 000 people in the labor force in the ZFU1G in the 1999 Census.
So the estimated 5.5 percentage points reduction in unemployment up to 2002 (which is the
most comparable to that estimation) corresponds to approximately 16 000 jobs : it is very close
to that upper bound.17. Note however that this estimation takes into account direct and indirect
effect of the program as it estimates the effect on the number of jobs occupied by residents,
exempted or not. It could thus in theory be higher than the upper bound of the direct effect.
Gobillon et al. (2012) found that the program created 10 jobs per semester per enterprise
zone in the Paris region, so 10×2 semesters×5 years×13 zones = 1 300 jobs for the Paris
region from 1997 to 2001. Applying their estimates to all enterprise zones proportionally to
labor force size, this leads to an estimation of roughly 5 000 jobs created in 2001 thanks to the
program and benefiting to the residents. Their estimation was made with control variables so it
can be compared to the estimated 5.2%, which corresponds to roughly 15 000 jobs.18 Therefore
it can be concluded that there is an effect on residents for the whole program, not just for the
Paris region, and that this effect seems of a larger magnitude than estimated by Gobillon et al.
(2012).
We also compute a cost per created job and compare it to other programs. In 2001, the
exemptions in ZFU amounted to 293 million euros (a` la Ville (2001)). In France since 1993,
several payroll tax exemptions for low wage jobs have been implemented. We therefore have to
take into account that, without the program, jobs could benefit from other exemptions. We can
very roughly estimate the net cost to be half of the gross cost (Benatsou (2009)). This gives an
estimated yearly net cost of 9 500 euros per job created. It can be compared to the estimation
of 31 000 euros per job created by Rathelot and Sillard (2007) for the 2004 ZFU. Bunel et al.
(2012) reviewed the various estimations of the gross cost per job created by the French payroll
tax exemptions that can be found in the literature and it varies between 10 000 euros and 50 000
euros (to be compared to our estimation of a 19 000 gross cost per job created). Our estimation
thus falls within this range. Note however that estimations can vary strongly according to the
way they are computed (as shown by the review of Bunel et al. (2012)) and our estimation is
merely indicative. Moreover this is far from being enough to perform a cost-benefit analysis
or a welfare analysis since, among other things, general equilibrium effects are not taken into
account.
17However this estimation is not very precise due to the small number of observations : the 95% confidence
interval is 120 to 32000 jobs
18The 95% confidence interval is 2 700 to 27 800 jobs.
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1.3.2 Displacement and composition effects
According to our results, the program decreased residents’ unemployment, thanks partly to
the local hiring condition. Now we investigate the changes in social composition that seem to
have occurred. In column 1 of table 1.8, the same DD regression is estimated but on the age
(as a proxy for experience) and the level of education of EZ residents which are two major de-
terminants of labor market outcomes such as unemployment or wage. It shows that since 2002,
EZ residents are a bit older and more educated than they would have been without the program,
so the program induced a change in the resident social composition of the zone and it happens
after 2002. This is consistent with the previous result that the decrease in unemployment after
2002 is due to composition effects.
New residents
In order to understand how this composition effect on age and education happened, we
present some estimations on new residents, split between the ones coming from within and
from outside the municipality. First, the proportion of new residents with either definition was
not much impacted by the program (table 1.22 in appendix).19 In a second step we examine
whether the characteristics of these new residents changed because of the program (columns 2,
3 and 4 of table 1.8).
There is no effect of the program on the age of new residents, so it seems that the aging of
the residents induced by the program is not linked to new residents. It may be that the people
leaving the zones are younger or that the ones staying are older. A possible story is that, before
the program, the residents, when getting older and achieving a more stable situation on the labor
market, tended to leave the zone but with the program and the local hiring condition they stayed
more.
Results for education level are different : the new residents coming from the same municipal-
ity before 2002 and new residents coming from outside the municipality after 2002 were indeed
more educated. So during the first 5 years of the program, people with a high degree living
relatively close to the neighborhood and who had better ex ante chances to be hired, decided
to move inside the zone. If they were living close by already, the move might not have been
too costly. With the tightening of the local hiring condition people with a high degree from
further away decided to move inside the zone. This means that when incentives to hire residents
increased, it did not increase the probability of getting a job of the residents but it attracted
19These results can be related to Freedman (2012) who found, for another type of place-based policies, an
increasing effect on residents’ turnover.
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Table 1.8: DD estimations of composition effects
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 0.733
(0.672)
0.435
(1.033)
−0.592
(1.650)
1.375
(1.101)
ZFU1G × post2002 1.862∗∗
(0.933)
−1.170
(1.147)
−1.459
(1.616)
−1.619
(1.479)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 1387 927 1080
R2 0.36 0.22 0.31 0.25
Share of 15-25 year olds
ZFU1G × post97 −0.007
(0.024)
−0.008
(0.056)
0.038
(0.093)
−0.042
(0.055)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.029
(0.028)
−0.015
(0.055)
−0.095
(0.087)
0.074
(0.064)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 1387 927 1080
R2 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.27
Share with a high-degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.007
(0.023)
0.051
(0.041)
0.010
(0.071)
0.070∗
(0.036)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.074∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.069
(0.053)
0.178∗∗
(0.084)
−0.001
(0.060)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.25
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.010
(0.025)
−0.029
(0.046)
−0.046
(0.076)
−0.018
(0.058)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.013
(0.030)
0.003
(0.049)
−0.010
(0.090)
0.016
(0.062)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.23
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.003
(0.035)
−0.022
(0.054)
0.035
(0.083)
−0.052
(0.060)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.086∗∗
(0.043)
−0.072
(0.062)
−0.168∗
(0.094)
−0.015
(0.073)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.37 0.26 0.30 0.30
Share living in social housing
ZFU1G × post97 −0.055
(0.091)
0.027
(0.101)
0.016
(0.126)
0.070
(0.097)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.196∗
(0.101)
−0.235∗∗
(0.109)
−0.247∗
(0.131)
−0.264∗∗
(0.120)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 1387 927 1080
R2 0.53 0.47 0.53 0.48
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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people with better education and they had more chance to be hired and maybe fitted better firm
requirements.
To sum up, the program in the first years seems to have achieved its goal to help the “original”
residents but in the long run and with the tightening of the local hiring condition, some social
composition effects occurred. Maybe firms that were the most likely to hire local residents were
the ones already present or the ones arrived during the first years but in the long term, ZFU1G
have hosted firms less interested in the skills available and attracted other workers with better
skills. Moreover, since workers do not adapt their residence choices at once, changes in social
composition of the zones were probably slow. Hence, in the short term there was an effect for
some of the “original” residents but in the long term a new equilibrium arose.
In the exiting theoretical models, there is only one housing market and therefore no social
housing market. But the share of social housing is very high and residents of social housing
may not be very mobile, we therefore estimate the effect of the program on the share of resi-
dents living in social housing (last row in table 1.8). There is a strong negative effect of 20%,
which means that a higher share of the residents live in dwellings of the private sector. This is
consistent with the idea that mobility is low in the social housing sector and that displacement
effects took place more through the private housing sector.
Job characteristics
In this section, we investigate the skill level of the jobs occupied by the residents, rather than
of the residents themselves, in order to assess if the program induced a change in the demand for
skills. If the job skill levels of employed people only are studied, there is potentially a selection
effect. If more jobs are created but with different skill levels, and at the same time the job
skill levels of those who would have been employed without the program change too, it is not
possible to disentangle these two effects and results would have to be interpreted relative to the
distribution of the job skill levels without the program. To avoid this, it is more straightforward
to present the share of a job with a certain skill level among all residents whether they have a
job or not. Moreover, we focus on the 26-65 year old residents as the program had no effect for
the 15-25 year olds.
Results in table 1.9 show that the additional jobs are medium- or high-skilled and this holds
with and without controls. For medium-skilled jobs, there is an additional effect of the local hir-
ing condition but which seems again related to some composition change as it is not anymore
significant when adding control variables. For high-skilled jobs, the effect occurs after 2002
and through composition effects. This confirms the idea that the demand for high-skilled jobs
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increases after 2002 and is met by attracting high-degree workers. Although this last feature
may not be directly linked to the local hiring condition but rather to a progressive adaptation of
workers and firms to the program since there is actually a significant time trend in the effect on
high-skilled jobs (table 1.23 in appendix).
Table 1.9: DD estimations for job characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.013∗
(0.007)
0.008
(0.007)
0.008
(0.006)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.028∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.006
(0.008)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.219 0.451 0.221 0.451
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.041∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.025∗∗
(0.010)
0.019∗
(0.011)
0.018∗
(0.010)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.031∗
(0.016)
0.010
(0.013)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.199 0.343 0.201 0.344
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.018
(0.027)
0.012
(0.023)
0.006
(0.024)
0.017
(0.021)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.034
(0.027)
−0.006
(0.024)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702 2702 2702
R2 0.267 0.389 0.267 0.389
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
High-skilled occupations correspond to number 3 in the French socio-economic ranking, for medium-skilled occupations, it is 4, for employees
5 and for workers 6.
Long term contracts : undetermined duration (CDI) or at least than 12 months. Short term contracts : duration inferior to 12 months.
Geographical externalities
As seen in the theory, if workers are mobile, EZ programs might have an effect outside the
program zone. Moreover, workers who can commute in the zone can be affected too. Geo-
graphical externalities are therefore an important issue. There could be for example negative
spillovers if unemployed residents of the ZFU were employed instead of neighbors living in
closer proximity. Then the number of jobs at the ZFU level would be higher but there would
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be a negative effect on the near neighbors. To evaluate this issue, column (1) and (2) of table
1.10 presents a DD estimation of the effect of the ZFU program on the neighbors of the zones.20
No significant effect on the unemployment rate of the neighbors is detected, whether we use or
not control variables. There thus might not be externalities on the neighbors or at least not of a
significant magnitude. Nonetheless estimations in column (3) and (4) of figure 1.10 show that
there was a decrease in the unemployment of EZ neighbors after 2002. This could be due to
the fact that their residents commute into the zone. Indeed if commuting cost is not too high,
workers who have strong preferences for their neighborhood, might still have benefited from
the ZFU program by commuting into the zone. This would be consistent with the results of
Briant et al. (2015) who show that the most accessible ZFU are the most successful in terms of
jobs creation.
Table 1.10: DD estimations for geographical spillovers
Unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors of a ZFU 1G × post1997 −0.013
(0.009)
−0.007
(0.007)
0.012
(0.009)
0.009
(0.007)
Neighbors of a ZFU 1G × post2002 −0.029∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.018∗∗
(0.007)
obs. (sampling areas×year) 18108 18108 18108 18108
R2 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.25
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
1.3.3 Heterogeneity of the effect by education level
A major concern of the program is also the low level of education in these zones and its effect
on the situation of the residents, particularly on the labor market. Indeed the level of education
of ZFU residents was used to compute the deprivation index. The effect of the program on the
unemployment rate of residents by degree level is therefore estimated in table 1.11. It allows to
assess if low-educated workers benefited more or less of the program than high-educated work-
ers and therefore give elements on redistributive aspects of the program. Results are stronger
for the residents with a low degree, with and without control variables. For the residents with a
20Neighbors are defined as those living in a municipality which contains a ZFU without actually living in the
ZFU. The control groups are the neighbors of the ZRU; a placebo test has been performed to verify that they are a
valid control group.
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high degree, results are weaker and not significant. So it seems that the program indeed bene-
fited to the residents with a low level of education. But regarding the effect of the local hiring
condition, an interesting pattern shows up : the effect before 2002 is mainly concentrated on
the unemployment of low-degree residents while the effect after 2002 is mainly for high-degree
residents (with and without controls). This means that firms hired first residents of the zone
with low education level but in a second time, residents with a higher level of education. This
adds up with the composition effects observed previously in this way : in the first 5 years, the
labor demand was directed more toward low-skilled jobs and thus no strong composition effects
occurred as the supply was sufficient in the zone but after 5 years and with the tightening of the
local hiring condition, the demand turned to higher skills leading to an increase of residents with
high degrees as there was probably not enough supply in the zone. This could have happened
by attracting new residents with high degrees or retaining them if they were previously leaving
the zone. It may also have been through an increase in the level of education of people in their
studies at that time who might have been encouraged to further their education in order to take
advantage of new opportunities. But as no effect is observed on the rate of 15-25 year olds
residents nor in employment or studies, the last channel does not seem to be important whereas
the first one, explored in the previous section, seems indeed to occur.
The effect on wages is also detailed by level of education in table 1.12. For low-degree
owners, there is also a significant effect only after 2002, with and without control variables. As
seen previously, the increase in employment for low-degree owners occurred at the start of the
program. One consistent story is that the program raised the demand for low-skilled workers
but, since their supply was quite high as many were unemployed, it first only had an effect
on their employment. After a while, as the more employable low-skilled workers found a job
and the demand kept on increasing because of the tightening of the local hiring condition, this
translated into an increase in their wages.
For medium-degree owners, there is also a significant effect on wages only after 2002 but
not significant when adding controls. Globally effects on medium-degree owners are similar to
low-degree owners but are more often not significant, so the programs seems to impact them
less strongly.
For high-degree owners, there is a significant negative effect on wages in the first 5 years.
This could be explained by selection issues. The jobs occupied by residents with a high-degree
due to the program were less paid than the jobs occupied by high degree owners without the
program. This might be due to the fact that it was not the same type of jobs and/or that it was
not the same type of high-degree owners. They may have unobserved characteristics that could
explained a lower wage. The positive effect on wages after 2002 is very high and significant.
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When estimating a time trend, it is also very significant, so the effect might be due to a pro-
gressive effect of the program rather than a direct effect of the local hiring condition. If the
additional high-degree residents due to the program had different unobserved characteristics or
different type of jobs, this may explained the positive effect on wages. It might be due to the
fact that the demand for high-skilled jobs increased in the long term in the zone and that it both
attracted and/or retained high-degree owners in the zone, decreased their unemployment rate
and increased their wages.
Table 1.11: DD estimations for labor market outcomes by education level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate high-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 −0.058
(0.052)
−0.052
(0.050)
0.056
(0.058)
0.034
(0.057)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.156∗∗∗
(0.052)
−0.119∗∗
(0.051)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1654 1654 1654 1654
R2 0.269 0.336 0.272 0.338
Unemployment rate of medium-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 −0.083∗∗
(0.036)
−0.049
(0.032)
−0.058
(0.038)
−0.048
(0.036)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.035
(0.040)
−0.002
(0.040)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2505 2505 2505 2505
R2 0.191 0.269 0.191 0.269
Unemployment rate of low-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 −0.114∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.075∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.071∗∗
(0.034)
−0.064∗∗
(0.029)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.061
(0.038)
−0.016
(0.033)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2536 2536 2536 2536
R2 0.299 0.390 0.299 0.390
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Table 1.12: DD estimations on wages by education level
Log of 26-65 year old private sector hourly wage of high-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 −0.022
(0.119)
−0.032
(0.121)
−0.187∗
(0.112)
−0.123
(0.109)
−0.354∗∗
(0.160)
−0.263∗
(0.148)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.240∗
(0.144)
0.132
(0.123)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.060∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.042∗∗
(0.021)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 590 590 590 590 590 590
R2 0.48 0.607 0.48 0.608 0.49 0.61
Log of 26-65 year old private sector hourly wage of medium-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 0.023
(0.059)
0.019
(0.051)
−0.035
(0.054)
−0.020
(0.047)
−0.012
(0.078)
0.012
(0.068)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.079∗
(0.044)
0.054
(0.040)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.006
(0.011)
0.001
(0.009)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1337 1337 1337 1337 1337 1337
R2 0.38 0.449 0.38 0.450 0.38 0.45
Log of 26-65 year old private sector hourly wage of low-degree owners
ZFU1G × post97 0.057
(0.047)
0.050
(0.046)
0.002
(0.040)
−0.007
(0.040)
0.043
(0.060)
0.045
(0.058)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.079∗
(0.040)
0.082∗∗
(0.038)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.002
(0.009)
0.001
(0.009)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1375 1375 1375 1375 1375 1375
R2 0.39 0.431 0.39 0.432 0.39 0.43
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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1.4 Sensitivity analysis
1.4.1 Placebo tests
The validity of the Difference-in-Difference strategy and the choice of the control group
are tested through placebo tests. The four potential control groups presented in the evaluation
strategy section are tested.
The idea of the placebo test is to verify that the treated and control groups are really similar
in trend before the treatment of 1997. The test can be performed only if several years of obser-
vation before the treatment are available, as it is necessary to measure not only the difference
between the two groups but also their time trends. The years 1993 to 1996 are used. A re-
gression is then estimated with a “fake” or placebo treatment in the years 1994, 1995 and 1996
while controlling for the 1993 initial difference in level of the outcome between the two groups.
Time and urban unit fixed effects are also included.
Tests can be run on various observable characteristics. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 show the results
of these placebo tests for some socio-demographic characteristics used in the choice of the ZFU
relatively to ZRU : age, education and the nationality of residents (the latter is not in the index
but immigration issues are often mentioned in relation to urban issues). Placebo tests are also
run for various labor market outcomes with and without control variables (tables 1.15 and 1.16)
as both specifications are next estimated.
In almost no case is the placebo treatment for any possible control groups significant which
means that the control and treated group do have similar trends on observable characteristics
before the start of the program. A few years for some variables are slightly significant but
without a pattern except for the share of people with a low degree when using the ZRU that will
be ZFU in the second and third generation as a control group. The identification strategy thus
appears valid, except for the future ZFU. They are thus not used as a control group. A criteria
to choose among valid control groups is the number of observations : we wish to retain enough
observations to have power in the estimations. For this reason, all the ZRU could have been
kept but the possibility for those belonging to the same urban unit of a ZFU of being impacted
by the program is too strong and they would contribute only before 2002 as after that date they
are excluded because of the modification of the hiring condition that impacts them. So, finally,
ZRU that are not in the same urban unit of a ZFU is the preferred control group.
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Table 1.13: Placebo estimations for the effect of ZFU1G on socio demographic characteristics
all ZRU ZRU future ZFU
2G/3G
matched ZRU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × 1994 0.300
(0.519)
0.072
(0.509)
−0.362
(0.881)
0.111
(0.913)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.484
(0.733)
0.033
(0.758)
0.020
(1.177)
0.878
(1.258)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.778
(0.939)
0.307
(0.959)
0.352
(1.657)
1.544
(1.753)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 558 390 197 177
Share of 15-25 year old residents
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.013
(0.024)
0.002
(0.024)
−0.003
(0.031)
0.002
(0.031)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.015
(0.036)
0.005
(0.036)
−0.027
(0.045)
−0.031
(0.044)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.008
(0.041)
0.008
(0.039)
−0.010
(0.052)
−0.012
(0.055)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 558 390 197 177
Share not from EEC
ZFU1G × 1994 0.004
(0.034)
0.003
(0.028)
−0.036
(0.039)
−0.033
(0.037)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.027
(0.061)
−0.017
(0.039)
−0.068
(0.049)
−0.074
(0.053)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.048
(0.069)
−0.041
(0.051)
−0.063
(0.071)
−0.077
(0.082)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 558 390 197 177
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-1996, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.14: Placebo estimations for the effect of ZFU1G on the share of education groups
all ZRU ZRU future ZFU
2G/3G
matched ZRU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share with high degree
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.001
(0.012)
0.007
(0.012)
0.054
(0.036)
0.007
(0.023)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.008
(0.021)
0.009
(0.022)
0.063
(0.043)
0.024
(0.036)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.005
(0.025)
0.012
(0.029)
0.060
(0.056)
0.003
(0.047)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 557 389 196 176
Share with medium degree
ZFU1G × 1994 0.015
(0.021)
0.001
(0.019)
0.022
(0.030)
0.014
(0.030)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.023
(0.033)
0.024
(0.028)
0.042
(0.044)
0.009
(0.052)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.060∗
(0.034)
0.057∗∗
(0.029)
0.045
(0.048)
0.017
(0.046)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 557 389 196 176
Share with low degree
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.014
(0.022)
−0.008
(0.021)
−0.076∗∗
(0.029)
−0.021
(0.033)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.031
(0.038)
−0.034
(0.033)
−0.105∗∗
(0.045)
−0.033
(0.056)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.064
(0.040)
−0.069∗
(0.037)
−0.105∗∗
(0.049)
−0.020
(0.055)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 557 389 196 176
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-1996, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.15: Placebo estimations for the effect of ZFU1G on labor market outcomes
all ZRU ZRU future ZFU
2G/3G
matched ZRU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.014
(0.028)
−0.020
(0.028)
−0.039
(0.038)
−0.067∗
(0.035)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.005
(0.044)
−0.009
(0.041)
−0.046
(0.046)
−0.071
(0.045)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.001
(0.052)
−0.009
(0.049)
−0.046
(0.055)
−0.067
(0.058)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 557 389 196 176
26-65 year old unemployment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.005
(1.000)
0.001
(1.000)
−0.045
(1.000)
−0.044
(1.000)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.007
(1.000)
0.015
(1.000)
−0.031
(1.000)
−0.036
(1.000)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.020
(1.000)
0.009
(1.000)
−0.034
(1.000)
−0.048
(1.000)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 556 388 195 175
26-65 year old employment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.002
(0.028)
−0.007
(0.028)
0.046
(0.036)
0.033
(0.034)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.026
(0.045)
−0.026
(0.040)
0.031
(0.051)
0.044
(0.048)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.055
(0.051)
−0.033
(0.046)
−0.002
(0.057)
−0.026
(0.058)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 558 390 197 177
Share of 15-25 year olds not in employment nor studies
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.048
(0.034)
−0.063∗
(0.035)
0.034
(0.045)
−0.062
(0.059)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.034
(0.046)
−0.070
(0.044)
−0.014
(0.049)
−0.063
(0.051)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.068
(0.048)
−0.074
(0.045)
−0.020
(0.064)
−0.060
(0.070)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 546 382 191 175
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-1996, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.16: Placebo estimations for the effect of ZFU1G on labor market outcomes with controls
all ZRU ZRU future ZFU
2G/3G
matched ZRU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
not in UU of
ZFU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.001
(0.025)
−0.009
(0.027)
0.002
(0.041)
−0.045
(0.032)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.027
(0.036)
0.012
(0.037)
0.006
(0.043)
−0.033
(0.044)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.042
(0.042)
0.027
(0.044)
0.017
(0.054)
−0.036
(0.051)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 557 389 196 176
26-65 year old unemployment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 0.012
(0.027)
0.017
(0.029)
−0.013
(0.044)
−0.032
(0.038)
ZFU1G × 1995 0.036
(0.036)
0.036
(0.037)
0.004
(0.044)
−0.013
(0.048)
ZFU1G × 1996 0.058
(0.044)
0.045
(0.046)
0.009
(0.056)
−0.026
(0.055)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 556 388 195 175
26-65 year old employment rate
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.013
(0.023)
−0.011
(0.023)
0.002
(0.039)
0.010
(0.034)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.047
(0.029)
−0.039
(0.027)
−0.024
(0.035)
0.000
(0.032)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.079∗∗
(0.034)
−0.057∗
(0.033)
−0.051
(0.046)
−0.024
(0.041)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 558 390 197 177
Share of 15-25 year olds not in employment nor studies
ZFU1G × 1994 −0.042
(0.027)
−0.056∗∗
(0.027)
0.041
(0.034)
−0.057
(0.053)
ZFU1G × 1995 −0.007
(0.041)
−0.032
(0.038)
0.029
(0.040)
−0.028
(0.059)
ZFU1G × 1996 −0.025
(0.041)
−0.023
(0.039)
0.048
(0.051)
−0.038
(0.066)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 546 382 191 175
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-1996, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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1.4.2 Robustness checks
A first set of robustness checks is performed using the two other possible control groups that
were not rejected by placebo tests. Table 1.17 shows the estimations of the main results when
using all ZRU as a control group rather than ZRU not in the same urban unit than a ZFU1G.21
Results are very similar although in a few cases, they do not reach the same level of significance.
Table 1.17 shows also the main estimations when using matched ZRU as a control group.22 The
main result on unemployment is lower although not significantly different. In general a lot of
significance is lost as the number of observations is divided by more than 2.
A second set of robustness checks is done using different period of study : 1993-2003 (before
the start of ZFU of second generation) and 1993-2011 (last year available); see table 1.17 and
appendix. Results are very similar except that estimations regarding the local hiring condition
are quite weak in the case where only 2 years are used (2002 and 2003).
Globally, results are quite robust to a change of the control group or of the period of study.
21The other estimations are available in appendix.
22The other estimations are available in appendix.
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Table 1.17: DD estimations for unemployment, robustness checks
Unemployment rate
Period of estimation : 1993-2003
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.089∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.066∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.052∗
(0.028)
−0.054∗∗
(0.023)
−0.028
(0.034)
−0.045
(0.028)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.061∗
(0.035)
−0.019
(0.029)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.014∗
(0.008)
−0.005
(0.007)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1520 1520 1520 1520 1520 1520
R2 0.409 0.574 0.411 0.575 0.411 0.575
Period of estimation : 1993-2011
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.102∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.051∗∗
(0.022)
−0.055∗
(0.028)
−0.047∗∗
(0.022)
−0.118∗∗∗
(0.041)
−0.062∗∗
(0.031)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.058∗∗
(0.027)
−0.006
(0.020)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.002
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4152 4152 4152 4152 4152 4152
R2 0.296 0.460 0.297 0.460 0.296 0.460
All ZRU as control group
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.090∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.041∗
(0.022)
−0.037
(0.027)
−0.036∗
(0.021)
−0.063
(0.040)
−0.051
(0.033)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.076∗∗
(0.030)
−0.007
(0.023)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.005
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3074 3074 3074 3074 3074 3074
R2 0.295 0.458 0.297 0.458 0.296 0.458
Matched ZRU as control group
ZFU1G × post1997 −0.058∗
(0.032)
−0.040
(0.028)
0.005
(0.036)
−0.002
(0.031)
−0.011
(0.056)
0.002
(0.055)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.088∗∗
(0.037)
−0.055
(0.036)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.009
(0.009)
−0.008
(0.010)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105
R2 0.338 0.474 0.341 0.475 0.339 0.475
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey. 1993-2003, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter shows that the ZFU program significantly decreased unemployment
among residents, by more than 11%. Since the starting level was about 30%, this brought the
ZFU unemployment rate close to the level of the control group, but unemployment remains
much higher than in the rest of the country. This benefit was due both to an improvement of the
situation of “original” residents of the zones and to social composition effects. So there is clear
evidence that the ZFU program was beneficial to the zones, even if it was probably not enough.
It is much less clear if the ZFU program was beneficial to the whole economy.
There is evidence that the program helped to attract or retain residents with high degrees,
which can be taken as evidence that workers are mobile. The theory (Kline and Moretti (2014)
states that, in that case, the EZ credits are capitalized in land prices. In the US, there is indeed
some evidence that EZ program led to an increase in land prices (Freedman (2012), Krupka and
Noonan (2009)). For France, Poulhes (2015) showed that there was an increase on commercial
property values, whereas Gregoir and Maury (2012) found a decrease in housing values on a
small subsample of ZFU. Further research is needed but it is plausible that indeed a part of
the ZFU program was capitalized into land prices. It is a welfare loss if land owners and ZFU
residents are separate, which is probably the case as the share of social housing is very high in
EZ. However, a change in social composition can be positive for the neighborhood if it leads,
for example, to positive peer effects and this is not taken into account in the existing theoretical
modeling of EZ.
The effect is not totally due to composition effects and the ZFU program seemed to have
improved the situation of some local residents. It could correspond to two cases of Kline and
Moretti (2014) welfare analysis. Either inequalities between zones were due to some market
imperfections such as the presence of hiring costs and then EZ is efficient and increases welfare.
Either there are differences in local productivity and workers are not fully mobile, then EZ is
only a redistributive tool and there is no total welfare gain.
Last, the local hiring condition seems to be effective, as the effect of the program was stronger
when the condition was made more rigorous, and there was a positive effect of the program on
long term contracts, which are the type of labor contracts stipulated in the condition. This hints
that the deprived situation of the EZ is not only due to spatial mismatch. As the tightening of
the hiring clause led to an increase in the share of high degree workers, it is plausible that the
adequation between the level of skills of EZ residents and job offers is a more serious issue.
From a public policy point of view, it might therefore be more efficient to attach benefits to
people rather than to places. The French government is in fact experimenting with a new policy
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of “emplois francs” (roughly, “free-range jobs”) in which hiring subsidies are linked to the
residents of deprived zones whatever the location of their workplace.
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Appendices
1.A Complementary results on data and methodology
Table 1.18: ZFU and ZRU exemptions in 1997
ZRU ZFU
Payroll tax 1 year exemption 5 years of exemption
- within a limit of 50
employees and 1.5 minimum
wage
- within a limit of 50
employees and 1.5 minimum
wage
- for long term contracts - local hiring condition from
the 3rd employee
- for long term contracts
- firms of less than 50
employees at their date of
creation
- some activities are
excluded
Individual social charges
(health system)
no 5 years of exemption
of artisans and tradespeople - within a limit of 1.5
minimum wage
Local business tax 5 years of exemption 5 years of exemption
- est. of less than 150
employees
- firms of less than 50
employees at their date of
creation
- within a limit determined
yearly (990 kF or roughly
151 kEuros in 2000 , half for
est. already existing)
- within a limit determined
yearly (2835 kF or roughly
432 kEuros in 2000)
- whatever the activity - some activities are
excluded
Profit tax 5 years of exemption 5 years of exemption
- restricted to new firms - for new firms and firms
existing the 01/01/1997
- degressive : 100% for year
1 and 2, 75 % for year 3, 50
% for year 4, 25 % for year 5
- within a limit since 2000 - within a limit of 400 000 F
or roughly 61 000 Euros for
the yearly profit
- no employees number
restriction
- no employees number
restriction
Tax on properties no 5 years of exemption
for business properties
Specific Paris region tax on
creation of offices
no exemption
Transfer rights for
acquisitions
exemptions up to 700 000 F exemptions up to 700 000 F
of businesses or roughly 107 000 Euros or roughly 107 000 Euros
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Table 1.19: Characteristics of ZRU and approximated ZRU in 1990
ZRU Approximated ZRU
Average age 31 31
Share of under 25 year old 48% 47%
Share of men 47% 47%
Share of no diplomas 58% 58%
Unemployment rate 19% 18%
Unemployment rate of 15-25 year old 30% 29%
Share of 15-25 years old studying 48% 48%
Share of 15-25 years old not in employment nor studying 20% 20%
Share of foreigners from EEC 3% 3%
Share of foreigners from outside EEC 15% 14%
Share of French by naturalization 5% 4%
Share of French by birth 75% 75%
Share of public housing 67% 64%
Number of persons per room of the dwelling 1.05 1.04
Average population size of a zone 7221 6612
Source : 1990 Census
1990 European Economic Community definition is used : the members are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
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Table 1.20: Characteristics of ZUS and ZFU1G in 1999 : comparison of LFS and Census
(a) ZUS
1999 Census 1999 LFS
Estimate Std. Err
Average age 36.3 36.9 0.3
Share of under 25 year old 27.3% 26.1% 0.9%
Share of men 48.5% 47.8% 0.6%
Share of no diplomas 43.7% 42.0% 1.3%
Unemployment rate 25.9% 24.8% 1.3%
Share of 15-25 years old studying 56.8% 58.9% 1.8%
Share of 15-25 years old not in employment nor studying 20.6% 21.4% 1.4%
Share of foreigners from European Economic Community 2.8% 2.4% 0.3%
Share of foreigners from outside EEC 15.2% 16.6% 1.6%
(b) ZFU1G
1999 Census 1999 LFS
Estimate Std. Err
Average age 35.8 35.8 0.7
Share of under 25 year old 29.2% 29.3% 2.6%
Share of men 48.6% 48.4% 1.5%
Share of no diplomas 48.0% 44.0% 3.1%
Unemployment rate 30.2% 28.0% 3.2%
Share of 15-25 years old studying 57.2% 54.5% 5.2%
Share of 15-25 years old not in employment nor studying 22.3% 27.0% 3.6%
Share of foreigners from European Economic Community 2.8% 2.3% 0.8%
Share of foreigners from outside EEC 19.6% 22.4% 3.5%
Source : 1999 Census and 1999 Labor Force Survey, 15-65 year old population
The variance of the LFS estimations is computed as explained in the econometric method section, taking into account the design of the survey
and potential serial and spatial correlation.
1999 European Economic Community (except Finland) definition is used : the members are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
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Table 1.21: Parameters of the matching equation :Probability of a ZRU of being a ZFU1G
Unemployment rate
Intercept −6.58∗∗∗
(1.19)
unemployment rate 1.29
(1.98)
share of 15-25 year old 5.85∗∗
(2.30)
size of population in thousands 0.11∗∗∗
(0.02)
share of not from EEC 0.70
(0.63)
share of no degree 0.55
(1.47)
Observations 550
Percent Concordant 92
Source : French Census 1990
Logistic model, *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%
The 1997 ZFU were chosen among the ZRU, partly according to an index computed with information from the 1990 Census (the unemployment
computed with information from the 1990 Census (the unemploymentrate, the proportion of residents under 25, the proportion of residents
without a diploma) and the average tax potential of the city (tax data). Using a logistic estimation (see figures1.21), a score is computed with
census information and the ZFU are matched with the closest ZRU not belonging to the same urban unit than a ZFU according to this score.
The unemployment rate in 1990, the share of 15-25 year olds and the share of no diploma are used, as in the index. The tax information is not
available. The size of the zone in terms of population is also added as the ZFU were supposed to have at least 10 000 residents and the share of
foreigners born outside the European economic community as these deprived neighboorhoods have a concentration of low-skilled immigrants.
1990 European Economic Community definition is used : the members are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
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1.B Complementary results : test of a trend in the effect of
the program
Table 1.22: DD estimations of the effect on the share of new residents
Share of new residents Share of new residents
from outside the
municipality
Share of new residents
from within the same
municipality
ZFU1G × post97 −0.012
(0.018)
0.000
(0.011)
−0.012
(0.012)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.005
(0.017)
−0.008
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 2713 2713
R2 0.19 0.14 0.16
year fixed effects yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes
Control variables no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.23: DD estimations for job characteristics with a trend
Share among 26-65 years old of private sector workers
ZFU1G × post97 0.058
(0.043)
0.074∗∗
(0.037)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.002
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702
R2 0.238 0.378
Share among 26-65 years old of private sector workers with long term contracts
ZFU1G × post97 0.051
(0.042)
0.068∗
(0.038)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.002
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702
R2 0.257 0.374
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.013
(0.016)
0.011
(0.013)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t 0.003
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702
R2 0.220 0.451
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.057∗∗
(0.023)
0.052∗∗∗
(0.019)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.003
(0.004)
−0.005
(0.003)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702
R2 0.200 0.346
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.010
(0.041)
0.016
(0.032)
ZFU1G × post97 ×t −0.001
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.005)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2702 2702
R2 0.267 0.389
year fixed effects yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes
Control variables no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Table 1.24: DD estimations of the effect on age and education with a trend
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 1.831
(1.296)
0.368
(1.271)
−0.473
(1.882)
1.833
(1.412)
ZFU1G × post97× t 0.039
(0.195)
−0.121
(0.210)
−0.193
(0.286)
−0.275
(0.248)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 1387 927 1080
R2 0.35 0.22 0.31 0.25
Share of 15-25 year old
ZFU1G × post97 −0.012
(0.037)
−0.007
(0.065)
0.087
(0.105)
−0.064
(0.066)
ZFU1G × post97× t −0.003
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.009)
−0.021
(0.015)
0.013
(0.011)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2713 1387 927 1080
R2 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.27
Share with a high degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.026
(0.040)
0.057
(0.051)
−0.010
(0.084)
0.070
(0.053)
ZFU1G × post97× t 0.006
(0.006)
0.007
(0.008)
0.025∗
(0.013)
0.000
(0.010)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.25
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.000
(0.042)
0.013
(0.056)
−0.038
(0.094)
0.061
(0.068)
ZFU1G × post97× t 0.000
(0.006)
−0.008
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.015)
−0.014
(0.011)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.23
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.026
(0.063)
−0.070
(0.065)
0.048
(0.098)
−0.131∗
(0.070)
ZFU1G × post97× t −0.006
(0.008)
0.001
(0.010)
−0.022
(0.016)
0.014
(0.011)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 2711 1342 846 1052
R2 0.37 0.26 0.30 0.30
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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1.C Complementary results for robustness checks
Table 1.25: DD estimations of the effect on age and education, 1993-2003
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 0.549
(0.714)
0.435
(1.033)
−0.310
(1.525)
1.375
(1.101)
ZFU1G × post2002 2.887∗∗
(1.135)
−1.170
(1.147)
0.718
(1.766)
−1.619
(1.479)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1538 1387 727 1080
R2 0.45 0.22 0.28 0.25
Share of 15-25 year olds
ZFU1G × post97 −0.003
(0.025)
−0.008
(0.056)
0.028
(0.084)
−0.042
(0.055)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.045
(0.032)
−0.015
(0.055)
−0.172
(0.111)
0.074
(0.064)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1538 1387 727 1080
R2 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.27
Share with a high degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.009
(0.024)
0.055
(0.039)
0.015
(0.072)
0.070∗
(0.036)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.064∗∗
(0.031)
0.035
(0.079)
0.038
(0.108)
−0.001
(0.060)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1536 1017 665 1052
R2 0.43 0.26 0.32 0.25
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.012
(0.026)
−0.039
(0.048)
−0.087
(0.080)
−0.021
(0.057)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.029
(0.037)
0.041
(0.085)
0.200
(0.130)
−0.058
(0.078)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1536 1017 665 823
R2 0.39 0.22 0.28 0.24
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.003
(0.036)
−0.016
(0.054)
0.072
(0.081)
−0.051
(0.057)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.035
(0.052)
−0.076
(0.085)
−0.238∗∗
(0.101)
0.067
(0.108)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1536 1017 665 823
R2 0.44 0.30 0.37 0.28
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2003, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.26: DD estimations of the effect on age and education,1993-2011
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 0.906
(0.678)
0.483
(1.098)
−0.392
(1.800)
1.260
(1.129)
ZFU1G × post2002 1.150
(0.831)
−1.335
(1.015)
−1.008
(1.439)
−1.821
(1.381)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4233 1803 1167 1369
R2 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.25
Share of 15-25 year olds
ZFU1G × post97 −0.014
(0.024)
−0.004
(0.058)
0.038
(0.096)
−0.039
(0.057)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.025
(0.024)
0.002
(0.045)
−0.053
(0.071)
0.064
(0.055)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4233 1803 1167 1369
R2 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.25
Share with a high degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.007
(0.024)
0.040
(0.040)
−0.009
(0.071)
0.078∗∗
(0.036)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.067∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.036
(0.046)
0.141∗
(0.077)
−0.029
(0.049)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4215 1731 1060 1325
R2 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.21
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.010
(0.024)
−0.023
(0.047)
−0.019
(0.078)
−0.014
(0.060)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.017
(0.024)
−0.002
(0.045)
−0.023
(0.076)
0.003
(0.057)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4215 1731 1060 1325
R2 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.24
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.003
(0.034)
−0.017
(0.054)
0.029
(0.083)
−0.064
(0.063)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.050
(0.035)
−0.035
(0.055)
−0.118
(0.081)
0.027
(0.068)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4215 1731 1060 1325
R2 0.36 0.26 0.32 0.30
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2011, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.27: DD estimations of the effect on age and education, all ZRU as control goup
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 0.652
(0.633)
−0.058
(0.202)
−0.133
(0.270)
−0.187
(0.238)
ZFU1G × post2002 1.990∗∗
(0.906)
−0.271
(1.195)
−0.771
(1.776)
0.925
(1.330)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3119 1708 1138 1336
R2 0.35 0.20 0.28 0.22
Share of 15-25 year olds
ZFU1G × post97 −0.005
(0.023)
−0.005
(0.009)
−0.020
(0.014)
0.009
(0.011)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.030
(0.028)
0.005
(0.061)
0.055
(0.097)
−0.029
(0.063)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3119 1708 1138 1336
R2 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.25
Share with a high degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.010
(0.019)
0.007
(0.007)
0.023∗
(0.013)
0.001
(0.009)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.054
(0.047)
−0.001
(0.079)
0.059
(0.047)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3117 1655 1045 1300
R2 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.24
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.009
(0.026)
−0.007
(0.008)
−0.006
(0.014)
−0.010
(0.010)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.021
(0.030)
0.005
(0.055)
−0.023
(0.088)
0.033
(0.066)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3117 1655 1045 1300
R2 0.32 0.18 0.23 0.21
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.001
(0.034)
0.000
(0.010)
−0.018
(0.016)
0.009
(0.010)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.094∗∗
(0.042)
−0.059
(0.062)
0.024
(0.092)
−0.091
(0.069)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3117 1655 1045 1300
R2 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.28
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.28: DD estimations of the effect on age and education, matched ZRU as control group
All New residents New residents
from other
municipalities
New residents
from the same
municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age
ZFU1G × post97 1.484
(0.963)
0.898
(1.547)
−0.479
(2.210)
1.753
(1.652)
ZFU1G × post2002 1.793
(1.182)
0.165
(1.706)
−0.854
(2.420)
0.983
(2.009)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1119 581 395 458
R2 0.18 0.26 0.40 0.26
Share of 15-25 year olds
ZFU1G × post97 −0.038
(0.035)
−0.043
(0.087)
−0.020
(0.132)
−0.066
(0.076)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.032
(0.043)
−0.002
(0.095)
−0.003
(0.132)
0.025
(0.090)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1119 581 395 458
R2 0.19 0.28 0.48 0.26
Share with a high degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.011
(0.029)
0.129∗
(0.074)
0.072
(0.118)
0.166∗∗
(0.074)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.013
(0.037)
−0.010
(0.082)
0.152
(0.139)
−0.110
(0.105)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 562 348 443
R2 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.26
Share with a medium degree
ZFU1G × post97 −0.048
(0.034)
−0.064
(0.063)
−0.080
(0.107)
−0.048
(0.079)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.053
(0.037)
−0.020
(0.076)
−0.065
(0.199)
0.052
(0.092)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 562 348 443
R2 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.27
Share with a low degree
ZFU1G × post97 0.037
(0.047)
−0.065
(0.076)
0.009
(0.113)
−0.118
(0.094)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.066
(0.057)
0.030
(0.096)
−0.087
(0.197)
0.058
(0.108)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 562 348 443
R2 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.29
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no no no no
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
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Table 1.29: DD estimations for job characteristics, 1993-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.029∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.019∗∗
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)
0.008
(0.006)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.036∗∗
(0.016)
0.019∗
(0.011)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1530 1530 1530 1530
R2 0.293 0.494 0.303 0.497
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.040∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.032∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.017
(0.012)
0.017
(0.012)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.037∗∗
(0.017)
0.026∗
(0.014)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1530 1530 1530 1530
R2 0.311 0.444 0.317 0.447
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.025
(0.025)
0.014
(0.021)
0.004
(0.023)
0.020
(0.020)
32ZFU1G × post2002 −0.048
(0.031)
−0.010
(0.025)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1530 1530 1530 1530
R2 0.364 0.514 0.366 0.514
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2003, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
High-skilled occupations correspond to number 3 in the French socio-economic ranking, for medium-skilled occupations, it is 4, for employees
5 and for workers 6.
Long term contracts : undetermined duration (CDI) or at least than 12 months. Short term contracts : duration inferior to 12 months.
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Table 1.30: DD estimations for job characteristics, 1993-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.007
(0.006)
0.009
(0.007)
0.006
(0.006)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.015∗
(0.008)
0.001
(0.006)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4208 4208 4208 4208
R2 0.196 0.376 0.197 0.376
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.024∗∗
(0.010)
0.018
(0.012)
0.016
(0.011)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.023
(0.014)
0.009
(0.012)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4208 4208 4208 4208
R2 0.186 0.325 0.186 0.325
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.027
(0.024)
0.008
(0.021)
0.001
(0.025)
0.010
(0.022)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.035
(0.024)
−0.003
(0.021)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 4208 4208 4208 4208
R2 0.193 0.319 0.194 0.319
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2011, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Table 1.31: DD estimations for job characteristics, all ZRU as control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.030∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.014∗∗
(0.006)
0.012∗
(0.006)
0.010∗
(0.005)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.027∗∗
(0.011)
0.006
(0.008)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3108 3108 3108 3108
R2 0.211 0.448 0.214 0.448
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.024∗∗
(0.009)
0.021∗
(0.011)
0.019∗∗
(0.009)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.027∗
(0.016)
0.007
(0.013)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3108 3108 3108 3108
R2 0.192 0.339 0.193 0.339
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.026
(0.025)
0.006
(0.022)
−0.009
(0.023)
0.003
(0.021)
ZFU1G × post2002 −0.025
(0.026)
0.004
(0.023)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 3108 3108 3108 3108
R2 0.247 0.371 0.247 0.371
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Table 1.32: DD estimations for job characteristics, matched ZRU as control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1117
share among 26-65 years old of private sector high-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.013
(0.013)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.011)
0.004
(0.009)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.010
(0.014)
0.002
(0.012)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 1117 1117 1117
R2 0.127 0.475 0.127 0.475
share among 26-65 years old of private sector medium-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 0.034∗∗
(0.016)
0.023
(0.015)
0.009
(0.015)
0.006
(0.016)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.036∗∗
(0.017)
0.025
(0.017)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 1117 1117 1117
R2 0.172 0.343 0.174 0.344
share among 26-65 years old of private sector low-skilled jobs
ZFU1G × post97 −0.002
(0.035)
0.034
(0.032)
−0.045
(0.038)
−0.040
(0.033)
ZFU1G × post2002 0.062
(0.037)
0.106∗∗∗
(0.033)
obs. (sampling areas × year) 1117 1117 1117 1117
R2 0.199 0.436 0.201 0.442
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
UU fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control variables no yes no yes
Source : French Labor Force Survey, 1993-2007, 15-65 year old
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Estimations with sampling weights. The number of observations can be
slightly different when studying subpopulation : for example when computing unemployment rate, some areas may have only people out of the
labor force and are therefore not used.
Control variables : gender, age, age2, level of education divided in high, medium and low degrees, foreigners from outside EEC.
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Chapter 2
Communication costs and the internal
organization of multi-plant businesses :
evidence from the impact of the French
High-Speed Rail
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Introduction1
Large corporations with multiple sites represent a disproportionate fraction of employment.
Figure 2.1 shows for example that in France, geographically dispersed corporate groups ac-
count for around 40% (6 million workers in 2011) of total employment in the for-profit sector
(excluding workers directly hired by households), and even more when taking account of groups
headquartered from abroad. The splitting and implantation decisions of such corporations has
been the object of study of a large literature in economic geography (e.g. Aarland et al., 2007,
Davis and Henderson, 2008, Henderson and Ono, 2008, Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009) and in
trade (see the recent survey in Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014). Yet, very little is known about the
way these business organizations are managed. In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap and
provide detailed evidence about the managerial costs of geographic dispersion.
Figure 2.1: The Prevalence of geographically dispersed corporate groups
Break-down of total employment in the for-profit sector, by type of business organization
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Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey, covering the for-profit sector (except agricultural activities and
workers of the personnel service industries directly employed by households). See section 2.2 for further details.
Note: Employment is measured in terms of days of work, normalized by 360 (to be comparable with headcounts).
Our empirical investigation is guided by theoretical predictions. The literature in corporate
finance (Giroud, 2013, Giroud and Mueller, 2015) suggests that the geographical dispersion of
a group’s affiliates might hamper information transmission and monitoring by the managers of
the group’s headquarters, thus amplifying moral hazard problems; it predicts that such a mech-
anism could negatively affect affiliate size. The literature in economic geography (Duranton
and Puga, 2005) further suggests that the geographical dispersion of affiliates in a corporate
group is related to the optimal mix of “functions” present in each implantation. A prediction of
1This chapter is based on a joint work with C. Lelarge and C. Trevien.
75
this strand of the literature is therefore that a reduction in communication costs between head-
quarters and affiliates lowers the cost of transferring headquarters services to remote affiliates,
thus increasing the incentives to specialize affiliates by function. Last, the literature in organi-
zational economics (Garicano, 2000, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, 2012, Antra`s et al.,
2006, 2008) predicts that workers are differentially impacted by decreases in internal communi-
cation costs, depending on their skills. A robust prediction of this set of papers is that the need
for skills at the bottom of the hierarchies decreases, such that wages of the less skilled workers
(and the associated labor costs) decrease.2
We test these predictions using administrative data providing a comprehensive description of
the workforce in the entire population of French corporate groups. We take advantage of the
expansion of the French high-speed rail network over the 1993 to 2011 period and interpret the
associated decreases in travel times as decreases in internal communication costs for corporate
groups benefiting from the new high-speed rail services.3
Our regressions show that a functional specialization indeed occurred and was most pro-
nounced in the service industries, where information to be transmitted is arguably softer (Pe-
tersen and Rajan, 2002). We also obtain that employment of affiliates in manufacturing indus-
tries, retail and trade and business services was positively affected by decreases of their travel
time to headquarter. These results are robust to alternative identification strategies addressing
the problem of the endogenous placement of the HSR infrastructure (use of high-dimensional
fixed effects controlling for local and affiliate-level shocks as in Giroud, 2013 and evidence
from un-realized lines as in Donaldson, 2014). At the group level, our regressions suggest a
positive impact on the operational profit margin consistent with the hypothesis that travel time
between affiliates and headquarters is a managerial cost for geographically dispersed corporate
groups.
These meaningful patterns of adjustments in the internal organization of corporate groups
2See Bassanini et al. (2015) and Landier et al. (2007) for an analysis of labor adjustments on the extensive
margin (dismissals) depending on the distance to headquarters.
3Our paper is therefore related to the large literature (Michaels, 2008, Datta, 2012, Banerjee et al., 2012, Don-
aldson, 2014, Faber, 2014, Ghani et al., 2015) investigating the economic economic impact of standard rail or road
infrastructure on various dimensions of firm activities: the global volume of trade, the management of inventories,
access to remote suppliers or markets (Bernard et al., 2015, Nunn, 2007, Cristea, 2011). However, in these contri-
butions, infrastructures are mainly understood as facilitating “the juncture between production and consumption”
(Martin and Rogers, 1995): they essentially generate a reduction in trade barriers which pertains mainly to the
circulation of goods (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2015), with the associated impact in terms of increases in trade-
related activities, selection, and aggregate productivity (Melitz, 2003). However, these effects are unlikely to be
of first order in the case of high-speed rail, because this mean of transportation pertains mainly to people, and not
to goods. In the case of the French High Speed Rail program, most of the infrastructure is not even accessible to
freight (at the notable exception of mail) because technically, HSR tracks are too steep for the weight of freight
trains.
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suggest that face-to-face interactions remain crucial in spite of the development of other means
of communication (phone, e-mail, visio-conference) over the same period (Storper and Ven-
ables, 2004). Our results also show by revealed preference that business travellers (or their
employers) are willing to pay a significant premium for reduced travel time, in spite of the
arguably high comfort and “workability” of HSR coaches.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2.1 proposes a synthesis of the-
oretical predictions. In section 2.2, we describe the French HSR network and present the data-
sources which enable us to provide a comprehensive picture of French corporate groups. The
empirical strategy is explained in section 2.3. Regressions results are discussed in section 2.4.
Robustness checks are performed in section 2.5 and complementary descriptive evidence is
proposed in section 2.6.
2.1 The management of multi-plant businesses : a review of
theoretical predictions
In this section, we review three different but non mutually exclusive strands of the literature
analyzing how travel times between headquarters and affiliates of corporate groups are likely
to affect their managerial organization (and performance). In each case, their testable empirical
predictions are outlined.
2.1.1 Geographical dispersion and affiliate size
A recent literature in corporate finance (Giroud, 2013, Giroud and Mueller, 2015) relates
travel times to information transmission between headquarters and affiliates in settings where
there are information asymmetries and moral hazard problems. It delivers predictions linking
travel times and investment or employment at the affiliate level.
These contributions specifically focus on the dual managerial structure of corporate groups,
with both managers at headquarters (“principals”), who are endowed with the ultimate decision
rights, and managers at remote affiliates (“agents”) who have an informational advantage over
managers at headquarters about the profitability of local investment projects. The management
of such business organizations features a moral hazard problem if the interests of managers at
affiliates are not fully aligned with the interests of managers at headquarters, with the associated
agency rents captured by the managers of remote affiliates and reduced profit for the group as a
whole. Whether local managers over-invest (over-hire) or under-invest (under-hire) depends on
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whether managers at affiliates have preferences for local “empire building” strategies, or con-
versely if they preferred an excessively “quiet life”. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) actually
show that the second case is more frequent among US managers, which implies that managers
at affiliates are likely to under-invest when investment decisions are delegated to them. In such
a setting, lower travel times between headquarters and remote affiliates increase monitoring
and are therefore associated with higher investment (Giroud, 2013) and higher complementary
employment (Giroud and Mueller, 2015) at affiliates.4
To test the relevance of such mechanisms in the French data, we replicate the analyzes in
Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller (2015) and investigate the relationship between em-
ployment at affiliates and travel time to their headquarters.5 As in Giroud (2013), we also
investigate the correlation between travel time and affiliate destruction or creation: indeed, if
proximity facilitates monitoring and information gathering, one might expect that it also matters
on the “extensive margin”.
2.1.2 Geographical dispersion and the functional specialization of affili-
ates
The literature in economic geography suggests that the geographical dispersion of affiliates
in a corporate group is related to the optimal mix of “functions” present in each implantation.
In Duranton and Puga (2005), firms are considered as bundles of two broad types of functions:
“headquarter services” on one hand, and production activities on the other hand. These two
functions can be either pooled in the same location or split into different plants. Splitting is
costly, for example because of the agency problems outlined in the section 2.1.1.6 However,
there are gains to split firms when there exist “function specific” agglomeration economies,
such as the possibility to outsource certain activities to local suppliers that might be specifically
4This reasoning assumes that investment decisions for affiliates are delegated to local managers. This needs not
be the case (see section 2.1.2) but the same prediction holds (in expectation) under centralized control at headquar-
ters when HQ managers are risk averse: easier information acquisition about the profitability of investment projects
at remote affiliates decreases the “uncertainty premium” required by them and increases average investment.
5Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to observe investment at the affiliate level, such that for this variable,
we will only be able to estimate regressions aggregated across all affiliates, at the group level.
6 Duranton and Puga (2005) model such mechanisms in a reduced form, as a fraction of managers’ time that
is lost in travels to visit the remote affiliate. Refer to Acemoglu et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of
the trade-offs involved: the optimal organizational choice between delegation of authority to a local manager or
centralized decision taking at headquarters trades off the gain to rely the local manager’s superior information
against the risk that he could use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the
group as a whole. Shorter travel times ease information acquisition by principals, and shift the trade-off in favor
of centralized control at headquarters.
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appropriate, the optimization of labor costs across local labor markets (depending on local labor
supply), or simply market access for final products.
The distinctive prediction of Duranton and Puga (2005) is that a reduction in travel time
lowers the cost of transferring headquarter services to remote affiliates, thus increasing the in-
centives to specialize affiliates by function.7 We therefore expect them to be relatively more
focused on their production activities and to discard the administrative tasks which are cheaper
to complete at headquarters. This prediction can be tested by regressing the share of employ-
ment at affiliates that is devoted to production activities (as opposed to managerial, administra-
tive activities) against travel time between affiliates and headquarters: we expect the sign of the
corresponding coefficient to be negative.
2.1.3 Geographical dispersion and wages at affiliates
The literature in organizational economics (Garicano, 2000, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg,
2006, 2012, Antra`s et al., 2006, 2008) enables to make predictions about the way heterogeneous
workers (in terms of skills) might be differentially impacted by decreases in internal commu-
nication costs within a same group, labelled here as “firm” (like in the expression “theory of
the firm”). In this strand of the literature, the internal organization of production (i.e., the way
workers of different skills and knowledge are organized) is endogenously determined by the op-
timization of the usage of these two costly inputs of production. Firms organize as hierarchies
because these types of organizations allow for the most parsimonious usage of two costly inputs
of production: workers’ time and workers’ knowledge. In such structures, the bottom layer is
specialized in the most common problems and concentrates the less skilled workers, while the
upper layers only deal with exceptions (Garicano, 2000). Managers in one layer spend their
time communicating with less skilled agents in the layer just below and solving some of the
problems that are transmitted to them. They pass the rest to the layer with more skilled agents
just above them.
The previous baseline representation of firms is plugged into a two - region model in Antra`s
et al. (2006) and Antra`s et al. (2008), which can easily be transposed to our setting. As in sec-
tion 2.1.2, lower travel times, i.e. decreases in communication costs between units located in
7Notice that in Duranton and Puga (2005), this result is an equilibrium outcome: a decrease in the cost of remote
management (if sufficiently large) shifts the entire economy from an equilibrium where no firm is geographically
dispersed and cities specialize by sector, to an equilibrium where all firms adopt a multi-location organizational
form and cities specialize by function. The authors suggest that a “smoother” result would hold in an augmented
version of the model incorporating some firm level heterogeneity, together with (sufficiently large) sunk costs of
reorganization. Such additional dimensions of firm heterogeneity would explain why all firms would not split
instantaneously and relocate all of their units along the new HSR lines as they open.
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different regions, always increase the relative benefit to split businesses in order to take advan-
tage of lower relative wages in the less dense areas; it also has a positive impact on overall group
size. A more distinctive prediction of these papers is that lower communication costs increase
the incentives to organize in more complex hierarchical organizations (having more layers) by
making them a better “technology” to economize on knowledge. As a result, the relative role
of managers at headquarters increases, while it is profitable to decrease the knowledge content
of bottom operational workers at affiliates (and therefore, their skills), in order to save on their
wage. We test this prediction by regressing the wage of low-skill operational workers on travel
time, and expect a positive sign for this coefficient.8
2.1.4 Geographical dispersion and operational profit at the group level
Notice that in all models of sections 2.1.2 to 2.1.3, decreases in travel time between headquar-
ters and affiliates always decrease the overall costs of operating large, multi-plant businesses. At
the group level, we therefore expect a negative correlation (other things equal) between the op-
erating profit margin and average travel time to affiliates. Corporate groups which are cheaper to
operate grow larger, other things equal: we therefore also expect a negative correlation between
overall group size and average travel time to affiliates.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 The geographical organization of corporate groups
The first ingredient of our analysis is the information system allowing us to recover the struc-
tures of French corporate groups. We rely on the LIFI9 files and use the information on the
(direct and indirect) equity stakes of headquarters in affiliate companies reported in this data
source. Prior to 1999, the LIFI files only covered companies of the private sector whose size
was above at least one of three different thresholds, defined in terms of financial stakes in other
firms (higher than 1.2 million euros), sales (60 million euros) or employment (500 workers).
From 1999 onwards, these files are complemented with the Diane-Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk)
8Section 2.1.1 also generates predictions related to wages. In this set-up, a decrease in communication costs
would alter the wage contracts of managers at affiliates from rather high- to rather low- powered incentive contracts.
Unfortunately, we are not able to test this prediction with our data.
9The acronym “LIFI” stands for “LIaisons FInancie`res” (financial linkages). See e.g. Boutin et al. (2013) for
a previous use of this dataset. Complementary exhaustive fiscal data (BRN files, also used in Boutin et al., 2013)
provide the accounting information required in our empirical analysis.
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dataset, which is constructed from commercial court records and which covers smaller busi-
ness groups. For most of our period of analysis, our file therefore contains almost exhaustive
information about corporate groups operating in France.
We follow the standard approach in corporate finance since the classic contribution by La
Porta et al. (1999) and define headquarters of (potentially complex) group structure as units
having the actual ultimate control over assets in the group, thanks to the direct or indirect own-
ership of more than half of the equity in any of the group affiliates. We locate these headquarters
at the main plant of the group headquarter (ultimate owner) company;10 affiliates correspond to
all other plants of the considered group. However, previous empirical work (e.g. Aubert and
Sillard, 2005, Picart, 2004) has documented that establishments (and even companies within
groups) might be created, terminated and replaced for reasons that are uncorrelated with the
human resource management practices we want to focus on11. We choose to abstract from such
phenomena by aggregating the information across all plants of a same group, having the same
activity (at the 1 digit level) and located in the same municipality (“commune”) into a single
“affiliate” unit.12
This dataset allow us to complement figure 2.1 in the introductory part and provide in fig-
ure 2.2 a synthetic description of the geography of remote control, as of 2011. We use as our
unit of local markets the commuting zones which are constructed “as the geographical areas
within which most of the labor force lives and works, and in which establishments hire most of
their workforce”. By definition, if headquarters and affiliates are not located in the same com-
muting zone, travel from one to another by managers cannot be considered as a local trip. Panel
(A) provides for each commuting zone, the share of businesses that are controlled from outside.
This share is higher than 15% in most commuting zones, and above 20% in a number of zones
located in the northern half of the country, which is explained by the disproportionate “sphere of
corporate influence” of Paris over this part of the country.13 The employment weighted version
10In cases where these headquarters are non-employer holdings, we rather choose the employer company that
is most directly related to the holding, in terms of rank of control, and in cases where several companies meet this
criterion, we select those having the largest share of executives (see section 2.2.2 below). The aim of this procedure
is to locate (probabilistically) the upper management team of the entire group structure.
11In particular, plants are terminated and created even when transfers occur on very short distances, e.g. for
reasons related to capacity, which we want to abstract from. Moreover, firm and plant identifiers also change when
the legal status of companies evolves, most often due to regulatory constraints (e.g. upper bounds on the admissible
number of shareholders for certain legal forms, etc.) or due to fiscal or administrative reasons which, again, are
entirely orthogonal to the mechanisms described in section 2.1.
12This aggregation is not drastic, since there are ca. 36,000 such municipalities across France. Its benefit is to
increase by a little bit the power of our setting by increasing the number of years an affiliate unit is observed - 3.2
years on average. Notice also that the variations of travel time induced by HSR line openings are homogenous
within municipalities, since they are typically served by only one single station.
13See appendix 2.F for a comparison of the “spheres of corporate influence” of different French cities showing
the disproportionate weight of Paris.
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of the indicator presented in panel (B) shows that in most of the country, more than 30% of
employment is managed at arm’s length. This share rises to rates above 50% in a significant
number of commuting zones, mostly located in the northern part of the country.
Figure 2.2: Share of affiliates under control of a HQ located outside the considered commuting
zone
Percentages for the year 2011
Un-weighted Weighted by
employment
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Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey, covering the for-profit sector (except agricultural activities and
workers of the personnel service industries directly employed by households).
Notes: The left panel describes the number of affiliates in each commuting zone that are controlled by HQs located
outside the zone, as a share of the total number of businesses (affiliates and HQs) located in each zone. The right
panel describes the share of private employment in each commuting zone that is under control of an external HQ:
this indicator is an employment weighted version of the previous.
2.2.2 The organization of the workforce within corporate groups
We complement the previous files with exhaustive worker level information sourced from
the DADS14 files. These files are available from 1993 onwards, and include roughly 14 million
workers per year in the recent period. They allow us to track economically active plants within
each group and provide us with a rich description of their internal workforce and wage structure.
Most importantly, the classification of occupations in the DADS files allows us to contrast
the workforce allocated to production activities with the workforce allocated to support and ad-
ministrative activities, both at headquarters and affiliates. This distinction is required to test the
14The acronym “DADS” stands for “De´clarations Annuelles de Donne´es Sociales”. See e.g. Caliendo et al.
(2015) for a previous use of these files.
82
empirical predictions of section 2.1.2. We interact this typology of functions with the indica-
tors of hierarchical layers proposed in Caliendo et al. (2015), in order to test the predictions of
section 2.1.3, which rely on these concepts:
• Administrative functions:15
– Low-skilled workers performing administrative tasks,
– Medium-skilled workers performing administrative or commercial tasks,
– High-skilled workers performing administrative or commercial tasks: this category
will be labeled as “managers” in the remainder of the article.
• Production functions:16
– Low-skilled workers having functions related to production or performing commer-
cial tasks,17
– Medium-skilled workers having functions related to production,
– High-skilled workers having functions related to production.
Figure 2.3 describes the average structure of the workforce we obtain when implementing
the above definitions, both at affiliates and headquarters.18 Notice first that methodological
changes in the coding of occupations occurred in 2002 and 2009 and produced two breaks in
the series.19 Abstracting from this difficulty, panel (A) of figure 2.3 shows that administrative
functions represent a similar share of the workforce, on average, at headquarters and affiliates.
What differentiates HQs from affiliates sharply is not the weight of these activities, but the
structure of skills within them: headquarters employ 15 to 20% of their workforce in higher
management positions, against 5 to 10% in the case of affiliates. Conversely, affiliates em-
ploy around twice as many middle managers (ca. 20%) as headquarters. Last and in contrast,
the structure of the workforce allocated to production activities (panel B in figure 2.3) is not
highly contrasted between headquarters and affiliates: headquarters only tend to hire somewhat
fewer low-skilled and medium-skilled workers, and more high-skilled workers. Unreported
15See appendix 2.C for a full description of the classification of occupations. In the typology which follows,
low-skilled administrative workers are coded 5 except 53, 55 and 56. Medium-skilled administrative workers are
coded 4 except 47 and 48. High-skilled administrative workers are coded 2 and 3 except 34 and 38.
16Low-skilled production workers are coded 6 and 53, 55 and 56. Medium-skilled production workers are coded
47 and 48. High-skilled production workers are coded 34 and 38.
17Notice that we allocate commercial low-skilled workers to production activities, which is of particular rel-
evance in the retail and trade industries. For medium and high-skilled workers, unfortunately, the classification
available in our file does not allow to distinguish between administrative and commercial activities.
18In these graphics, employment in each occupation is measured in days (between start and end of the labor
contract of each worker) to take part time work into account.
19 Our empirical strategy, which saturates each regressions with rich temporal fixed effects, is relatively immune
to this measurement issue (see section 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Structure of the Workforce at Affiliates vs. Headquarters, 1993 - 2011
Workforce at affiliates Workforce at headquarters
(A) Administrative functions
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(B) Production functions
As a share of total employment
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Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; units which are part of geographically dispersed groups.
Notes: Employment is measured in days. The break in the series in 2009 was generated by a change in the
codification procedure for occupations in the DADS files. It affects mostly the breakdown between low-skilled
administrative or commercial occupations, and medium-skilled administrative occupations.
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complementary descriptive statistics confirm unsurprisingly that the structure of the workforce
at affiliates is highly differentiated across industries. For example, skilled workers (involved in
either administrative or production functions) represent 11% of the workforce in manufacturing
industries, 21% in business services and 18% in the finance industry. In contrast, the share
ranges between 6 and 8% in the personnel services, retail and trade, or transport industries. The
share of managers (high-skill administrative workers) is around 4% in all industries, except in
the business services (10%) and finance (18%) industries: in these two cases, most probably
part of them are in fact allocated to production (but non “technical”) activities.
2.2.3 HSR network and rail travel times
The last ingredient for our empirical analysis is detailed information about the evolution
of the rail network over time. This allows us to compute rail travel times between any two
points of the French metropolitan territory - and more specifically, between the headquarters
and affiliates of French corporate groups. We collected detailed information from the archives
of the French national rail company or its open-data platform, and complemented with various
technical publications available from rail fan web sites to reconstruct the expansion of the HSR
network over time. The outcome of this task is represented on figure 2.4, which describes the
expansion of the HSR network over thirty years: the first HSR line was opened in 1981 on
a segment located on the track between the two largest cities, Paris and Lyon. This line was
subsequently extended in 1994 and 2001 to ultimately reach Marseille on the Mediterranean
Coast. The network was also extended towards the Atlantic coast in 1989-1990, towards Lille
and London in 1993 and 1994, and towards Strasbourg and Frankfurt (in Germany) in 200720.
The expansion of the HSR network had a huge impact on rail travel times across the territory
because high-speed trains operate at twice the maximum standard rail speed: ca. 320km/h on
the dedicated infrastructure. While the actual procedure we implemented to compute rail travel
times is relegated to appendix 2.D, figure 2.5 shows how the expansion of the HSR network
translated into reductions in travel times for selected destinations over our period of analysis.
Between 1993 and 2011, new line openings mainly benefited the Eastern and Southern regions,
which experienced the largest accessibility gains, both in terms of time and geographical range.
Paris experienced the symmetric gains towards the Mediterranean zone and the Eastern zone. A
few examples enable to gauge orders of magnitude: rail travel time between Marseille and Paris
decreased from 6h40 to 4h40 in 1982, to 4h18 in 1994 and ultimately to 3h00 in 2001. Between
20As of today, high-speed rail service also includes cross-border services to UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Ger-
many, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. However, this feature of the network in not analyzed in the present paper,
since we are not able to locate HQs abroad.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of the French HSR Network between 1981 (resp. 1993) and 2011
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Sources: Archives and open-data platform of the French national rail company; rail fan web sites. Authors’
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Strasbourg and Paris, travel time decreased from 3h55 to 2h20 in 2007, when the Eastern line
opened.
In our empirical analysis, all of the indicators of travel times between headquarters and af-
filiates are based on the above rail travel time computations, and all travel time variations (re-
ductions) are driven by the opening or extension of new HSR lines. One important concern is
of course that our indicator misses all travel time reductions which might be driven by other
means of transportation - and more specifically, by airlines.21 Appendix 2.A however shows
that over our period of analysis, HSR became one of the most popular means of transportation
for long distance travels, such that rail travel times became of practical relevance to managers.
Appendix 2.A also shows that the airline industry did not seem to be a strong competitor of HSR
over the same period, since it rather lost market shares in spite of the liberalization episode of the
90s. This is most presumably because travel time by air (incorporating access to airports, which
in contrast to most train stations, are often located in the outskirts of cities) is not lower than
rail travel time for most domestic trips.22 In all cases, as also argued in detail in appendix 2.A,
21No heavy change is to be expected from road travels.
22See Behrens and Pels (2012) for a similar argument in the case of the London-Paris passenger market.
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Figure 2.5: Reduction in Rail Travel Times to Selected Destinations
in minutes, between 1993 and 2011
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we expect our approximation to bias our regression results against finding any impact of travel
time on management practices.
A second, more minor problem is that HSR line openings were almost always associated with
improved rail service beyond travel time:23 for example, new and more comfortable coaches
were most of the time introduced, with increased “workability” and a higher frequency of train
services, at least for terminal cities.24 Conversely, the quality of service offered by standard rail
might have suffered from the reallocation of resources of the rail company towards HSR. In our
empirical analysis, such unobserved differential evolution of the rail services provided by HSR
23A related concern is that our results might be driven by standard market access mechanisms rather than by
those described in section 2.1 if the new HSR infrastructure was accessible to freight and also impacted the trans-
port of goods. This is however not the case of the dedicated HSR infrastructure, which is too fragile and sometimes
too steep to be accessible to freight trains (because of their weight). Note furthermore that our empirical strategy
would anyway address this potential concern (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.1).
24This last point is more debated for the case of certain smaller or middle size cities, more precisely those that are
bypassed by HSR services while they were previously served by traditional rail service (FNAUT, 2011, Emangard
and Beaucire, 1985). For example, the number of direct services per day from Paris to Charleville - Me´zie`res fell
from 7 to 3 in 2007, and from 9 to 4 between Paris and Tourcoing.
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and standard rail (which is correlated with our indicator of travel time variation) would bias our
estimates somewhat upwards.
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Main specification at the affiliate level
Our main equations of interest are estimated at the affiliate level, and investigate the correla-
tions between travel time and the outcome variables that are suggested in section 2.1. They take
the following generic specification:
yijlt = β.Tijlt + εijlt (2.1)
where subscript i denotes the affiliate, j its headquarters, l denotes the commuting zone were
the affiliate is located and t denotes time. Tijlt denotes travel time between the affiliate and
its headquarter and yijlt is the outcome of interest: typically affiliate employment, the share
of employment allocated to production activities (“production employment”) or the wages of
production workers.
Baseline identification strategy
We first insert affiliate level fixed effects αijl into this regression framework in order to ad-
dress the fact that affiliate location (relative to its headquarters) is potentially endogenously
driven by unobserved affiliate characteristics that are also correlated with the outcome vari-
ables. For example, a higher specificity of the production of the affiliate25 might be correlated
with both a higher proximity of the considered affiliate to its headquarters, and higher wages
paid to its production workers. Thanks to the inclusion of this first set of fixed effects, the re-
lation between travel time and the various outcome of interest will be identified by changes in
travel time, namely those generated by the expansion of the HSR network over time. This is
also ensured by the fact that a group of which the headquarter moves is also considered a new
group and that an affiliate moving out of its commuting zone is considered as a new affiliate.
In this framework, the extensive margin (openings and closures of affiliates) is not accounted
25Regressions are estimated industry by industry to further address this concern and to investigate industry level
heterogeneity.
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for but it is controlled by the affiliate level fixed effects. Some descriptive evidence on affiliates
exits and entries is therefore proposed in section 2.6 as a complement.
However, this regression framework is still affected by the fact that the placement of the HSR
infrastructure might be endogenous: there might exist some local unobserved heterogeneity, e.g.
local growth potential, which could have been taken into account for the governmental decision
to build the HSR infrastructure, and which might be also correlated with our outcome variables,
thus biasing our results. Furthermore, the HSR infrastructure itself might have boosted local
growth, a phenomenon we want to control for in our regressions. We address these two issues
using an identification strategy similar to Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller (2015), by
introducing large sets of commuting zone × time “fixed” effects (αlt), on top of the standard
affiliate level fixed effects (αijl):
yijlt = αijl + αlt + β.Tijt + γ.Xjt + εijlt (2.2)
These many dummy variables capture the time varying local heterogeneity which could gen-
erate the above endogeneity issues. Notice that all of these fixed effects are identifiable in
our setting, because the impact of variation in travel times on outcomes of interest is identi-
fied jointly from the locations of affiliates and from the location of their headquarters, i.e. travel
time is a dyadic variable. More intuitively, our identification strategy amounts to use as a control
group, the set of local affiliates located in the same commuting zone as the considered affiliate,
which are therefore exposed to the same local shocks, but which are unaffected (or differently
affected) by travel time reductions because of a different location of their headquarters26.
One additional concern with such specifications which are saturated with fixed effects is that
it requires that the explanatory variables of interest have to be measured accurately, since oth-
erwise fixed effects tend to amplify the attenuation bias arising from measurement error.27 We
argue in appendix 2.D.3 that if travel times might be affected by some measurement problems,
variations in travel times are likely to be measured much more accurately: since identification
in equation 2.2 is in differences, this is what is required. Furthermore, this problem should if
anything lead us to minimize the true impact of travel time on our outcome variables.
In terms of the estimation method, the inclusion of several sets of high-dimensional fixed
26In the reported regressions, we exclude affiliates which are not part of a multi-implantation group, mainly
for practical reasons (this reduces drastically our file size and the associated computing time). However, these
observations could serve as additional controls for local shocks. Un-reported regressions show that results are
basically unaffected by this choice.
27This problem is well known in the literature about the estimation of production functions, where capital is
typically not measured accurately (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
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effects renders estimation non-trivial, despite the fact that equation 2.2 is fully linear. We choose
to apply the iterative procedure proposed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010): its principle is to
iterate on sets of normal equations that are conveniently defined; the only practical constraint
is to use continuous empirical proxies for the explanatory variables of main interest, in order to
insure identification (see appendix 2.B for full details).
Robustness checks
We also provide a bunch of robustness checks to test the robustness of our results to additional
potential sources of endogeneity. First, additional controls for group level market conditions
Xjt, both on the domestic and the international markets, are incorporated in all specifications
to control for group-wide shocks which might be spuriously temporally correlated with travel
time reductions in our sample. This strategy is however not sufficient in cases where group-wide
shocks are endogenously correlated with HSR line openings: this would happen, for example,
in cases where the group lobbied in favor of certain HSR line openings or extensions.28 To mit-
igate this concern, we first estimate regressions where we simply remove the most “suspicious”
observations, namely the largest affiliates in each area. Second, we experiment with specifica-
tions where we remove large HSR beneficiaries, i.e. affiliates benefiting from HSR for more
than 50% of the rail track to their headquarters.29
Further evidence from un-realized lines
To mitigate an even broader set of endogeneity concerns, but at the cost of discarding a larger
fraction of the sample, we also implement an additional strategy along the lines of Donaldson
(2014). This strategy makes use of the fact that a governmental plan was drafted in 1991 (ahead
of our period of analysis) and endorsed by the Prime Minister of the time, which described an
ambitious network of HSR lines to be built in the years to come, based on local development
and profitability criteria (Ministe`re de l’E´quipement, 1991).30 However, some of the lines were
not implemented (Zembri, 1997). In some cases it was because their expected profitability was
28Giroud (2013) also considers the possibility of lobbying at the affiliate (rather than group) level. We think that
this case is very unlikely for HSR given the cost of the infrastructure. However, the specifications suggested in
the previous case, where we remove the largest affiliates or discard affiliates benefiting from HSR on a too large
proportion of the track to their headquarters, would also mitigate the concern of lobbying at the affiliate level.
29This strategy is very similar to what is implemented in Giroud (2013), in specifications where he only considers
indirect flights where either the last leg of the flight (involving the plant’s home airport) or the first leg of the flight
(involving headquarters’ home airport) remains unchanged.
30See appendix 2.E for a map of the foreseen infrastructures.
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deemed too low:31 we choose to discard these lines. For the remainder, non-implementation
was explained by the fact that budgetary constraints imposed some phasing and rescheduling
of projects, or because of unexpected technical difficulties32 that are arguably exogenous in our
empirical setting.
We suggest that affiliates which would have benefited from the latter subset of the 1991 plan
are likely to have the same un-observables (potentially correlated with travel time reductions)
as affiliates which actually benefited from realized HSR lines. In more technical terms, this
would imply that conditional on being part of the 1991 plan, travel time is orthogonal to the
error term in equation 2.2.33 We therefore propose to estimate our baseline specification on the
corresponding sub-sample, after discarding affiliates which could never expect benefiting from
the HSR technology because of their location relative to their headquarters. This is an even
more flexible procedure than simply inserting the variable indicating insertion into the 1991
plan as a new control, as a strict implementation of the Donaldson (2014) methodology would
imply.
2.3.2 Complementary specification at the group level
As explained in section 2.1.4, some important theoretical predictions hold at the group level
rather than at the affiliate level, most notably predictions about the impact of reduction in travel
time (managerial costs) on overall group size and profitability. We therefore run a few specifi-
cations on the level of the entire group:
yjt = αj + β.Tjt +
∑
r
αrt.δjrt + γ.Xjt + εjt (2.3)
As previously, we introduce group level fixed effects to control for fixed observable and un-
observable characteristics that might be correlated to our variables of interest such as group
size and profitability. Moreover, similarly to the specification at the affiliate level, the varia-
tions of the gross average travel time to affiliates Tjt might be correlated to local dynamics of
31This is the case of lines connecting Paris to the center of the country (Auvergne, Limousin), or to Normandy,
which all had expected profitability below 4%.
32In their case, expensive art works or deviations were required by local authorities or lobbyists to preserve the
environment (e.g. protected areas, vineyards, etc.) - see Zembri (1997).
33Notice that this procedure is not strictly speaking an instrumental variable strategy. Indeed, we do not argue
that the placement of the 1991 plan was more exogenous than the placement of the actually implemented network,
as would have been required for an instrumental variable. We only suggest that the factors determining actual
implementation (i.e. the mapping between the 1991 plan and the actually implemented network) are likely to
be relatively orthogonal to our relation of interest, such that the information about insertion into the 1991 plan
captures the unobserved heterogeneity potentially generating remaining endogeneity issues.
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the zones where the group is operating. Hence, we insert a set of dummy variables αrt cap-
turing market conditions in the areas where the group operates. These dummy variables are
not mutually exclusive, such that it is not possible to implement the same estimation procedure
as previously. To render the estimation computationally tractable, we aggregate the circa 300
commuting zones into the 22 French metropolitan regions prevailing over the period.34 As in
the case of the affiliate level specifications, we estimate these regressions industry by industry.35
A new concern that arises from the fact that estimations are made at the group level is that
variations of travel time are not due only to HSR line openings but also to change in the spatial
organization of the group, and it is harder to argue that they are exogenous to our variables of
interest. We therefore decompose the gross average travel time to affiliates Tjt into two parts, in
order to factor out the “pure” travel time effect (holding the structure of the group fixed) from
the variation in travel time induced by changes in the spatial organization of the group (which
however might also be driven by aspects related to travel time - see section 2.6, although these
are unlikely to be the main determinants36):
Tjt =
∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt0 T(ij)t0
Card Fjt0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normalization
=
(∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t0
Card Fjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in rail travel time
+
(∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t0
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt0 T(ij)t0
Card Fjt0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in group spatial dispersion
(2.4)
where Fjt denotes the set of affiliates in group j at date t and T(ij)t is travel time between
affiliate i and the headquarter of group j at date t.
In this setting, the effect of the group spatial dispersion will have to be interpreted with
caution. The main concern is that spatial dispersion is probably positively correlated to the
growth of the group. To mitigate this concern, we include in our control variables the number
of affiliates in the group and, in any case, our interest is mainly on the “pure” travel time effect,
which is less impacted by this issue.
34 These regions have been recently officially aggregated into 12 larger metropolitan aggregates.
35 Industry affiliation at the group level is given by the main share of employment in the first year of our panel.
36In principle we should rely on a more formal IV strategy to control from the endogenous changes in group
spatial organization driven by HSR. It is however difficult to find such an IV. For example, using the first year
spatial group organization as an IV remains somewhat endogenous for large groups, and is weakly informative for
the many group structures which enter the sample without any affiliate, thus weakening the IV.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Sample descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 provides a comprehensive description of the main empirical indicators in our sam-
ple of affiliates of multi-location groups. 4% of them (and 5% of the corresponding corporate
groups) were affected by the new HSR line openings which occurred over the 1993 to 2011
period and experienced the associated reductions in rail travel times.37 Unsurprisingly, these
affiliates appear to be most often located further away from their respective headquarters than
affiliates which did not experience any rail travel time reduction, since HSR is typically a long
distance mean of transportation.38 They are also more often headquartered in Paris, which is
due to the fact that the HSR network is mostly organized like a spider web centered on the
capital city (see figure 2.4). On average, average rail speed (distance divided by travel time) is
lower than 100km/h in the years before the line openings, and around 110km/h in the years af-
ter. This is largely below the highest HSR commercial speed (320km/h), because most affiliates
only benefit from HSR on a small portion of the track to their headquarters. Last, the industry
affiliation of affiliates appears to be somewhat differentiated depending on the considered HSR
line opening. This is driven by the specific industrial specialization of the areas which became
connected to the HSR network: while the Northern line opened in 1994 benefited dispropor-
tionally (compared to population average) to affiliates of the manufacturing industries, and less
to affiliates active in the retail, trade and finance industries, the converse is true for the Eastern
line (opened in 2007).
2.4.2 Regression at the affiliate level
Table 2.2 contains our main results, estimated by the (1 digit) industry level. The most
striking pattern is the consistently negative relation between travel time and the functional spe-
37 Figures 2.9 and 2.12 in appendix 2.G complement table 2.1 and provide a full description of the distribution of
travel time reductions at the dates of the main line openings, as well as their precise geographical location. Affiliates
which benefited from the HSR line openings in 1994 and 2001 were mainly located in the North and in the South
of France, because the new HSR lines opened at these dates mainly improved the north/south connections. The
Eastern line opened in 2007 mainly benefited affiliates located along the new line, and to a much lesser extent to
affiliates located in the South-western part of France. The associated distributions of travel time reductions appear
to be quite differentiated: travel time reductions are clustered below 25 minutes in 1994, with very few cases of
travel time reduction exceeding this value. In 2001, there are two modes in the distribution, at 5 and 55 minutes
respectively. Last, the distribution obtained for 2007 is flatter, with many rail travel time reductions staggered
between 0 and 90 minutes, combined with a larger mass point at 90 minutes.
38Typically, 40% of the affiliates that are unaffected by HSR are located in the same employment zone as their
HQ (see table 2.12 in appendix 2.D.3 for complementary descriptive statistics).
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Affiliates of multi-location firms, 1993-2011
Affiliates experiencing reductions in Affiliates
travel time between 1993 and 2011 never
At main years of change: affected
1993- 1993/ 2000/ 2006/
2011 1994 2001 2007
Geography:
Distance to HQ (km) 411 478 488 334 205
HQ in Paris 41% 49% 36% 39% 36%
Travel times (hours):
Travel time after treatment 3.93 4.15 4.20 3.12 2.13
Variation in travel time - -0.20 -0.70 -0.93 -
New HSR user - 7% 15% 63% -
Workforce and wages at affiliates:
Employment 36 38 31 30 32
Share of production workers 56% 58% 57% 55% 59%
Annual wage of op. workers (ke) 15.7 15.2 14.8 17.0 16.1
Share of managers 8% 9% 8% 8% 8%
Industry affiliation:
Manufacturing industries 15% 21% 15% 13% 16%
Personnel services 8% 11% 7% 5% 10%
Retail and Trade 39% 32% 39% 41% 40%
Business Services 14% 18% 18% 16% 16%
Transport 6% 9% 7% 5% 5%
Finance 18% 9% 15% 19% 13%
Counts of business units:
Nb observations (affiliates × year) 253,287 7,061 11,882 9,633 2,573,936
Nb affiliates 35,429 // // // 856,840
Nb HQs (groups) 10,762 2,865 4,712 3,078 216,483
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; business units (HQs or affiliates - see section 2.2.1 for definition)
which are part of multi-location groups between 1993 and 2011. Employment is measured in days of work but is
reported in this table as headcount equivalents (days divided by 360).
Notes: The main “years of change” correspond to the opening dates of the Northern line (1993/1994), of the
connection to Marseille (2000/2001) or of the Eastern line (2006/2007).
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cialization of affiliates into production activities. Estimated coefficients range between around
0.5 percentage point of decrease in the employment share of production activities per hour of
transport, which is the value obtained in the finance, retail and trade industries, to around 1
percentage point per hour in the manufacturing industries, and 2 percentage point per hour in
industries related to services (personnel services, business services and transport). The average
travel time between affiliates and headquarters is around 2 hours (table 2.1) such that these esti-
mates imply shifts of the workforce structure ranging from 1 to 4 percentage points on average.
In most industries, they are also associated with positive correlations between travel times and
the share of managers at affiliates: the higher ratio of managers per worker when travel times
are higher indicates that geographical dispersion generates higher local managerial needs.
The relation between (decreases in) travel time and functional specialization is highest in the
service industries, which is consistent with Petersen and Rajan (2002). These authors suggest
that the mechanisms relating organizational structure and the use of information presented in
section 2.1 are most relevant in industries where information to be transmitted is particularly
“soft”. In their view, this is the case when activity relies heavily on relationship building, such
as consulting, research and new product development, and more generally service industries.39
In contrast, the relation between travel time and functional specialization estimated in the trade,
retail and manufacturing industries is somewhat less pronounced. In the latter case of the man-
ufacturing industries, this result might also be driven by the fact that adjustments in production
employment might require complementary adjustment in capital, and therefore a significant
costly investment effort, as in Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller (2015).
In column (5) of table 2.2, we investigate the relation between travel times and the wage of
production workers. The obtained relation is most often positive, but only significant in the
manufacturing and business services industries. This seems unsurprising, since we expect the
knowledge based mechanism in section 2.1.3 to be more relevant in those most skill inten-
sive industries.40 Magnitudes are relatively large: the average geographical dispersion within
French corporate groups, requiring 2h of travel time between affiliates and headquarters, would
translate into a 2% increase in operational costs driven by the higher wages paid out.
39 A surprising result in this respect in table 2.2 is the weak coefficient obtained in the case of the finance in-
dustry. This is most likely because our empirical indicator of production activities is inadequate (see section 2.2.2)
in this industry: it only captures 10% of the workforce, which seems excessively low. In contrast, this industry
presents disproportionate shares of managers (17%, as opposed to ca 5% in other industries) and middle skilled
administrative workers (46%, as opposed to around 20% in other industries), which suggests that part of produc-
tion workers are non technical and therefore (mis)classified into the same occupational categories as administrative
workers, which generates a measurement problem in our setting.
40See section 2.2.2 for basic descriptive statistics. Again, the lack of significance in the case of the finance
industry (which is also highly skill intensive) might be driven by the inaccuracy of our indicator of production
activities.
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Table 2.2: Travel Time to HQ and the Structure of the Workforce at Affiliates
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
Affiliate Structure of Wage (ln)
employment (ln) the workforce (shares)
Total Prod. Prod. Managers Prod.
workers workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(A) Manufacturing Industries
Travel time (hours) -0.013 -0.019* -0.009*** 0.002* 0.008**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 60.670 48.915 0.753 0.046 18,334
Observations 426,595 408,861 426,595 426,595 408,861
(B) Personnel Services
Travel time (hours) 0.005 -0.055*** -0.020*** 0.018*** 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 23.089 15.835 0.733 0.047 13,204
Observations 241,846 227,936 241,846 241,846 227,936
(C) Retail and Trade
Travel time (hours) -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 16.848 11.094 0.660 0.060 13,925
Observations 1,045,869 965,013 1,045,869 1,045,869 965,013
(D) Business Services
Travel time (hours) -0.009 -0.070*** -0.018*** 0.000 0.013*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 45.814 29.755 0.515 0.114 19,538
Observations 401,844 329,680 401,844 401,844 329,680
(E) Transport
Travel time (hours) 0.018 0.006 -0.016*** 0.012*** 0.001
(0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 38.610 26.857 0.584 0.052 17,811
Observations 138,865 115,205 138,865 138,865 115,205
(F) Finance
Travel time (hours) 0.031** 0.000 -0.005* 0.006* 0.010
(0.013) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023)
Mean of unlogged dep. var. 27.485 3.618 0.102 0.168 16,437
Observations 348,836 104,192 348,836 348,836 104,192
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time
fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales
to capture the cycle on international markets (but all results are robust to the exclusion of these controls).
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In most industries, there is no significant effect on affiliate total employment and the func-
tional specialization therefore translates into significant negative correlations between travel
times to headquarters and affiliate production employment (column 2 in table 2.2). Two ex-
ceptions are retail and trade and finance industry. For retail and trade, the significant negative
relation between travel time to headquarters and total employment is consistent with mecha-
nisms described by of Giroud and Mueller (2015). For the finance industry, the sign is reverse,
so there might be a productivity effect of travel time but as there is no information on produc-
tivity at the plant level, this can not be investigate further. So empirical findings of Giroud and
Mueller (2015) for the US manufacturing industry employment, do not seem to fully apply to
France and to a wider set of industries.
But we further follow Giroud and Mueller (2015) and investigate whether the employment
and management of affiliates might be affected by the other business units in the group (ta-
ble 2.3). This would occur, for example, if HQ managerial time is a scarce resource (Giroud,
2013), or if the group is financially constrained such that all desirable adjustments do not take
place (Giroud and Mueller, 2015). To that end, we insert into the regression, variables describ-
ing the variations of average travel time to other affiliates in the group.
Columns (1) and (2) show that these resource constraint mechanisms are likely to drive a
downward bias in our baseline regression for total affiliate employment. Indeed, we obtain that
affiliate total employment growth is negatively affected by decreases (or positively affected by
increases) in travel time at other affiliates in all industries. In these enriched specifications,
the coefficient associated with own travel time also becomes significant (and negative) in the
manufacturing industries, retail, trade and business services, which suggests that the relation
between affiliate size and travel time (explained in section 2.1.1) suffered from attenuation bias
in table 2.2 and that empirical findings of Giroud and Mueller (2015) can indeed be extended to
France in these industries.
Columns (3) and (4) show that functional specialization tends to be slightly fostered (but
not impaired) by variations in travel time at other affiliates. This finding might be driven by
the fact that HQ manager time that is saved at other affiliates (due to shorter travels) is par-
tially reallocated to remote affiliates, thus decreasing the need for local managers and fostering
their functional specialization. Overall, table 2.3 suggest that HQ managerial time might be a
particularly scarce resource (or costly input) in large and spatially dispersed groups.
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Table 2.3: Impact of Travel Time to Other Affiliates in Group
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
Dependent Employment (ln) Share of
variable: Production emp.
Own Variations at Own Variations at
travel time other affiliates travel time other affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing industries -0.018* 0.025*** -0.009*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Personnel services 0.002 0.027*** -0.020*** -0.002**
(0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Retail and trade -0.033*** 0.057*** -0.007*** -0.002***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Business services -0.024** 0.057*** -0.018*** 0.002***
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Transport 0.014 0.030*** -0.016*** -0.002**
(0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Finance 0.019 0.104*** -0.005* -0.001*
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time
fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales
to capture the cycle on international markets. Same samples and numbers of observations as in table 2.2.
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2.4.3 Regressions at the group Level
As a complementary piece of evidence, in table 2.4, we run regressions at the entire group
level which unable us to gauge the impact of travel time on global operating profits and other
operational decisions - mainly, investment decisions.
Though the identification strategy is not as strong as for the affiliate level,41 the obtained
results provide a remarkably consistent picture. First, the remoteness of affiliates is associated
with fewer administrative workers, or fewer managers at HQs relative to affiliates (columns (3)
and (5) of panel (A) of table 2.4), which would be consistent with increased delegation of au-
thority to local managers of affiliates. The obtained pattern of correlations is highly significant
and coherent across all industries. The obtained estimates are higher than the decreases in the
share of managers documented in table 2.2, which would imply that the sum of all adjustments
of managerial resources at remote affiliates, downwards (when travel time decreases) or up-
wards (when travel time increases), are more than compensated by the symmetric adjustments
at headquarters.
In terms of growth and profit, the most striking result is the highly significant negative corre-
lation between travel time and profit margin which is obtained in all industries (column (5) of
panel (B) of table 2.4). In column (3) of panel (B) of table 2.4, we also obtain that investment is
always negatively correlated with travel time, a result which is consistent with Giroud Giroud
(2013), although the relation is only significant in the retail, trade, transport and finance indus-
tries. The correlation with employment is highly differentiated across industries: while travel
time is found to be negatively correlated with total employment in the manufacturing, personnel
services and retail and trade industries, it seems that a productivity effect (of more efficient and
parsimonious managerial organizations made possible by reduced travel times) dominates and
reverses the relation in the business services, transport and finance industries.
Last, although there might be some remaining endogeneity issues on the estimates of the im-
pact of spatial dispersion on group performance, the indicator of group level spatial dispersion
(defined in equation 2.4) is found to be consistently negatively correlated with group size (as
measured by total value added or employment), investment, and operational profit margin.
41See section 2.3.2 for a discussion.
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Table 2.4: Spatial Dispersion and Performance at the Group Level
1993-2011, corporate groups which are geographically dispersed only
(A) Workforce
ln Group Sh. admin at HQ Sh. managers at HQ
employment in total admin in total admin
Travel Spatial Travel Spatial Travel Spatial
time disp. time disp. time disp. Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing -0.026* -0.032*** -0.012*** 0.004*** -0.026*** 0.000 230,041
industries (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Personnel -0.074*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.011*** -0.027*** -0.008*** 134,951
services (0.025) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
Retail -0.049*** -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.004*** -0.022*** -0.001*** 417,799
and trade (0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Business services 0.082*** -0.059*** -0.040*** -0.003*** -0.025*** 0.001* 257,055
services (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Transport 0.040* -0.025*** -0.008 0.008*** -0.019** 0.000 53,868
(0.024) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Finance 0.080** -0.012*** -0.044*** -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.008*** 74,668
(0.031) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
(B) Growth and Profit
ln Value Added ln Investment Profit Margin
Travel Spatial Travel Spatial Travel Spatial
time disp. time disp. time disp. Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing -0.067*** -0.017*** -0.037 -0.020*** -0.008** -0.003*** 225,942
industries (0.014) (0.002) (0.035) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Personnel -0.107*** -0.044*** -0.064 -0.003 -0.010* -0.004*** 131,829
services (0.024) (0.002) (0.067) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Retail -0.049*** -0.017*** -0.146*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 406,310
and trade (0.013) (0.001) (0.034) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Business services 0.029** -0.041*** -0.015 -0.066*** -0.007** -0.003*** 249,263
services (0.014) (0.002) (0.030) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Transport -0.017 -0.008** -0.232*** -0.034*** -0.017*** -0.002*** 52,936
(0.024) (0.003) (0.059) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
Finance 0.072* -0.023*** -0.254*** -0.038*** -0.014* -0.003*** 69,823
(0.037) (0.005) (0.073) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001)
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; groups owning affiliates in different locations (commuting zones)
for at least one year between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include group level fixed effects, as well as local variable describing the employment share
of the group in each French region, interacted with years (to capture local market conditions). Regressions also
include the logarithm of the total number of implantations (HQ and affiliates) as well as group level exports in total
sales to capture the business cycle on international markets.
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2.5 Robustness checks
2.5.1 Common trend assumption and non-linear impacts
The discussion in section 2.3.1 shows that our setting is similar to a difference-in-differences
setting, where we contrast affiliates experiencing changes in travel times to their headquarters
with affiliates located in the same area which did not experience the same changes, because
of a different location of their headquarters. To test the common trend identifying assumption
underlying such a setting, and to investigate potential anticipation effects (or conversely, lagged
adjustment processes), we run a specification where we include lags and leads of our indicator
of travel time. Results are reported in the first three columns of table 2.5, for our indicator of
functional specialization (the share of employment allocated to production activities).
If anything, we detect anticipation effects in the business and personnel services industries;
unreported results show that these anticipation effects do not exceed one year. Lagged adjust-
ments only occur in the transport industry. Overall, although the simultaneous inclusion of three
indicators of travel times is probably too demanding in our setting, this experiment shows that
the response to changes in travel times occurs mostly in the year where affiliates experience
them in the manufacturing industries, personnel services, retail and trade and business services.
Columns (4) to (6) in table 2.5 propose a different experiment. In this second specification,
we investigate the potential non-linearities underlying our main results in table 2.2 and split our
travel time variable into three different classes: short travels, lasting less than 3hours, medium
length travels, lasting between 3 and 5hours and which would still be feasible (round trip) in
one day, and longer travels, lasting more than 5 hours. We obtain that in almost all industries
except in the finance industry, the relation between travel time and functional specialization is
low and insignificant for the shortest travels. In contrast, the relation is always highly significant
for medium range travels, which drive our main results in table 2.2. In most industries (manu-
facturing industries, personnel and business services, transport), the longest trips also contribute
significantly to our results. These findings are consistent with the descriptive statistics reported
in table 2.A of appendix 2.10, which show that the market share of HSR is highest for the market
segment of the longest trips.
2.5.2 Alternative identification strategies
Table 2.6 presents a series of important experiments, where we vary the identification strategy
in order to test the robustness of our findings. As previously, for compactness, results are only
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Table 2.5: Anticipation vs. Adjustment Effects, Non-Linearities
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
(Dependent variable: Anticipations and adjustments Non-linear impact of travel time
Share of prod. emp.)
Travel time at: Travel time at t:
t− 1 t t+ 1 shorter 3h to longer
than 3h 5h than 5h
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing industries 0.000 -0.008* -0.001 -0.004 -0.009** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Personnel services -0.012* -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.030*** -0.024**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Retail and trade -0.004* -0.006** 0.002 -0.001 -0.020*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Business services -0.012*** -0.010** 0.001 -0.008* -0.010** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Transport 0.011 -0.007 -0.023*** -0.009 -0.023*** -0.021**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Finance -0.006 0.000 -0.001 -0.026*** 0.017*** -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Sources: Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part
of multi-location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time
fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales
to capture the cycle on international markets Same samples and numbers of observations as in table 2.2.
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presented for our indicator of functional specialization (the share of employment allocated to
production activities). Column (1) simply replicates the results of table 2.2 as a benchmark.
In columns (3) and (5), we only use each third or fifth year in our panel, in order to identify
the impact of travel time on longer time differences. The cost of this strategy is obviously the
drastic decrease in sample size. Results are fully preserved in this experiment. We tend to
obtain higher point estimates when increasing the length of the time difference, but this finding
might be driven by the selection of survivors that is induced by this experiment.
In column (5), we estimate a specification where we remove the largest affiliates in each
commuting zone. This experiment is meant to test whether our results could be driven by
this sub-population of affiliates, which are most likely to be at the source of the endogeneity
concerns related to potential lobbying activity. Our results are however fully preserved. In
column (6), we propose another experiment which is directly inspired from Giroud (2013).42 In
this specification, we only use affiliates which only benefit from HSR for less than 50% of the
track to their headquarters. These observations are less likely to have lobbyied in favor of the
HSR line than those benefiting from it on the entire track to their headquarters. Again, results
are fully preserved in this experiment: if anything, we obtain higher point estimates than in the
baseline specification.
Last, column (6) of table 2.6 contains the evidence obtained from unrealized lines (see sec-
tion 2.3.1). It amounts to restrict the sample to affiliates which would have benefited from the
initial 1991 plan voted by the government if it had been implemented. Again, results are how-
ever preserved, and even somewhat amplified in the cases of the manufacturing, personnel and
business services industries.
42The setting in Giroud (2013) is very similar to ours: this author estimates the effects of headquarters’ proximity
to plants on plant-level investment and productivity using the opening of US airlines. To mitigate concerns related
to lobbying, he proposes specifications where he only considers indirect flights where either the last leg of the
flight (involving the plants home airport) or the first leg of the flight (involving headquarters home airport) remains
unchanged.
103
Table 2.6: Alternative Identification Strategies
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
Dependent variable: Baseline Longer time Removing Partial 1991
share of production differences: largest HSR track plan
employment 3 years 5 years only only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing Coef. -0.009*** -0.009** -0.017** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.019***
industries (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs. 426,595 156,189 86,121 423,677 369,587 209,537
Personnel Coef. -0.020*** -0.009 -0.049*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.026***
services (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs. 241,846 89,653 53,552 238,931 209,326 116,566
Retail and Coef. -0.008*** -0.006* -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007**
trade (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Obs. 1,045,869 382,129 230,819 1,043,053 917,541 464,929
Business Coef. -0.018*** -0.016** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.030*** -0.025***
services (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Obs. 401,844 148,698 90,025 399,065 334,041 202,592
Transport Coef. -0.016*** -0.032*** -0.024* -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.015*
(0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Obs. 138,865 50,795 30,714 136,052 117,185 65,123
Finance Coef. -0.005* -0.005 -0.019*** -0.004* 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs. 348,836 128,286 76,777 345,895 284,478 174,259
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time
fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales
to capture the cycle on international markets.
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2.6 Descriptive extension for the extensive margin
2.6.1 Empirical tools
Affiliate creation and destruction can not be studied in the previous regression framework but
they are controlled for since in practice these events are well captured by the affiliate level fixed
effects (which “purge” regressions from most of the selection bias which could arise). A thor-
ough econometric treatment of these events would require the specification of a discrete choice
model of implantation across commuting zones, which would not fit our main identification
strategy (in section 2.3.1). We leave this aspect for future research but propose as in Giroud
(2013) a series of regressions describing the relation between affiliate creation or destruction
and travel time.
For affiliate destruction, we propose a direct extension of the previous regression framework:
EXITijlt = αj + αlt + β.Tijlt + γ.Xjt + εijlt (2.5)
where EXITijlt is a dummy variable indicating that the considered affiliate is exiting from
the group.43 In our panel, inclusion of affiliate × group fixed effects (as in equation 2.2) would
capture too much heterogeneity because affiliates are on average present for only 3.2 years in
our panel. We therefore replace the affiliate × group fixed effects in equation 2.2 with group
level fixed effects, which preserve the identification of the β coefficient from variations in travel
time. Equation 2.5 is then estimated as a linear probability model, using the same estimation
procedure as in section 2.3.1.
Our treatment of affiliate creations44 is different and less powerful, since we can’t rely on
variations in travel time for such events. As in Giroud (2013), we simply choose to describe
characteristics of the new affiliates ZCREAijlt : we document whether new affiliates are set up
further or closer away (in terms of geographical distance or travel time Tijt), or whether an
HSR line is available for travels between these affiliates and their headquarters, as a function
of the size of the created affiliate, the total number of affiliates within group, etc. (variables in
Xijt).
43Affiliate “destruction” corresponds to actual closures or to resale of affiliates, while the group itself still oper-
ates in the same industry, with other affiliates (to abstract from more global market exit decisions).
44Affiliate “creation” correspond to actual creations or to acquisitions in our setting. We only consider affiliate
creation in pre-existing groups, which were furthermore already operating in the same industry (to abstract from
global market entry decisions).
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ZCREAijlt = αlt + β.Tijt + γ.Xijt + εijlt (2.6)
Commuting zone × time fixed effects are still identified and allow to control very precisely
for local shocks in these regressions.
2.6.2 Affiliates exits and entries
If travel time (and proximity) affects the management of remote affiliates, then it might also
affect the decision related to affiliate closures and openings. We first investigate closures in
table 2.7.We obtain that everything else equal, more distant affiliates (in terms of travel times)
have a higher probability to be terminated, either because they are more difficult to manage
and/or because they are less profitable - or simply because they are also “politically” distant
(Bassanini et al., 2015). These correlations tend to be higher in service industries (business
services, and especially finance industries). We also obtain that affiliates who benefited from
gains in travel time thanks to the HSR network expansion were less likely to get terminated,
while the probability of closure was also highly significantly reduced by gains at other affiliates,
which tends to confirm the resource constraints story.
Table 2.7: Travel Time and the Reshuffling of Affiliates: Exits
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
Dependent variable: Manufacturing Personnel Retail and Business Transport Finance
probability of exit Industries Services Trade Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Travel time 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Gains since entry -0.014*** 0.012** -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Gains at other affiliates -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of exits 0.428 0.354 0.415 0.465 0.423 0.485
Observations 426,487 241,677 1,045,416 401,694 138,778 348,801
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time
fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales
to capture the cycle on international markets.
The characteristics of affiliate entries are described in table 2.8. More precisely, we investi-
gate whether geographic distance or travel time to headquarters are related to different charac-
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Table 2.8: Travel Time and the Reshuffling of Affiliates: Characteristics of Entries
1993-2011, affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only
Dependent Distance Travel
variable: (ln) time
(1) (2)
Employment of affiliate -0.054*** -0.032***
(ln) (0.001) (0.002)
Gains at other affiliates 0.088*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004)
Other affiliate entry(ies) -0.219*** -0.200***
in same group (dummy) (0.008) (0.011)
Other affiliate exit(s) -0.099*** -0.044***
in same group (dummy) (0.009) (0.011)
Other affiliates are HSR users 2.061*** 1.724***
(0.008) (0.010)
Mean (un-logged) dependent variable 282 2.951
Observations 404,427 404,427
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: All regressions include industry (2 digits) × local (commuting zone) × time fixed effects to control for the
local market conditions, as well as (4digit) industry dummies. Regressions also include the (ln) number of affiliates
in the group as well as the group level exports in total sales to capture the cycle on international markets.
teristics of the group which might also “tap” into the scarce HQ managerial resources that are
to be shared across all affiliates. We obtain that larger affiliates, which are likely to be more
difficult to manage remotely (or for which the “size of stake” might be larger) tend to be created
closer to their headquarters, whatever the indicator of distance. Similarly, when other affiliates
experienced gains in travel time, thus freeing some HQ managerial resources, then affiliates
tend to be created at a greater distance (to enhance the gains to split, e.g. by settling closer to
their final market, at the cost of a larger managerial cost). Last, affiliate churning (creation but
also destruction), which might be demanding in terms of headquarters’ managerial resources,
are both negatively correlated with distant affiliate creations. Un-reported regressions show that
all of these results also hold industry by industry.
Conclusion
In this paper, we documented the impact of travel time between affiliates and headquarters of
geographically dispersed corporate groups on the management of such business organizations.
Guided by theory, we tested predictions on the population of French corporate groups, using
the expansion of the High Speed Rail network as an arguably exogenous shock on internal
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travel times. First, we obtained that a functional specialization induced by decreases in travel
times occurred in all industries and that it was most pronounced in the service industries, where
information to be transmitted is arguably softer (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). It amounts to the
shift of roughly one job from administrative to production activities, against 20% of a job in
other industries (retail, trade or manufacturing). At the group level, our regressions suggest
that it translates into an increase in the share of managers at headquarters. Second, we found
evidence that travel time between affiliates and headquarter can be considered as a monitoring
cost that leads to asymmetries of information and lower employment growth in remote affiliates
in most industries as found by Giroud and Mueller (2015) for the US manufacturing industry.
We also obtain evidence that managerial time is a scarce resource such that the management
and the employment growth of an affiliate is impacted by travel time from other affiliates to the
headquarters. This suggests that the management of spatially dispersed group is costly and less
efficient. Indeed, our results at the group level suggest that the impact on the operational profit
margin (in particular, via reduced labor costs) is significant in all industries.
Though suggestive of the interplay between communication and management in spatially
dispersed business organizations, our results leave several questions open. First, we leave for
future research the more ambitious question of the impact of HSR on group level overall ge-
ographic configuration decisions: location / relocation / splitting decisions in particular for
affiliates that are specialized in support activities within the group. This more global analysis of
firm organization would require an entirely different identification strategy. Second, we focused
in this paper on within group, HQ to affiliate communication. Natural extensions of our work
would be to extend the analysis to within group between affiliates communication and, more
importantly, to external communication: between firms and their suppliers or customers as in
Bernard et al. (2015), or between firms and investors (banking relationships as in Bernstein et al.
(2015), access to public programs, etc.). These aspects could have non-negligible productivity
or profitability impacts as well.
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Appendices
2.A The business travels of managers: HSR or Air?
2.A.1 Business travels by managers account for a significant share of HSR
travels
Table 2.9 is constructed from the most recent survey data about transports and provides a
breakdown of the clients of each mode of transportation in 200845. It shows that most HSR
travels have a private motivation, with only 35% of them having a business motivation - which
is a lower share than in the case of air or standard rail travels. However and strikingly in
the case of HSR, this contribution of business travels to total HSR traffic is largely driven by
managers: they account for 20% of total HSR domestic travels, and to more than half of business
HSR travels. Altogether, these figures suggest that managers, despite their low weight in the
workforce (typically 9 to 10%) are a non-negligible segment of HSR customers, in particular
among “business” customers.
Table 2.9: Break-down of Long Distance Domestic Travels by Main Purpose, in 2008
For each mode of transportation, by type of user (%)
Main purpose: Private Trips Business Trips
Type of users: All (High Managers All Managers
income)
Car 86 (33) 10 14 5
HSR 65 (29) 11 35 20
Other Rail 46 (13) 5 54 19
Bus 89 (20) 1 12 1
Air 54 (28) 14 45 32
Sources: SOES, Transport and travel survey, 2008.
Note: This survey was collected at the household level. Income is measured at the household (not respondent) level.
“High income” corresponds to the top quartile of the income distribution (total household income, normalized by
units of consumption). The category “Managers” describes the occupation of the respondent.
Managers account for 20% of all HSR trips. This represents 20/35 = 57% of HSR business trips.
The disproportionate contribution of managers to HSR travels is first driven by the fact that
they travel more in absolute terms: they contribute more to business travels, whatever the mean
of transportation, than their relative weight in the workforce. Second, their contribution is even
45For homogeneity concerns, we restrict the analysis to domestic trips, since in this paper we focus on domestic
HSR routes.
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more disproportionate for means of transportation dedicated to long distance travels: HSR and
planes.
2.A.2 HSR market share for long distance business travels: 1994 vs. 2008
Table 2.10 investigates what is the precise “market” of HSR, and what are its main com-
petitors46. First, the market share of HSR is highest, among domestic business travels, for the
longest trips: it reaches 42% on the segment of very long distance travels (longer than 800km),
on which airlines capture the second largest market share (33%). For travels of intermediate
length, the market share of HSR is still of 24%, but the contribution of other rail is larger
(31%), while it is negligible in the category of the longest trips. Symmetrically, air becomes a
residual category in the range of travels of intermediate length. Altogether, these results sug-
gest that over the recent period, HSR is one of the most popular mean of transportation for the
longest domestic business travels.
Table 2.10: “Market Share” of Each Mode of Transportation by Market Segment
Domestic Business Travels Only
Market shares in 1994 Market shares in 2008
Distance: <200km 200 to > 800km all all <200km 200 to > 800km all all
800km 800km
Weight: trips trips trips trips km trips trips trips trips km
Car 77 62 17 68 56 76 37 15 56 42
HSR 0 19 12 8 14 2 24 42 13 26
Other Rail 21 11 9 16 12 21 31 9 25 20
Bus 1 2 7 2 2 1 2 0 1 2
Air 0 6 43 5 13 0 6 33 4 10
Not answered 1 1 11 2 3 0 2 0 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Insee, Transport and communication survey, 1994, and SOES, Transport and travel survey, 2008.
Note: Both surveys are collected at the household level.
In 2008, HSR travels account for 13% of all trips (26% when weighted by distance), while air travels account for
4% of all trips (10% when weighted by distance).
Table 2.10 also provides some information about market shares at an earlier period, 1994,
which corresponds to the beginning of our period of observation. It shows that the extension of
the HSR network and its wider availability was accompanied by large gains in market shares.
46Unfortunately, the sample size of the survey does not allow to analyze the break-down of managers’ travels by
distance in a statistically meaningful way, especially for the shortest trips. Therefore, we only provide a description
of the aggregate of all business travels and assume that the discrete choice patterns of managers does not deviate
too much from them (which for the longest trips at least is a reasonable assumption).
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Figure 2.6: Market Shares of Rail and Air for the Passenger Market (Business and Non-
Business), 1993 - 2011
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Sources: compiled by SOeS - Ministry in charge of Transports from rail operators and DGAC.
This fact is further confirmed by figure 2.6, which shows that HSR traffic experienced a steep
growth while traffic by air and standard rail did not increase much.
This large market penetration by HSR is consistent with the fact that HSR was adopted
quickly by a significant share of professional users when it was introduced as a new trans-
portation device.
2.A.3 Further evidence from the evolution of the airline industry
This section documents the aggregate evolution of the airline industry over our period of
study: in spite of a structural liberalization episode between 1994 and 2000, the evolution of
the industry did not affect massively the options available to managers for their business travels
during the period.
The airline industry was marked by an important liberalization episode between 1994 and
200147, which witnessed the entry of several airlines on the French market (including the do-
mestic market), and the global increase of the supply of domestic flights. This pattern is doc-
umented on figure 2.7, which shows that while entry (and the supply of new flights) increased
steeply between 1994 and 2000 (panel (A)), the number of air passengers however did not fol-
low the same pattern and remained almost stable over the period (panel (B)). Due to a lack of
demand, the number of domestic flights decreased quickly between 2000 and 2004, to go back
to the supply level of 1993. Figure 2.6 shows that in contrast, transport by rail experienced a
47 For a description, see for example the report to the French Senate Senate (2001).
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massive increase over the period, with implied volumes that are several orders of magnitude
larger than total air traffic (as measured by total number of passengers, even when weighted by
distance traveled).
Figure 2.7: Supply and Demand in the Airline Industry, 1993 to 2011
(A) Number of domestic flights (capacity supplied) (B) Passengers of domestic flights
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Sources: Flux de Trafic Commercial (Commercial Traffic Flows), 1986 - 2013, DGAC (published in June 2014).
These patterns are suggestive of the fact that in spite of the liberalization episode, airlines
did not actually gain large market shares over other means of transportation, in particular rail.
Figure 2.8 shows that there was no huge change in the relative price advantage of airlines over
rail, neither over our period of analysis (given the parallel evolution of the two respective price
indices), nor today (when comparing fares for selected destinations). Over the recent period,
the number and frequency of connections by air is lower than the number and frequency of
connections by rail, and many destinations served by HSR are simply not served by airlines.
2.A.4 Discussion of potential biases
What is the likely impact of overlooking air connections in our computations of travel times?
If anything, this should produce an attenuation bias, which we expect to be small given the
previous developments. More precisely:
• Whenever managers use air connections (be they new or not) rather than rail, then HSR
travel time reductions are irrelevant, which generates attenuation bias in our setting.
• When airline connections appear (resp. disappear), then managers’ demand might reports
to air (resp. rail) in absence of rail travel time reduction. Travel time might change
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Figure 2.8: Prices of Transport by Rail and Air, between 1993 and 2011
(A) Aggregate Consumption Price Indices (B) Selected Prices Posted Online
Computed by the Statistical Institute as of March 2015
(base year 1998) for 38 Destinations with Departure from Paris
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Sources: Panel (A): French National Statistical Institute (Insee).
Panel (B): Online available prices as of March 2015, for 38 selected destinations (with departure from Paris) sorted
by distance:
Reims, Arras, Le Mans, Tours (St-Pierre-Des-Corps), Lille, Valenciennes, Dijon, Angers St-Laud, Metz, Poitiers,
Nancy, Maˆcon-Loche´ TGV, Rennes, Besanon-Viotte, Nantes, Niort, Lyon Part-Dieu, Angouleˆme, Lyon St-Exupe´ry
TGV, Strasbourg, La Rochelle, Mulhouse, Valence TGV, Chambe´ry Challes-les-Eaux, Annecy, Grenoble, Bor-
deaux St-Jean, Lorient, Brest, Avignon TGV, Nıˆmes, Dax, Aix-en-Provence TGV, Montpellier, Marseille St-
Charles, Toulon, Toulouse-Matabiau, Nice. Air fares are retrieved from the website of Air France (Hop!), the
leading airline company.
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(increase or decrease) in absence of HSR travel time variation, which would also generate
attenuation bias in our setting.
• When airline closures are related to HSR line openings, then actual travel time might
decrease by less than what we compute, or even increase. This would also generate
attenuation bias in our setting.
• Amplification biases could be generated by airline openings as simultaneous responses
to the opening of new HSR lines, in association with shorter travel times by air than by
rail. We however think that these events were relatively rare. Furthermore, these upward
biases are most likely low if travel time achieved by HSR is close to travel time by air
(including access to airport or train station, see the discussion in section 2.2).
2.B Details of the estimation method (Guimaraes and Portu-
gal, 2010)
The principle of the estimation method is to iterate on three sets of normal equations that are
conveniently defined. Let us first rewrite equation 2.2 in matrix format as:
Y︸︷︷︸
yijlt
= X B︸︷︷︸
β.Tijt+γ.X(ij)lt
+DI A
I︸ ︷︷ ︸
αij
+DLT A
LT︸ ︷︷ ︸
αlt
+ ︸︷︷︸
εijlt
(2.7)
where X is a vector encompassing our continuous treatment variable and additional contin-
uous explanatory variables (typically group exposure to international demand conditions, i.e.
export intensity), DI is the vector of the affiliate level dummies (αi), DLT the vector of the
commuting zone× year dummies (αlt), B, AI and ALT are the corresponding parameters to be
estimated. The three sets of normal equations are defined as follows:
 B = (X
′X)−1X ′(Y −DI AI −DLT ALT )
AI = (D′IDI)
−1D′I(Y −X B −DLT ALT )
ALT = (D′LTDLT )
−1D′LT (Y −X B −DI AI)

The algorithm is initiated at AI(0) = 0 and A
LT
(0) = 0. The first of equation provides the
first estimated value for B(1), which is plugged into the second set of equations to get AI(1) =
AI(1)
(
B(1), A
LT
(0)
)
. Then B(1) and AI(1) are plugged into the third set of equations to get A
LT
(1) .
This procedure is iterated until the sum of squared residuals no longer decreases.
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The benefit of decomposing the set of normal equations into the three sets above is that
it renders the estimation computationally tractable. Only the first set of equations requires an
actual matrix inversion, but it is of relatively low dimension. It can be performed by simple OLS
on the modified dependent variable Y −DI AI(n−1)−DLT ALT(n−1). The two last sets of equations
simply correspond to the computations of means: of the variable (Y −X B(n) −DLT ALT(n−1))
by affiliate across years (classes generated by DI), and of the variable (Y −X B(n)−DI AI(n))
by commuting zone × time across affilaites (classes generated by DLT ). This algorithm, which
consists in iterating sequentially across each set of equations, falls into the class of so-called
“partitioned” algorithms (“zigzag” iterations) which has been analyzed in full length by Smyth
(1996): while the iteration process is slow in general (unless covariates are orthogonal, but this
is not the case in our setting), the zigzag iteration is found to admit a global convergence result.
To compute the correct standard errors associated with the estimate of B, Guimaraes and
Portugal (2010) apply a result derived by Abowd et al. (2002), who show that the total number
of identified “fixed” effects is given by N I + NLT − G, where G is what they call (in their
application) the number of “mobility groups” (classes) generated by the two sets of fixed effects,
DI and DLT . In our case, this simply corresponds to the partition by geographical zones, i.e.
G = L. The formula for the computation of standard errors is then given by:
V (β̂) =
SSR
(N −NX −N I −NLT + L).N.s2time.(1−R2time)
where N is the total number of observations, NX is the number of variables in X , N I is the
number of affiliates andNLT is the number of commuting zones× time. Last, s2time is the sample
variance associated with the travel time variable and R2time is the coefficient of determination
obtained from a regression of travel time on all other remaining explanatory variables.
2.C Details of the French classification of occupations
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Table 2.11: French Classification of Occupations
Code Description of Occupation
2 Heads of businesses
34 Science and educational professionals
35 Creative professionals
37 Top managers and professionals
38 Technical managers and engineers
42 Teachers
43 Mid-level health professionals
46 Mid-level managers and professionals
47 Technicians
48 Supervisors and foremen
53 Security workers
54 Office workers (clerks)
55 Retail workers
56 Personal service workers
62 Skilled industrial workers
63 Skilled manual laborers
64 Drivers
65 Skilled transport and wholesale workers
67 Unskilled industrial workers
2.D Computation of rail travel times
This section describes the construction of rail travel times between headquarters and affiliates.
We relied on a two-step procedure:
• First, we simplify the network of trains stations and select only one “main station” by
commuting zone.
• Second, we collected and constructed time tables for the resulting list of 316 stations.
Rail travel time between an affiliate and its headquarters is then measured by rail travel time
between the respective “main stations” of the commuting zones where they are located. Travel
time between headquarter or affiliate and “main station” is neglected for two reasons:
• It is typically short, and it does not vary over time (while our identification strategy typi-
cally relies on variations in travel times - see section 2.3).
• Furthermore, managers who are asked to travel for professional reasons might depart from
home rather than from work: in such cases, travel time between headquarter or affiliate
and “main station” is not the relevant quantity. In absence of precise information about
the location where managers live, and from which station they might depart, the main
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station in each commuting zones is by construction48 the best statistical guess we can get
about it.
This fact therefore also motivates our choice to allocate each headquarter and affiliate to
the main station in their commuting zone, although the alternative of choosing the closest
station is discussed in detail in section 2.D.3 below (it does not make much difference
since the two candidate stations under each alternative are typically very close).
2.D.1 Selection of the “main station(s)” in each commuting zone
We select a set of 316 “main stations”, among the set of stations which existed in 1993, using
the following criteria:
• In cases where only one station in the considered commuting zone is served by HSR, we
select it as its “main station”.
• In cases where several stations in the considered commuting zone are served by HSR, we
select the station having the highest long distance traffic using an adequate score based
on the number of long distance services that are available in each station.49
• In cases where none of the stations in the considered commuting zone is directly served
by HSR, we select the station having the highest long distance traffic score.
• In the rare cases of ties, we select the station located in the most populated municipality.
• Stations that were specifically built to accommodate HSR services during our period of
estimation replace the previous “main station” in their employment zone from the date
they enter into service.
Overall, these “new HSR stations” have a large impact on rail travel times.50
2.D.2 Time tables between “main stations”
We then collected past and current timetables in order to recover the fastest train service
between any two directly connected “main stations”:
48Commuting zones are defined “as the geographical area within which most of the labor force lives and works,
and in which establishments hire most of their workforce”.
49To be more precise, we computed traffic scores as of 2013 (for data availability reasons), based on the total
number of services available in each station, but giving less weight to services with many local stops. The score is
computed as the sum of the squared average distance between any two consecutive stops for each service available
in the considered station.
50Which legitimates the investment required by their construction...
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• Travel times for train services which remained “local” over the entire period (i.e. those
implying no HSR service) were simply approximated by the 2013 timetables, which are
available on the open-data platform of the national rail company.
• For long distance services, we relied on rail fan web sites and the archives of the national
rail company, as well as on the evaluation reports of the French Ministry for Transporta-
tion (LOTI reports). These sources enable us to assess train travel times both before and
after HSR line openings.
The obtained database contains travel times between any two directly connected stations, at
any date between 1980 and 201351. We then complement it with travel times between any two
indirectly connected stations, assuming that each train change takes 15 minutes (a rather lower
bound).
2.D.3 Discussion
In table 2.12, we compare travel times obtained with our baseline procedure, where we allo-
cate each affiliate or headquarter to the main station in their respective commuting zone, with an
alternative procedure where we allocate each affiliate or headquarter to the closest main station
(not necessarily located in the same commuting zone). The main take-away of this table is that
absolute travel times are somewhat altered by this alternative choice of measurement, since the
average discrepancy for treated affiliates is 12 minutes (while the median is only 2 minutes).
However, changes (reductions) in travel times are far less affected, since they only occur via
new HSR line openings and therefore fundamentally rest on stations served by HSR, which are
the same in the two procedures. The precise distribution of these changes in our estimation
sample is plotted on figure 2.9.
51This time span encompasses our period of analysis and enables us to run the “placebo” robustness checks
presented in section 2.5.
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Table 2.12: Travel Times with Alternative Computing Procedures
Affiliates × years No travel time change Reduction in travel time
in our sample in our sample
Computation of travel time from/to: Com. Closest Diffe- Com. Closest Diffe-
Zone rence Zone rence
Distance to HQ (km) 160 - 450 -
HQ in Paris 29% - 36% -
Comparison of computing procedures:
Same zone (station) as HQ 42% 40% (4%) 0% 0% (0%)
Travel time after change (minutes) 95 98 7 232 240 12
Variation in travel time (minutes) 0 0 0 35 32 6
Share of firms with travel time change 0% 0% (0%) 100% 81% (19%)
Share of aff. benefiting from HSR service 33% 32% (2%) 100% 96% (4%)
Share of new HSR users 0% 0% (0%) 19% 16% (5%)
Direct track 72% 68% (7%) 47% 37% (13%)
1 change 14% 16% (8%) 25% 26% (16%)
2 changes or more 12% 15% (4%) 28% 37% (11%)
Nb observations (affiliates × year) 4,739,655 63,769
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see section 2.2.1 for definition) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Notes: The classification in columns between affiliates × years experiencing (or not) changes in travel times is
based on the computation of travel time between commuting zone which is actually used in our regressions. Notice
that around 40% of the affiliates × years experiencing no change in travel time are located in the same commuting
zone as their headquarters. For the 60% which are not located in the same commuting zone as their headquarters:
average distance to HQ is 273km, average travel time (between employment zones) is 162.3 minutes, and the share
of direct tracks (between employment zones) is 52.5%.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of travel time reductions at main dates of HSR line openings
Northern line (1993/94), connection to Marseille (2000/01) and Eastern line (2006/07)
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Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; affiliates (see definition in section 2.2.1) which are part of multi-
location groups between 1993 and 2011.
Note: Values are expressed in minutes. Firms which did not experience any change in rail travel time at the
respective dates were excluded: observations in the bin labeled by “0” correspond to strictly positive travel time
reductions, but that are smaller than 5 minutes.
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2.E Map from the 1991 Governmental Blueprint Document
Figure 2.10: Map of the HSR Lines Proposed in the 1991 Governmental Blueprint Document
Sources: Ministe`re de l’E´quipement (1991), French Ministry for Equipment.
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2.F Remote corporate control in France: the disproportion-
ate weight of Paris
Figure 2.11 provides a break-down of the indicator of figure 2.2 (section 2.2.1) and describes
in each commuting zone, the share of employment under control of HQs located respectively in
Paris, Lyon, Marseille or Strasbourg. The main take-away of this comparison is the dispropor-
tionate weight of Paris in terms of corporate control. In terms of geographical range, the map
shows that its sphere of “corporate influence” is particularly wide ranging, since most of the
territory is reached by Parisian headquarters. Lyon and Marseille also reach very distant areas,
but only occasionally and with a lower weight in terms of local employment.
Figure 2.11: Sphere of “Corporate Influence” of 4 of the Largest French Cities, in 2011
Share of private employment in each zone that is under control of HQs located in the respective cities
in percentage of total private employment (except agriculture and personnel services)
Paris
<1
1−20
20−50
>50
Marseille
Lyon
Strasbourg
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey, covering the private sector (except agricultural activities and
workers of the personnel service industries directly employed by households).
Notes: the four maps describe the share of private employment in each “employment zone” that is under control of
HQs located, respectively, in Paris, Lyon, Marseille or Strasbourg (i.e. the sphere of “corporate influence” of these
four large French cities.
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2.G Geographical distribution of the estimation sample
Figure 2.12: Localization of Business Units Benefiting from Rail Travel Reductions
Estimation Sample (Population)
(A) (B) (C)
Headquarters Affiliates Affiliates befiting
from that year’s
HSR line opening
1994
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<200
200−500
500−1000
>1000
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1994
2001
<200
200−500
500−1000
>1000
2007
1994
2001
<1
1−50
50−100
>100
2007
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; business units (HQs or affiliates - see section 2.2.1 for definition)
which are part of multi-location firms between 1993 and 2011.
Note: The different dates correspond to the opening date of the Northern line (1993/1994), of the connection to
Marseille (2000/2001) and to the opening date of the Eastern line (2006/2007).
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Part II
Wage inequality by skills, labor demand
and local labor markets : evidence from
France
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Chapter 3
Wage inequality and the labor demand by
skills in France : national trends and
spatial dynamics
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Introduction1
Wage inequalities have increased a lot in the US since the 1980s (see, e.g., Goldin and Katz
(2008), Juhn et al. (1993), Card and Lemieux (2001)), giving birth to a broad literature on wage
inequalities and, in particular, on wage inequalities by skills. This literature relates the rela-
tive wage of college-educated workers with respect to workers who completed high-school, to
the evolutions of the education level of workers (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu
(2002), Autor et al. (2008), Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). Since, both the relative supply and
wage of college educated workers increased in the US during that period, this entails a rise in
the relative demand for college educated workers or, in other words, a skill-biased shift in labor
demand. Main explanations proposed for the skill-biased shift in labor demand in the US are
market factors such as technical change and globalization. These factors are common to de-
veloped economies such as France and it is likely that they also impacted their labor demand.
But, in France, there has been no such increase of wage inequalities by skills (Verdugo (2014)
and figure 3.1). We thus investigate in this chapter whether the decreasing wage inequalities by
skills in France have hidden a skill-biased shift in labor demand.
Figure 3.1: France/U.S. Comparison: Cumulative Log Changes in Real Weekly (U.S.) and Real
Daily (Fr) Wages since 1967.
Source: France: DADS-EDP data. 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector,
Weighted by Job Duration. U.S.: Full-Time Full-Year Male Workers, from Acemoglu and Autor (2011);
1This chapter is based on a joint work with E. Coudin and M. Gaini and a joint work with M. Orand.
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A part of the literature documented this skill-biased demand shift and its causes in other
countries than the US. The U.K., Canada, Germany, and Portugal do yield evidence in favor of
a skill-biased demand shift. Over the 1980s and the 1990s, skill premiums and residual inequali-
ties increased in these countries but with varying degrees of strength, see e.g. Card and Lemieux
(2001), Dustmann et al. (2009), Machado and Mata (2005). For France, this skill-biased shift
in demand has not been much studied and probed. Goux and Maurin (2000) provided some
evidence of a skill-biased shift in France between 1970 and 1993, of a smaller extent than
in the U.S. Studies on panel of European countries including France also provide some results.
Machin and Van Reenen (1998) used a panel on seven OECD countries between 1973 and 1989,
including France, and found a significant association between skill-upgrading and R&D inten-
sity. They concluded that skill-biased technical change is an international phenomenon. Goos
and Manning (2009), studying the distribution of employment between occupations in Europe,
found evidence of job polarization in France between 1993-2006. Polarization is the fact that
the demand for jobs at the bottom and top of the wage distribution increases while the demand
for jobs in the middle of the wage distribution decreases. It can be viewed as a refinement of
the hypothesis of a skill-biased demand shift. This could explain increasing wage inequalities
by skills if low-skilled workers move from jobs in the middle of the wage distribution to jobs at
the bottom.2
Hence, evidence for France is limited to some periods or to some dimensions. We propose a
broad picture of the trends in the supply, demand and wages of high-skilled workers relatively
to low-skilled between 1967 and 2009 in France. We use annual linked employer-employee
administrative panel data (DADS panel) matched with the census sample database (e´chantillon
de´mographique permanent), which yields high quality information on wages and education.3
We focus on full-time private sector workers and the analysis is restricted to male in order to
limit labor market participation issues.4 We document a strong decrease in wage inequalities
over 1967-2009, even stronger once we control for composition changes in education and expe-
rience. The high-skilled/low-skilled wage gap strongly decreased over the period, along with a
strong increase in the high-skilled workers relative supply. Then, we use a supply and demand
model a` la Card and Lemieux (2001) to estimate demand effects on the high-skilled/low-skilled
relative wage and we find that there has been a skill-biased demand shift in France and that it
has an upward effect on the relative wage of high-skilled workers with an order of magnitude
between half and 100% of what is found in the U.S. It means that if there has not been an in-
2But Goos and Manning (2009) did not relate it to wages.
3The wage information is compulsorily reported by firms to social and fiscal organizations to compute social
contributions and pensionable earnings.
4Papers in the literature run separate regressions for men and women (see Lemieux (2006) or Autor et al.
(2008)) or focus only on men (Dustmann et al. (2009)).
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crease in the supply of high-skilled workers, the wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled
workers would have increased. We then run some simulation exercises using our estimated pa-
rameters to compute projections of wage inequalities by skills up to 2030. We find that under
reasonable assumptions, wage inequalities may increase in France in a similar way as already
happened in the US.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and section 2 the trends in
labor supply and wages by skills in France over the last forty years. In Section 3, we present
the empirical strategy to test for the presence of a skill-biased shift in demand and in section 4
the results. Section 5 is dedicated to a robustness analysis of our results with respect to issues
of selection into employment and labor cost. Section 6 proposes complementary results by
extending the analysis to local labor markets and testing whether the skill-biased shift in labor
demand is homogeneous across local labor markets.
3.1 Data
We use the panel subsample of the De´clarations Annuelles de Donne´es Sociales (DADS)
matched with the Census, Echantillon de´mographique permanent (EDP) dataset.5 The analysis
is conducted from 1967 to 2009, except for 1981, 1983, 1990 (years for which wage data are
unavailable) and 1994 (because of poor quality data).
The DADS is an exhaustive administrative database of annual employer-employee wage bill
information with compulsory completion by any firm. It contains information on wages, work-
ing periods and the private sector employers of wage earners born at chosen dates. The panel
DADS is a subsample extracted from the DADS for scientific use.
The EDP database collects census information – e.g. education at the census dates – and
civil status administrative information for a sample of the population of France. Since 2004,
the exhaustive French population census, which used to be carried out once a decade, has been
replaced by annual census surveys, in which nearly 10% of the population are interviewed. We
use the data from the exhaustive population censuses of 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999 and the
census surveys for 2004 to 2009. Hence among young cohorts, that is, individuals who finished
their studies after 1999, the last exhaustive census year, the education level is only known for
individuals interviewed by at least one census survey after the end of their studies. This concerns
approximately 80% of those who ended their studies between 1999 and 2004, but only 13% for
5Those databases are produced by INSEE (French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).
135
the ones who finished in 2008. So, we weight the observations concerning those individuals to
avoid a deformation of the per-year population structure.6
Sample. The analysis is restricted to 15- to 64-year-old male wage earners working full-time
in the private sector and born in France. To ensure that the wage distribution is representative
of the total number of days worked in the economy, the working periods are weighted by the
number of working days which they report. Working periods corresponding to internships and
apprenticeships are excluded from the analysis because their remunerations are often fixed by
law and do not reflect an evaluation of skills. We also exclude intervals of work while studying
because the level of education attained at this point is unknown. Finally, our sample contains
approximately 40,000 observations per year between 1967-2009.
Wage, education, and experience. The variables used in the analysis are the wage, the high-
est degree obtained (education), and the experience accumulated as a wage earner in the pri-
vate sector. The wage and experience variables are constructed using the information from the
DADS panel and the education variables from the EDP dataset.
The wage variable is the real (deflated by the consumer price measure) net (social contribu-
tions excluded) daily wage in 2009 euros, i.e., the sum of net earnings (including all one-shot
remunerations paid during the year) for a given job spell, divided by the number of working
days for that given job spell. The DADS wage information is used by the social security and
fiscal organizations. This ensures the data quality in comparison to self-reported wage informa-
tion from survey data such as the Labor Force Survey, which may suffer from declaration bias.
More precisely, wages and bonuses are totally covered. Profit sharing and wage-saving schemes
are covered, but only for the portion immediately paid to the worker.7 This may be a limitation,
6We obtain weights for the individuals who ended their studies after 1999 and for whom information about
educational degrees has been collected – i.e. who were interviewed by at least one census survey after the end of
their studies – in the following way. First, note that the school-leaving year is not observed; we only know whether
or not an individual completed his/her studies at the date of the census survey. So we simulate a school-leaving year
for each individual, calibrated on the school-leaving year distribution by degree and cohort observed in the Labor
Force Survey. Then, for each individual with the same school-leaving year, we invert the sampling probability
of being interviewed in at least one annual census survey after that school-leaving year. For instance, those who
finished their studies in 2000 are weighted by one over the probability of being interviewed in at least one census
survey between 2004 and 2009, and those who finished in 2006, by one over the probability of being interviewed
at least once in the census survey 2007 to 2009. The weighted distributions of degrees per cohort obtained in our
data do not differ from those observed in the Labor Force Survey.
7In 2010, 49% of the employees of firms of more than 10 employees received some income from profit sharing
schemes, for an average of 6.9% of wages. Profit sharing schemes include ”inte´ressement”, and ”participation”.
The ”inte´ressement”, created in 1959, is optional but its coverage increased greatly in the end of the 1980s (590
000 covered workers in 1986, and 2 millions in 1990). The ”inte´ressement” equals 3%-4% of the wages. The
”participation”, created in 1969, is mandatory for firms of more than 100 employees, and more than 50 employees
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especially for the recent years, during which these remuneration schemes have grown. How-
ever, the amounts involved are still quite modest, and usually proportional to wages (Amar and
Pauron (2013)).
The education variable indicates the highest degree obtained at the end of studies. We
follow Abowd et al. (1999) and construct seven groups of educational attainment: no degree re-
ported or elementary school level, junior high-school degree, basic vocational degree, advanced
vocational or technical degree, high-school degree (BAC), some college (BAC+1, BAC+2) and
university degree (BAC+3 and more). The French labels for education groups are detailed in
Table 3.5 in the Appendix, together with their shares in the panel population.8
The experience variable refers to the experience accumulated as a wage earner in the pri-
vate sector. It is constructed as the sum of the shares of working days per year from a given
individual’s first appearance in the DADS panel up to the current working period.9
3.2 National trends in wage and labor supply by skills
In this section, we document trends in labor supply and wage by skills in France on the period
1967-2009. Up to now, due to data limitations, there has been in fact not much evidence for
France on wage inequalities by education level over such a long period.
3.2.1 The democratization of education and the rise of high-skilled work-
ers supply
From 1967 to 2009, the composition of the French male labor force changed dramatically.
The education level vastly increased: the share of workers with no diploma decreased from
62% in 1967 to 18% in 2009. Older – and less educated – workers were gradually replaced
since 1990 but the design of the scheme is firm-specific. It has also expanded since 1986. The participation amount
is not immediately paid out to the worker; it stays in a blocked account for 5 years.
8Declared education may differ between censuses. We favor the information in the census that was declared
directly after the end of studies or after having turned 27. The idea is to minimize potential memory bias. When
no degree is declared in that census, we use the information reported in the following ones. Individuals whose
information is still missing after these procedures are excluded from the analysis.
9Before 1976, the DADS panel is only available for a subsample of individuals. So, we assume that individuals
present in the DADS in 1976 or before with a school-leaving year anterior to the year of first appearance, were
employed between the end of their studies and their first appearance in the panel. We argue that this is not a strong
assumption because unemployment and part-time work were not frequent in the 1960s-1970s, especially for men.
Furthermore, the DADS data is missing for 1981, 1983 and 1990. To correct the experience variables for the
following years, we average the shares of working days per year for the year just before and for the year just after
the missing year and we add this average to the experience variable.
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by more educated new cohorts due to a succession of pro-education policies: first, increases
in the minimum school-leaving age, which was raised from 12-13 to 13-14 years-old in 1936,
and from 14 to 16, in 1959; 10 second, a strong drive to promote the democratization of educa-
tion, which gradually took effect from the 1960s to the 1990s at each level of education. In the
1960s, in connection with the increase in the school-leaving age, access to Junior/Basic degrees
became much more common: 40% of new labor market entrants held a basic vocational degree
in 1967, as shown in Figure 3.2. This share remained stable until 1990. Since 1990, changes in
the level of education in the labor force have principally come about through expanding shares
of high-school, advanced vocational and post-secondary degree holders. Once more, a politi-
cal impulse led to these evolutions. In the mid-1980s, the government promoted the national
objective of bringing 80% of a cohort to the baccalaureate level, i.e., up to the completion of
general or vocational high-school training. A new vocational high-school degree was created,
the ”Baccalaure´at professionnel”. In the 1990s, the share of new entrants with a basic voca-
tional degree decreased, and the share with this advanced vocational one rose. The passing rate
of the Baccalaureat also increased from 65% at the beginning of the 1980s to 73% at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. This eased access to post-secondary education. The share of labor market
new entrants with post-secondary education, either some years of college or a university degree,
doubled from 1989 to 2000 (17% in 1989 versus 32% in 2000).
3.2.2 Decreasing wage inequalities
Figure 3.3 shows that the overall wage inequality among private-sector full-time male work-
ers declined in France from 1967 to 1973 and has been declining again since the 1990s, whereas
it remained stable in between. From 1967 to 2009, the Q90-Q10 log wage difference decreased
by 0.17. In terms of wage levels, the Q90 wage was 3.5 times (=exp(1.26)) higher than the
Q10 in 1967, whereas in 2009, it was 3.0 times higher. In comparison, in the U.S. over the
same period, the Q90-Q10 weekly log wage difference of full-time male workers increased
by approximately 0.4, and the hourly log wage difference respectively by approximately 0.2.11
Figure 3.3 also shows the evolution of wage inequality keeping the 1967 labor force structure
by education and experience groups on the whole period. The decrease in wage inequality is
dramatically more pronounced once we control for skill-composition changes. Wage inequal-
ity only plateaued during the 1980s. Moreover, the decrease in wage inequality was driven by
10Before 1936, individuals could quit school at 12 if they had completed a certificat d’e´tude, 13 if not. After
1936, both minimum leaving school ages were increased by one year. The Berthoin reform in 1959 established a
sole legal minimum school leaving age of 16.
11Similarly, the Gini coefficient (for annual earnings in commerce and manufacturing) increased from 0.4 to 0.5
in the U.S., whereas it slightly decreased from .32 to .29 in France.
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Figure 3.2: New entrants on the labor market : shares by education of full-time male Workers
with less than five years of experience.
Source: EDP-DADS data. 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector with less than 5 Years
of Experience, weighted by Job Duration.
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decreases at both tails of the wage distribution. Inequalities decreased at a constant pace at
the bottom half of the distribution during the whole period (Q50/Q10). For the top half of the
distribution (Q90/Q50), raw inequalities declined only at the very beginning of the period and
since the mid-2000s. When controlling for skill composition, inequalities at the top half of the
distribution decreased on the whole period, with a sharp acceleration since the 1990s.
These trends in wage inequalities are in sharp contrast with the US ones but the evolution of
the very top wage inequalities slightly balances the picture. Amar (2010) and Landais (2008)
show that the wage growth rate of the top 1% of wage earners has dramatically increased since
the end of the 1990s. The Q99-Q90 log wage differential reported in Figure 3.3 has indeed in-
creased since the mid-2000s, but in a moderate way. This phenomenon has therefore been, and
remains at present, more concentrated than the comparable case in the U.S. or the U.K. Gode-
chot (2012) finds that it concerns mainly the top 0.1% and that the finance sector is responsible
for half of the rise in inequality.
The increasing top wage inequality trends in the U.S. have been explained by the increasing
relative wage of high-skilled workers with respect to low-skilled workers (some college and
university wrt high-school). In France, the decrease in top wage inequalities is concomitant
with a decrease in the relative position of high-skilled workers (some college and university
wrt high-school), especially for low-experience groups, as shown in figure 3.4 which displays
median wages by education level at 1 and 25 years of experience.12 More precisely, wages
increased quite uniformly across education and experience groups from 1967 to the beginning
of the 1970s. Since then, group patterns have diverged. For low-experience workers, wages
were stable during the 1970s except for university degree holders, who experienced a decrease.
Changes were rather similar for all education groups in the 1980s but, since the mid-1990s,
the gap between the university group and the high-school group has decreased. Among more
experienced workers, wages of both university and high-school graduates decreased between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, and then remained stable. Figure 3.4 also reports other
group wages: advanced vocational degree, basic vocational degree, and no degree at all, which
follow trends similar to the wages of high-school graduates.13
12As a given education and experience group may not contain enough observations in a given year, we use
estimated median wages for each group. We estimate a Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) regression model, in
which education group dummies are interacted with experience (in years) up to a third-order polynomial to allow
for different education-group-rewarding profiles of experience, and to account for the non-separability of these two
human capital types.
13The cases of junior high-school (very similar to basic vocational) and some college (very similar to university)
degree owners are not reported, for readability.
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Figure 3.3: Log wage inequality trends : observed and adjusted for education and experience
composition
Log wage quantiles differentials
Source: EDP-DADS data, 15 to 64-year-old full-time male Workers in the private sector, weighted by job
duration.
Note: Observed differentials of log wage quantiles are reported in Black. Differentials of log wage quan-
tiles with 1967 Education and Experience Structure are reported in grey. The latter are obtained with the
reweighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996). Weights are computed with a logit specification involving
education group dummies interacted with experience, experience2, and experience3.
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Figure 3.4: Median log daily wages by education and experience levels
(a) One Year of Experience (b) 25 Years of Experience
Source: EDP-DADS data, 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector, weighted by Job
Duration. Note: Median Log Wages obtained by year-by-year- Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) regressions
of Log Wages on Education Dummies interacted with Experience, Experience2, and Experience3. The cases of
junior high-school (very similar to basic vocational) and some college (very similar to university) degree owners
are not reported, for readability.
3.3 Empirical strategy
In France, as the supply of high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers increased,
it is consistent to find that, contrary to the US, their relative wage decreased. However this
evolution may nevertheless hide evolutions of the labor demand by skills. Hence, we now turn
to the demand side and estimate whether the dynamics of the demand for high-skilled workers
relatively to low-skilled workers have been similar between the US and France. In that case,
potential explanatory factors common to both countries should be first investigated while in the
opposite case, institutional factors might be more relevant. In this section, we detail the em-
pirical strategy used to test for the presence of a skill-biased shift in labor demand in France
between 1967 and 2009. We focus on skills measured by education levels, although experience,
the second component of the Mincer equation, is also a major skill. But the level of experience
of the 15-65 year old male is quite stable on the period as an increase in the length of studies
and in unemployment occurred concomitantly to the aging of the labor force (Charnoz et al.
(2011)). Since the evolution of labor supply by education is much stronger, the analysis focuses
on education levels and only controls for experience levels. More results on the evolutions of
experience premiums can be found in Charnoz et al. (2011). More precisely, we analyze uni-
versity and college groups, versus high school and less than high-school groups. In the US,
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low-skilled workers are high-school drop-outs but in the French context, it is more relevant to
include also workers with only a high-school degree. Either they graduate with a vocational
high-school degree, which is considered low-skilled on the labor market or with a non voca-
tional high-school degree which is not much valued on the labor market if not followed by post
secondary education. Moreover, less than high school group wages are closely connected to the
minimum wage, whereas it is much less the case for more educated groups.14
3.3.1 Aggregate supply and demand model
We follow the setting of Card and Lemieux (2001), Autor et al. (2008), Acemoglu and Autor
(2011), among others. It derives relationships between labor supply, demand and wage by
skills from a production function at the national level. Parameters of interest are then estimated
empirically using mostly time variations.
More precisely, we assume an aggregate constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function, with two factors, high-skilled labor (H), i.e. college and university graduates, and
low-skilled labor (L), i.e. high-school or less than high-school graduates. 15 The model extends
Katz and Murphy (1992) and allows for imperfect substitution between different groups of
experience within an education group by introducing two sub-aggregate CES forms:
Yt = ((ALtLt)
ρ + (AHtHt)
ρ)
1/ρ
, (3.1)
with Lt =
(∑
j
αjL
η
jt
)1/η
and Ht =
(∑
j
βjH
η
jt
)1/η
(3.2)
where Ljt and Hjt are the quantities of low-skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) belonging to the
group of experience j, observed at period t. We consider four groups of experience: 0-9, 10-
19, 20-29, and 30-39 years of real experience. Parameters αj and βj are the relative efficiency
parameters between the labor of different experience groups. They are assumed to be constant
in time. ALt and AHt are the factor-augmenting technology terms of period t for each skill
group. Finally, the elasticities of substitution between labor types are accounted for by ρ and
η. ρ = 1 − 1/σ, where σ is the aggregate elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and
low-skilled labors. η = 1 − 1/σE , where σE is the partial elasticity of substitution between
different experience groups within the same education group. σE is assumed to be equal in the
14See Charnoz et al. (2011) and Verdugo et al. (2012) who related the decrease in the bottom half French wage
inequality to minimum wage increases.
15It might be more accurate to label them as high-educated and low-educated but we choose to use the most
common terminology of the literature.
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two education groups. Deriving the marginal products of each type of labor and equaling them
to the wage rate entails that the wage ratio of high-skilled vs low-skilled workers belonging to
experience group j is :
wHjt
wLjt
=
(
AHt
ALt
)ρ
αj
βj
(
Hjt
Ljt
)η−1(
Ht
Lt
)ρ−η
. (3.3)
or
log(
wHjt
wLjt
) = β0t + β1(log(
Hjt
Ljt
)− log(Ht
Lt
)) + β2log(
Ht
Lt
) + δj (3.4)
where β1=η−1=−1/σE and β2=ρ−1 =−1/σ. They are assumed constant over time. δj=log(αjβj )
accounts for the experience-group relative efficiency parameters. log(Ht
Lt
) stands for the rela-
tive aggregate labor supply and log(Hjt
Ljt
), the experience-group relative labor supply. β0t =
ρlog(AHt
ALt
) accounts for the relative technology term.
3.3.2 Estimated equations
For each year and experience group j, empirical estimations of the relative wage log(wHjt
wLjt
),
of the relative aggregate labor supply log(Ht
Lt
) and the experience-group relative labor supply
log(
Hjt
Ljt
) can be estimated. δj can be estimated by experience group fixed effects.
β0t is usually interpreted as a technology factor as it arises from a production function. In
the empirical setting, it can be interpreted more generally as any factor impacting the demand
for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers, hereafter demand shifters. There
is evidence of a skill-biased demand shift if we find that the relative demand factor β0t is not
constant over time and, in the case of a bias in favor of high-skilled labor, increases significantly.
β0t is not observed. To be the most flexible, we could estimate it with year dummies but, in that
case, the effect of the aggregate supply could not be identified and thus the year dummies could
not be interpreted as the relative demand for high-skilled workers and that would prevent us
from testing for the presence of a skill-biased demand shift. In fact, Card and Lemieux (2001)
proposed a model in which time dummies absorb both supply and demand shifters, but only as
a robustness check for the estimation of the partial elasticity of substitution between experience
groups, which is the only identified parameter in that case. We run this robustness check but,
as our main specification, we prefer to follow the literature and estimate the relative demand
term with a polynomial time trend, choosing the order that fits best our data. Note that in
the literature, when a skill-biased shift in demand is found in this setting, it is interpreted as
a Skill-Bias Technical Change (SBTC) as it can be related to the technology parameter of the
production function. We prefer to take a conservative position and refer to it as a skill-bias shift
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in demand. Finally, as we suspect that if there has been a skill-biased shift in demand, it would
have been induced by market factors similar to the US, we also want to control for institutional
factors. So, in some specifications, the minimum wage is added as a control. Indeed the level of
the minimum wage may affect the labor demand, and in particular the demand for low-skilled
workers.
This leads to estimate
log(
wHjt
wLjt
) = β0 +Xtγ + β2log(
Ht
Lt
) + β1(log(
Hjt
Ljt
)− log(Ht
Lt
)) + δj + jt. (3.5)
where Xt contains square or cubic time trends capturing the unobserved relative demand term
and, in some cases, other institutional demand shifters such as the minimum wage level.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the specification, we also estimate the Katz and Murphy
(1992) model which is similar, except that it does not allow for imperfect substitution between
experience groups. It therefore only uses variations between years and not between experience
groups, and leads to estimate
log(
wHt
wLt
) = β0 +Xtγ + β2log(
Ht
Lt
) + t. (3.6)
The primary parameters of interest are the time trends, which are expected to be significantly
increasing. But we are also able to recover an estimation of the aggregate elasticity of substi-
tution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and of the partial elasticity of substitution
between different experience groups within the same education group.
The main concern with this empirical strategy is the possible endogeneity of the labor supply
by education level. The lengthening of studies could be a response to an increase in the demand
for skilled labor. Moreover, in the short run, supply may also be affected by demand; for
example, low-skilled workers may withdraw from the labor market if the demand for low-skilled
workers is too low. Another limit is that the analysis is based on the choice of a functional form
of the production function. The empirical strategy used here do not allow to tackle these issues
but is still of interest as a descriptive tool of stylized facts and for a comparison of France with
the US, for which it has been widely used in the literature.
3.3.3 Relative supply and wage computations
To estimate our regressions, we need to compute for each year an estimation of the price
(wage) and quantity (supply) of high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers of each experi-
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ence group (0-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40). To estimate the price, a simple method would be to
compute the mean or median of wages for each group, but, as we use ten-year-interval for expe-
rience and only two categories of education, composition effects might affect such estimations.
Regarding quantity, we could use the number of days worked by each group but it would not
take into account the fact that, for example, a day of work of a university worker may not have
the same value in terms of input in the production function as a day of work of a some college
worker. A similar reasoning holds within the low-skilled group and within 10-year-experience
groups. To tackle these issues, we use the micro-data presented in the previous section to com-
pute composition-adjusted estimations of the relative wage (log(wHjt
wLjt
)) and supply (log(Ht
Lt
) and
log(
Hjt
Ljt
)), following Autor et al. (2008) (details in appendix 3.A). Figure 3.5 shows the trends
of the resulting relative labor supply and wage. We find similar trends as the ones observed
with more detailed education groups : an increase in the relative supply of high-skilled workers
and a decrease in their relative wage. The relative supply measures are computed with male
observations only. To check whether the strong feminization of the labor force changes results,
we also consider relative supply measures computed on male and female observations. Results
are the same and not presented for the sake of brevity.
3.3.4 Projections
Using the estimated parameters, we are also able to simulate the relative wage out to 2030 to
assess the future evolutions of wage inequalities by skills. To run such an exercise, we need to
make assumptions on the evolution of the relative labor demand (β0t in equation 3.4). We test
several shapes : a constant (equal to to the level in 2009), a linear, a quadratic, and a cubic time
trend. We also need projections out to 2030 of the aggregate and the experience-group supply
measures. We use a simplified framework to obtain these projections. To focus on the effect of
changes in education rather than changes in the sizes of cohorts, we consider that in the future
the experience structure of the labor supply is fixed to the setting observed in 2009. So, for
each future year, the number of workers, or of working days per one-year experience group, is
fixed to the levels observed in 2009. However, their education structures change. The education
structure of each one-year experience group simulated for a given year is the one observed (or
simulated) the year before, for the group with one year less of experience. We make the implicit
assumption that each year, each worker gains one year of experience, and we do not allow for
inflows and outflows of the working population. The education structure of new entrants is the
one observed in 2009.
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Note: log relative supply: ratio of the college-equivalent to non-college equivalent labor supply index in efficiency
units. Log relative wage and labor cost: log of a fix-weighted ratio of college to high school predicted LAD wages
and labor costs to adjust for composition by experience and education changes over 1967-2009.
Figure 3.5: Changes in college/high school relative supply, relative wages and labor costs
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Hidden skill-biased demand shift between 1967 and 2009
In this part, we present the results of our estimations and assess if there has been a skill-biased
shift in labor demand in France.
The results of equation 3.5 estimation are reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.1. Columns
(1)-(3) refer to the pooled OLS estimates with different specifications for the demand shifters
Xt. We also estimate in column (4) the model proposed by Card and Lemieux (2001), in which
time dummies absorb both supply and demand shifters. Finally, we estimate the canonical Katz
and Murphy (1992) model (equation 3.6), in which experience groups are assumed to be perfect
substitutes. Results are reported in columns (5)-(6). We report the partial R2 of the different
covariates to study their explanatory power in explaining the relative wage gap.
Examining time trends, we find evidence in favor of a skill-biased demand shift : in Table
3.1, we report the p-values of F -tests for a null time trend16 and this nullity can be rejected at
10%. To give an idea of the magnitude of the skill-biased demand shift involved, but keeping
in mind the precautions required by potential imprecision, we compare the estimated French
levels of the time trend to those found in the U.S. by Autor et al. (2008).17 Depending on the
specifications used in Table 3.1, the increase in the relative log wage gap due to the time trend
ranges from .51 to .70 after 40 years, vs .94 for the U.S.18 That represents between 55% and
80% of what is found for the U.S.
Low-skilled workers’ wages are on average closer to the minimum wage than high-skilled
workers’ wages. The effect of the strong increase in the minimum wage that occurred over
the period may therefore have been greater on low-skilled workers, especially through spill-
over effects whose intensity decreases over the wage distribution.19 The minimum wage is thus
included as a potential demand shifter, in columns (2) and (3).20 Partial R2s of the minimum
16F -tests do not account for the fact that relative wages are predicted.
17The time variable used in the analysis is centered in 1963 to allow direct comparisons with Autor et al. (2008).
18Using estimates of Katz and Murphy (1992) model, the increase in the relative log wage gap due to the time
trend is smaller: between .17 to .36.
19The French minimum wage is set in blanket fashion and covers all workers, with no regional or sectoral
differences. Since 1970, its level is increased by a percentage that cannot by law be less than one-half of the
growth in the real hourly earnings of manual workers (skilled and unskilled). Its growth is given by a fixed linear
combination of the blue collar hourly wage growth (”salaire horaire de base ouvrier”), the changes in inflation, and
certain discretionary one-shot increases, called ”coups de pouce” or boosts, which the government can add to the
automatic re-evaluation. The minimum wage also increased from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s following the
implementation of the 35-hour workweek reduction, (Law Aubry I and II, and Law Fillon); see Figure 3.14 in the
Appendix.
20In column (6) for the Katz and Murphy (1992) model.
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Table 3.1: Estimates for the high-skilled/low-skilled relative wage, 1967-2009
with imperfect substitutability between experience groups Katz-Murphy model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demand side
Time -0.000 0.021* 0.010 -0.016*** -0.019*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.009)
Time2/100 0.088*** -0.011** 0.050 0.121*** 0.134***
(0.033) (0.005) (0.069) (0.018) (0.038)
Time3/1000 -0.011*** -0.007 -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004)
Minimum wage -0.203*** -0.091 0.032
(0.077) (0.148) (0.081)
Supply side
Rel. Aggreg. supply -0.475** -0.321 -0.444* -0.342** -0.352**
(0.238) (0.201) (0.244) (0.129) (0.133)
Rel. exp. group supply -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.194***
minus rel. aggreg. supply (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
σ 2.107 3.112 2.251 2.927 2.838
σE 5.205 5.178 5.196 5.159
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Experience group Dummies Y Y Y Y N N
Year Dummies N N N Y N N
Nb obs 156 156 156 156 39 39
R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.94 0.94
Pval F-test of no time trend 0.053 0.058 0.090 0.000 0.000
Partial R2 Ag. Sup 0.026 0.017 0.022
Partial R2 Exp. 0.426 0.428 0.427
Partial R2 Min Wage 0.046 0.003
Source: EDP-DADS Data. 15- to 64-year-old full-time men working in the private sector.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Each column reports OLS regression results of the composition-adjusted high-skilled/low-skilled relative
wage on indicated variables. Wages are computed weighting by the number of worked days. The log relative aggregate supply is the log of the
ratio between the high-skilled labor supply measure and the low-skilled labor supply measure in efficiency units. Experience group dummies
are included. Year dummies are included in columns (4). Time, in years, equals 1 in 1964. The year 1994 is not included in the computations
because of poor quality data. See the Appendix for details. F tests are not corrected for the fact that relative wages are predicted.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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wage is about 5%, when quadratic time trends are used to capture demand shifters, and null with
a cubic time trend. The explanatory power of the minimum wage is hence quite small compared
to that of the experience-group relative supply (40%). Changes in the minimum wage seem
less relevant to explaining the high-skilled versus low-skilled wage differential than changes
in relative labor supply. So, even in the French context of a minimum wage set comparatively
high, minimum wage does not exert substantial influence on the high-skilled/low-skilled relative
wage gap, and even if it did, changes in minimum wage would negatively affect the wage gap,
entailing an under-estimation of the skill-biased demand trends. In contrast, its rise explains the
decrease of wage inequalities at the bottom half of the distribution well (Charnoz et al. (2013)
and Verdugo et al. (2012)).
Then, we focus on the estimates of the aggregate elasticity of substitution between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers, and of the partial elasticity of substitution between experience
groups within an education group, that we use for our projections. As expected in a sup-
ply/demand model, we observe negative effects of the aggregate supply on the relative wage
gap, and of the relative supply in one’s own experience group. Point estimates for the aggregate
elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labors, σ, range from 2.1 to 3.6
(with large standard deviations), which is not so far from what is usually found in the U.S. or
the U.K. – between 1.6 and 3.21 Dustmann et al. (2009) find for Germany an elasticity of sub-
stitution between medium-skilled and low-skilled workers of around 4. In the Katz and Murphy
(1992) version of the model, our estimates for σ are somewhat larger, around 4.
In contrast to the aggregate elasticity, the partial elasticity of substitution between the expe-
rience groups is always precisely estimated. Depending on the specification used, the estimates
range between 4.6 and 5.2, which is close, but again slightly higher than what is found for
the U.S. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) report an elasticity of substitution between potential ex-
perience groups of 3.7 when they use both men and women. Card and Lemieux (2001) find
elasticities of substitution between age groups of around 5 when they focus on men only. Our
estimate for the partial elasticity of substitution across experience groups is similar (5.2) when
we consider the Card and Lemieux (2001) model, in which time dummies account for both
aggregate supply and demand shifters. We differ here from the results of Verdugo (2014), who
estimates this model on the French Labor Force Survey data, 1990-2008. He finds much higher
estimates of the partial elasticity of substitution between experience groups: between 8 and
12.5.
In the next section, we use these estimated parameters to compute some projections of wage
inequalities by skills in the next twenty years.
21See Autor et al. (2008), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Card and Lemieux (2001).
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3.4.2 Wage inequality projection exercise
We find evidence a skill-biased demand shift but, in France, contrary to the U.S., the addi-
tional supply of high-skilled labor was not over-compensated by this increase in demand for this
type of labor. In Tinbergen’s context of a race between education and technology (Tinbergen,
1974, 1975), for France, education leads the race. Yet the decrease in the relative wage would
have been much more pronounced if the demand for high-skilled labor had not increased.
As documented above, since the beginning of the 2000s, the educational structure of new
labor market entrants has somewhat stabilized. Might this lead to a turning point for wage
inequality trends, as in the U.S. in the 1980s, when wage inequality started to grow as the
supply of high-skilled labor slowed down? We propose a simple simulation exercise in order to
give a first answer.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 presents the different evolutions of the relative labor demand we
assume for our projections. Results of our projections of the wage of high-skilled workers
relatively to low-skilled workers out to 2030 are reported for 3 experience groups in panels
(b), (c) and (d). For workers with less than 10 years of experience, if the time trend effect
on the relative demand persists, the relative wage of high-skilled workers will sharply increase
from 2010 to 2020. The magnitude of this increase depends on the form of the time trends
(constant, linear, quadratic or cubic) but all specifications (except the constant one) lead to this
sharp increase in relative wages up to 2020. What will happen after 2020 depends on the form
assumed for the time trend: the increase will continue if the relative demand follows a linear or
quadratic rate or decrease if the relative demand decreases (cubic trend). Similar evolutions of
the relative wage are found for the group of workers with 10 to 19 years of experience, but a
decade later.
These simple simulations thus show that a rise in wage inequalities by skills similar to the US
may occur in France if the demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers
keeps increasing. To be able to assess whether this is plausible, one needs to assess the causes of
the skill-biased shift in the US and in France. For instance, if this is due to ICT dissemination,
and if France has not yet reached the US level, it is reasonable to assume that the skill-biased
shift in labor demand is not yet over in France. Finding evidence on the determinants of the
French skill-biased shift in demand is the purpose of the chapter 5.
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Figure 3.6: Simulations of relative wages
(a) Simulated time trends (b) Experience 0-9 years
(c) Experience 10-19 years (d) Experience 20-29 years
Source: DADS-EDP data, 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector.
Note: For years ≥ 2010, supply measures are simulated. Supply measures are computed in worker efficiency
units in worked days. Observed and predicted wages are reported up to 2009. Relative wages are predicted from
Card-Lemieux model regressions as presented in Table 3.2 with future demand shifters (minimum wage) equal to
the observed level in 2009, with cubic and quadratic time trends. We also consider the case when the future time
trend is constantly equal to the 2009 level and the case of a linear trend. Subfigure (a) reports the corresponding
time trends. See the Appendix for details.
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3.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct complementary analyses to check the robustness of our results.
The latter may be subject to certain caveats. First, unemployment changes may affect the two
skill groups differently, leading to unexpected changes in wage and supply measures. Second,
up to this point we have considered net wages, for the reason that total labor costs, i.e. total
wages paid by the firm, which are more relevant measures, are not available during the whole
period. This section examines robustness of our results to these concerns.
3.5.1 Selection into employment
The relative wage and the relative labor supply may be mis-estimated if unemployment af-
fects high-skilled and low-skilled workers differently, and if these differences in the employ-
ment selection processes change over time and/or space. In what follows, we run several exer-
cises, all of which lead us to think that variations of selection into employment do not affect our
evidence of a skill-biased shift in demand.
First, we compare the results of Table 3.1 for which the relative wages and supply measures
are weighted by job duration, and the same measures, with one annual wage observation per
worker only, and without weighting by the job spell duration (columns (1)-(4) in Table 3.2).
The wage in that case refers, for workers who occupied several jobs sequentially during the
year, to the average daily wage over these different job spells. So workers who did not work
year round – potentially due to spells of unemployment – bear the same weight as those who
worked year round. We only miss individuals fully and continuously unemployed during more
than one calendar year, a very small group.22 The time trend estimates differ slightly but the
magnitudes involved are quite similar.
Further, we compute our relative wage and supply measure on a modified dataset that we
construct exploiting the panel structure of our data. We add to the initial micro data an annual
observation for the individuals missing for a particular year, but observed the year before and
the year after. We impute for this year a wage for each of them, equal to the average of their
wages the year after and the year before. We then compute new measures of relative wage and
supply and new estimations of our supply and demand equations (columns (1b)-(4b) in Table
22We also miss the self-employed and public servants. We have data on the public sector from 1988, a time
period too short for us to run our estimations. However, inequalities and wage trends are very similar when the
public sector is included. Moreover Verdugo (2014) finds similar trends on the sub-period 1990-2008 using the
French Labor Force Surveys that provide information on both private and public sector wage earners.
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3.2). The estimates for the time trend (and for the elasticities of substitution) are very similar to
those of our main specification.
Table 3.2: Estimates for the high-skilled/low-skilled relative wage with imperfect substitutabil-
ity between experience groups, 1967-2009, robustness check
With supply measures in worker units
(equal weight per worker) (equal weight per worker and one-year missing imputed)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Demand side
Time -0.004 0.021** 0.009 -0.003 0.019** 0.003
(0.006) (0.010) (0.018) (0.005) (0.009) (0.017)
Time2/100 0.086*** -0.013** 0.038 0.082*** -0.012** 0.057
(0.030) (0.005) (0.068) (0.027) (0.005) (0.065)
Time3/1000 -0.011*** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.008
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
Minimum wage -0.222*** -0.121 -0.202*** -0.062
(0.076) (0.153) (0.068) (0.148)
Supply side
Rel. aggreg. supply -0.372** -0.276* -0.346* -0.376** -0.270* -0.360** -0.221***
(0.183) (0.161) (0.186) (0.169) (0.151) (0.173) (0.021)
Rel. exp. group supply -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.221*** -0.222*** -0.221*** 0.536***
minus rel. aggreg. supply (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030)
σ 2.688 3.624 2.886 2.662 3.710 2.776
σE 4.644 4.623 4.633 4.604 4.520 4.504 4.516 4.515
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Experience group Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies N N N Y N N N Y
Nb obs 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.67
Pval F-test of no time trend 0.033 0.028 0.053 0.022 0.028 0.041
Partial R2 Ag. Sup 0.027 0.020 0.023 0.033 0.021 0.029
Partial R2 Exp. 0.454 0.456 0.456 0.483 0.483 0.484
Partial R2 Min Wage 0.055 0.004 0.056 0.001
Source: EDP-DADS Data. 15- to 64-year-old full-time men working in the private sector.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Each column reports OLS regression results of the composition-adjusted high-skilled/low-skilled relative
wage on indicated variables. Wages are computed weighting by the number of worked days (columns 1-4) or weighting each worker who
worked at least once full time by one (columns 1b-4b). The log relative aggregate supply is the log of the ratio between the high-skilled
labor supply measure and the low-skilled labor supply measure in efficiency units, in days (columns 1-4) and worker units (columns 1b-4b).
Experience group dummies are included. Year dummies are included in columns (4) and (4b). Time, in years, equals 1 in 1964. The year 1994
is not included in the computations because of poor quality data. See the Appendix for details. F tests are not corrected for the fact that relative
wages are predicted.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
We also compute our projections weighting each worker by one instead of worked days in
our relative wage and supply measures (figure 3.7). Results are similar. For the 10-19 years of
experience group, the relative wage of high-skilled workers increases sharply up to 2020. The
main difference is that it increases even when we assume a constant trend for the relative labor
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demand. For the other groups of experience, results are similar to those found with our main
specification.
Figure 3.7: Simulations of relative wages, robustness check
(a) Simulated time trends (b) Experience 0-9 years
(c) Experience 10-19 years (d) Experience 20-29 years
Source: DADS-EDP data, 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector.
Note: For years ≥ 2010, supply measures are simulated. Supply measures are computed in worker efficiency
units. Observed and predicted wages are reported up to 2009. Relative wages are predicted from Card-Lemieux
model regressions as presented in Table 3.2, with future demand shifters (minimum wage) equal to the observed
level in 2009, with cubic and quadratic time trends. We also consider the case when the future time trend is
constantly equal to the 2009 level and the case of a linear trend. Subfigure (a) reports the corresponding time
trends. See the Appendix for details.
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3.5.2 Total labor cost and net wages
Net wages differ from total labor cost by the payroll tax amount, paid either by the employer
or the employee.23 The payroll tax legislation depends partly on the remuneration level, and the
firm size. Changes in payroll tax legislation may entail that total labor cost and net wage trends
differ slightly, and as total labor cost is more relevant in the context of a production function
setting, this could affect our estimates of a skill-biased demand shift.
We have individual information on the total labor cost paid by firms since 1995 only.24 This
does not provide enough time variation to conduct an analysis similar to the one conducted with
net wages. We propose to control for changes in payroll taxation between 1967 and 2009 by
including the median total labor cost to median net wage ratio in our estimations.
We first describe shortly the evolution of this ratio in relation with the evolution of the French
legislation. Payroll taxes increased continuously from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s,
even during the slow growth of the 1980s. First the employee-paid contributions increased, then
the employer-paid ones did (INSEE (2009)). Consequently, the net wage to labor cost ratio at
the median decreased from 1975 to the mid-1990s, and has stabilized since then (figure 3.15 in
appendix).25 Since 1993, several payroll tax subsidies for low wages have been paid to firms
to protect low-qualified employment. They were largely extended between 1995 and 1996. In
July 1993, these payroll-tax subsidies represented around 5% of the gross wage at the minimum
wage, and 18% in October 1996. They concerned wages up to 1.33 minimum wage, i.e. almost
one third of the workers in the private sector, but the level of the subsidies was degressive
with the wage level. Ultimately, from the beginning of the 1990s until 1996, the employer-
paid contributions at the minimum wage decreased by 18 percentage points, from 40% to 22%
(Cre´pon and Desplatz (2001) and Kramarz and Philippon (2001)). Since 1997, and parallel
to the implementation of the reduction of the workweek to 35h, payroll tax subsidies have in
part been extended to higher wages, up to 1.6 × the minimum wage, again in a degressive
fashion. These changes lead to an increase in the net minimum wage to labor cost ratio since
the mid-1990s but they do not affect the ratio at the median.
Table 3.3 presents the results of our robustness check that lead us to believe that, due to
23Including two taxes, the ”contribution sociale ge´ne´ralise´e”, (CSG) introduced in 1990 and the ”contribution
pour le remboursement de la dette sociale” (CRDS), introduced in 1996.
24The total labor cost, computed in 2009 euros, is constructed by adding to the wage variable the total amount
of the social contributions - whether paid by the firm or the employee. These social contributions are computed
a posteriori by applying the applicable legislation rules, which depend on the year, the wage level, the number of
employees in the firm, etc. The programs used to compute the labor cost at an individual level were constructed by
the INSEE Division ”marche´s et entreprise”, see Cottet, Quantin, and Re´gnier (2012)
25The daily labor costs are computed using the average number of hours worked per day. These two series are
borrowed from Nouveau and Ourliac (2012a) and Nouveau and Ourliac (2012b).
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Table 3.3: Estimates for the high-skilled/low-skilled relative wage with imperfect substitutabil-
ity between experience groups, 1967-2009 : controlling for changes in payroll taxation
With supply measures in days With supply measures in worker units
(weighted by job duration) (equal weight per worker)
(1) (2) (3) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Demand side
Time 0.001 0.025* 0.013 -0.001 0.031** 0.016
(0.007) (0.013) (0.018) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018)
Time2/100 0.099*** -0.015* 0.056 0.118*** -0.022** 0.060
(0.037) (0.009) (0.069) (0.038) (0.010) (0.070)
Time3/1000 -0.013*** -0.008 -0.016*** -0.010
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Minimum wage -0.233** -0.111 -0.294*** -0.152
(0.092) (0.150) (0.099) (0.154)
Median labor cost -0.144 -0.123 -0.169 -0.317 -0.254 -0.350
to net wage ratio (0.210) (0.209) (0.213) (0.237) (0.226) (0.239)
Supply side
Rel. aggreg. supply -0.510** -0.330 -0.479* -0.489** -0.330* -0.469**
(0.244) (0.201) (0.248) (0.202) (0.168) (0.203)
Rel. exp. group supply -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.214*** -0.216*** -0.215***
minus rel. aggreg. supply (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
σ 1.962 3.032 2.086 2.044 3.029 2.131
σE 5.227 5.192 5.220 4.663 4.631 4.650
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Experience group Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.62
pval F test for no trends 0.055 0.138 0.171 0.020 0.055 0.065
Source: EDP-DADS Data. 15- to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Men working in the Private Sector.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Each column reports OLS regression results of the composition-adjusted high-skilled/low-skilled relative
wage on indicated variables. Wages are computed weighting by the number of worked days (columns 1-3) and weighting each worker who
worked at least once full time by one (columns 1b-3b). The log relative aggregate supply is the log of the ratio between the high-skilled
labor supply measure and the low-skilled labor supply measure in efficiency units, in days (columns 1-3) and worker units (columns 1b-3b).
Experience group dummies are included. The log of the median labor cost to net wage ratio is included in the regressions to control for changes
in payroll taxation. Time, in years, equals 1 in 1964. The year 1994 is not included in the computations because of poor quality data. See the
Appendix for details. F tests are not corrected for the fact that relative wages are predicted.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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changes in payroll tax legislation, the skill-biased demand shift effect on the relative wage found
previously may in fact underestimate the true effect. The coefficient relative to the median total
labor cost to median net wage ratio is imprecisely estimated but we obtain time trend estimates
that predict, after the mid-1990s, a stronger increase in the relative wage than what we found
previously. The increase in the relative wage due to changes in demand after 40 years is now
very similar to the U.S., between 82% and 102% of the effect found by Autor et al. (2008).
The evidence of a skill-biased shift in labor demand in France between 1967 and 2009 seems
thus robust to both selection into employment and changes in payroll taxation.
3.6 Extension to local labor markets
France has experienced a skill-biased demand shift over the last 40 years, but the strong
increase in educational attainment has masked this trend up to now. Evidence of skill-biased
demand shift has been found for many other developed countries and its causes are much de-
bated. One of the most cited cause of those shifts is technical change, which is thought to be
skill-biased : information and communication technology (ICT) is hypothesized to have been
complement to high-skilled jobs but substitute to some unskilled jobs. The rise of ICT would
therefore entail a deformation of the relative demand. Globalization and offshoring could also
explain the transformation of the relative demand for skilled workers, for it would lead to a de-
crease of demand for unskilled jobs in rich countries with high labor costs. Other explanations
could be social or demographic trends such as the increasing labor force participation of women
or the ageing of the population that may have increased the demand for workers in child and
elderly care. Similarly, if more educated workers have different taste in consumption, the rise of
the population education level may have increased demand for unskilled jobs in some specific
industry such as tourism or entertainment for instance.
Recent papers (Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor et al. (2013)) used differences between local
labor markets to test for some of these potential explanations for the US. Moreover Moretti
(2013) and Lindley and Machin (2014) have documented that, in the US, inequalities in labor
supply and wages by skills tend to diverge across local labor markets : they have increased more
in some major cities. Moretti (2013) relates this feature to the fact that the demand for high-
skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers increased more in these large cities. In other
words, the skill-biased shift in labor demand has a spatial dimension. Potential candidates to
explain these differences between local labor markets are technology, trade and agglomeration
economies. These are mostly market factors and not institutional ones, and common to devel-
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oped economies. We thus suspect that similar trends on the spatial dynamics of labor demand
occurred in France too. As there is almost no evidence on the trends of labor supply, demand
and wages by skills at the level of local labor markets in France, we document them in this sec-
tion and, in the next chapter, we propose a test of the ICT hypothesis using differences between
French local labor markets.
3.6.1 Literature
Lindley and Machin (2014) showed that in the US, the rise in wage inequalities between
1980 and 2010 by skills has a spatial component. They first documented that wage inequal-
ities between skills increased more in some labor markets (defined as states or Metropolitan
Statistical Areas, MSA) and that the supply of high-skilled workers increased more in the same
labor markets.26 Drawing on the canonical Katz and Murphy (1992) relative supply and demand
model and estimating it for states or MSA’s, they then showed that there has been an increas-
ing spatial inequality in the relative demand for high-skilled workers. Moretti (2013) pointed
out that high-skilled workers usually do not live in the same places as low-skilled workers and
that taking into account the cost of living might lead to different conclusions on “real wage
inequalities” (or well-being inequalities) between high and low-skilled workers as local prices
vary sharply across space. He indeed found that the rise in inequality in the last 30 years in the
US is much lower when taking local prices into account. This naturally leads to the question
of why high-skilled people concentrated in more expensive places. He showed that it was, at
least partly, due to a spatial shift in the relative demand for high-skilled workers and not merely
to the fact that high-skilled workers got more attracted by the amenities of the cities. Diamond
(2015) showed that an endogenous increase in the amenities of high-skilled cities also occurred
and reinforced the demand shift.
There is less evidence on the evolution of the spatial dimension of wage inequalities by skills
in France. Combes et al. (2008), Combes et al. (2012) and Combes et al. (2015) analyzed the
spatial distribution of wages and skills in France on average on the last 20 years but they did not
provide results on time trends. These papers belongs to a literature which explain why wages
are higher in some places (often the most dense areas). This literature estimates whether this is
due to the fact that high-skilled workers tend to live in different places than low-skilled workers
(sorting) or to the fact that workers are more productive in denser areas thanks to agglomeration
economies (Duranton and Puga (2004)). For France, Combes et al. (2008) showed that the
sorting of workers by skills explains the major part of spatial wage inequalities in France and
26See also Berry and Glaeser (2005).
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Combes et al. (2012) showed that workers in denser areas are more skilled. However most
recent papers of this literature (de la Roca and Puga (2012) and Combes et al. (2015) for an
application on French data) showed that, due to learning by doing effects, workers are becoming
more productive in denser areas and remains more productive even after moving out of these
areas. There are therefore “dynamic agglomeration economies” and the distinction between
skill sorting and agglomeration economies effects is more complex. The analysis presented
here is complementary to this literature in the sense that it studies the wage inequality between
high and low-skilled workers within local labor markets, rather than estimating how much of
the wage inequality between local labor markets is due to skill composition effects.27 And it
also documents trends (between 1982 and 2011) rather than global results for a studied period.
3.6.2 Data and empirical strategy
In the US, Moretti (2013), Lindley and Machin (2014)) found a spatial divergence both in
supply and wages of high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled. As a comparison, we present
here a similar analysis for France between 1982 and 2011.28
Data issues
We use mostly the same data set (the EDP-DADS panel, an administrative database of an-
nual employer-employee wage bill information matched with some Census information) and
measures of relative supply and wage as in the previous chapter. We also use the same sample
of male private sector wage earners. In the data set, the location of work is available at a fine
geographical level (municipality). As administrative units are not a relevant geographical level
of observation for labor market issues, we use the ”employment zones” level, a zoning similar
to the commuting zones used by Autor and Dorn (2013) and specifically designed to study local
labor markets. There are 304 French employment zones (2010 zoning) but, we aggregate some
of the least populated of the same region to get enough observations to estimate our supply and
wage measures. We end up with 86 zones29 (see appendix 3.C for details on the aggregation
method used). To measure the supply of workers by education level, we can also use the 1982
and 2011 Censuses. This allows us to get more observations, and also to test the robustness of
our results by computing a supply measure on the whole labor force rather than on the private
27One link between these approaches would be to account for differences in agglomeration economies by skills.
Baum-Snow et al. (2014) propose such an approach on US data.
28Results are focused on men to be consistent with the first part. In the literature, they are often presented on
men and women. Results on men or women for France are not presented here but are very similar.
29Results are robust to various ways of aggregating employment zones.
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sector wage earners, thus taking into account potential selection issues. For this reason, and
since we need for the analysis to compute changes between two points in time, we use 1982 as
the start year and 2011 as the end year for the spatial analysis run in this chapter.30
Relative wage and supply measures. As in the previous chapter, we use the log of the daily
wage. Relative wages of high-skilled compared to low-skilled workers are also computed in
a similar fashion than in the previous chapter (appendix 3.A for details) but for each local
labor market separately. Relative supply is the share of high-skilled workers among male wage
earners of the private sector, computed in ‘efficiency units ’and worked days for each local labor
market.31 Using the Censuses, an alternative measure is computed in efficiency units with each
individual in the labor force weighted as one, independently of the number of days he worked,
and including unemployed individuals, self-employed and public employees. Supply measures
computed on male and female are also used in robustness checks.
Spatial relative supply of high-skilled workers
In this section, we investigate the relative distribution of high-skilled workers across French
employment zones and its evolution between 1982 and 2011.
The map of Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of our measure in efficiency units of the share of
male high-skilled workers in France.32 The employment zones of Paris and Saclay (the largest
Parisian university campus) have a particularly high supply of male workers with a college or
university degree, close to 35%. Large urban labor markets such as the ones around Grenoble,
Lyon or Toulouse also have a share close to 30%. Employment zones with the lowest shares are
mostly agricultural areas.
Figure 3.9 depicts the share of high-skilled among male workers by zone in 1982 and 2011
and reports the fit of a linear relationship between the two dates. The increase in the level of
education of workers, that we have described in the previous section, occurs everywhere but
with variable intensity across areas. There is a positive relationship between the level in 1982
and in 2011. The coefficient of the linear regression is significantly higher than 1, indicating a
spatial divergence : the employment zones that had the highest share of high-skilled workers
in 1982 experienced the largest rise in this share. Inequalities in high-skilled workers supply
30To our knowledge, there is no other source on wages by education level over a similar period of time available
for France with a bigger sample.
31This measure is slightly different from the one used in the previous section because of the empirical strategy,
see next section.
32This is computed for male and weighted by job duration in the private sector, but it is similar for male and
female or when taking each individual of the labor force and weighting by one rather than by job duration.
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Figure 3.8: Share of male high-skilled workers by employment zones in 2011
<0.14
0.14−0.16
0.16−0.2
>0.2
Source : EDP-DADS panel, metropolitan France, 15-65 year old male labor force.
Note : Share of male high-skilled workers in efficiency units. Within a region, some employment
zones are grouped, see the Appendix for details.
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between employment zones have thus increased. These trends are very similar to those observed
in the US, where high-skilled workers have concentrated in some specific metropolitan areas
(Moretti (2013), Lindley and Machin (2014) among others).
Figure 3.9: Share of high-skilled workers by employment zones in 2011 and 1982
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Source : Insee, EDP-DADS, metropolitan France, 15-65 year old male wage earners working in
the private sector.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Share of high-skilled workers in efficiency units and worked
days. Estimations are weighted by employment zones population size. The size of the bubble is
proportional to the employment zone population size. Within a region, some employment zones
are grouped, see the Appendix for details.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The spatial concentration of high-skilled workers can be due to an increase in their mobility
toward these places or/and to an increase of the level of education of people from these places.
To give some clues regarding these issues, we use the place of birth of workers33 (Degorre
(2015)) and compare it to their place of residence using French Censuses. We consider a worker
has moved if he does not live in his department of birth. The mobility rate of high-skilled
workers did not evolve much on the studied period, while that of the low-skilled workers has
increased but remained lower than the one of the high-skilled workers (see figure 3.10 (a)).
In order to further shed light on this issue, we regress the share of high-skilled workers by
place of birth in 2011 on the one in 1982, to compare with the estimation by current place of
work in Figure 3.9. This is done at the department level as it is the only available information.
The coefficient is also significantly higher than 1 (figure 3.10 (b)) : the level of education has
increased more where it was already high in 1982. These elements seem to indicate that the
concentration of high-skilled workers is not due to a dramatic change in mobility patterns, but
33It is at the department level rather than at the employment zone level as only this information is available.
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rather to the fact that people increased their level of education more in some places than others.
This could due to differences in local education choices or policies.
Figure 3.10: Spatial mobility of workers
(a) Mobility rate by education level 1982-2011 (b) Share of high-skilled workers by department
of birth in 1982 and 2011
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Source : Insee, Censuses, metropolitan France, 15-65 year old labor force.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by department population size. The
size of the bubble is proportional to the department population size. Mobility rate is defined as the share
of workers not living in their department of birth.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
Wage inequalities by skills across local labor markets
This section investigates how the differences in high-skilled relative wage between local labor
markets have evolved during the period 1982-2011.
In 1982, the high-skilled relative wage was lower in large cities, mostly because the wage of
low-skilled workers was higher there. To study the evolution of spatial patterns, we relate the
1982 relative wage by employment zones to the one in 2011 (figure 3.11). The dispersion of the
relative wage is lower in 2011 than in 1982, so it got more homogeneous across space between
1982 and 2011. The slope is not significantly different from 0, which means that there is no
link between the hierarchy of employment zones in terms of relative wage in 1982 and 2011.
In other words, in France during the last 30 years, the relative wage of high-skilled workers
has decreased less in large urban areas, where it was initially lower. There therefore has been
a convergence between employment zones of the relative wage of high-skilled workers which
is in sharp contrast with the United States where a divergence occurred (Lindley and Machin
(2014), Moretti (2013)).
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Figure 3.11: High-skilled/low-skilled relative wage in 2011 in function of 1982, by employment
zone
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Source : EDP-DADS panel, metropolitan France, private sector, 15-65 year old male wage earners in the private
sector.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by employment zones population size. The log
relative wage is the log of a fix-weighted ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled predicted LAD wages, adjusted for
composition by experience and education changes. LAD wages are computed weighting observations by the job
duration. Within a region, some employment zones are grouped, see the Appendix for details.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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To sum up, in France, as in the US, the high-skilled workers concentrated in large urban areas
in the last 30 years. But, whereas a divergence of wage inequalities by skills between local labor
markets occurred in the US, a convergence is observed in France. This can be related to the
fact that the markets where the share of high-skilled and their relative wage were higher were
the same in the US but not in France. To further explore and understand the similarities and
differences in French and US local labor markets dynamics, we now turn to the exploration of
the spatial differences in the demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers.
Empirical strategy
In line with Moretti (2013), we test whether the skill-biased shift in labor demand found in
the previous chapter is homogeneous across local labor markets. The approach is similar to
that of the previous chapter since it derives equations to be estimated from theory. However the
equations are based on relationships determined at the equilibrium of the model, whereas the
theoretical model was only partially solved in the previous strategy. Lindley and Machin (2014)
used an approach more directly derived from the models we used at the national level. They
estimated a Katz and Murphy (1992) model for each labor market, thus treating each market
separately. This approach does not take into account the potential mobility of workers and
differences in local prices and amenities between labor markets. Therefore, one major concern
is the endogeneity of the local labor supply. To address this issue, Lindley and Machin (2014)
proposed an instrumental variable strategy based on the place of birth of workers. We have seen
in the previous section that the mobility pattern in France did not change much and that the
concentration of high-skilled workers was probably more linked to local education choices. An
instrument based on the place of birth would not be very relevant for France. This is why we
prefer to use Moretti (2013) approach.
More precisely, Moretti (2013) uses the predictions of a theoretical model of supply and
demand with two types of workers (more and less educated) and spatial equilibria on the labor
and housing markets. This allows him to assess whether the spatial concentration of high-
skilled workers is due to a demand shift. If it is due to a demand shift, the share of high-skilled
workers has to increase in those areas where the skilled jobs are. If it is a supply shift, some
areas become more attractive for some other reasons, such as amenities. The model predicts
a relationship between changes in the share of high-skilled workers and changes in education
premiums. The estimated equation is the following :
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l being a local labor market, log(wHl
wLl
) the relative wage of high-skilled compared to low-
skilled for a local labor market l (adjusted for skill composition, see appendix 3.A), Hl
Hl+Ll
the share of high-skilled workers (in efficiency units). Estimations are weighted by the 1982
population size of employment zones.
As stressed by Moretti (2013), it is not a causal relationship but an equilibrium relationship.
If the concentration of high-skilled workers (as observed in the US and in France) is due to
a demand shift, there should be a positive correlation between their changes (β significantly
positive) : because the relative demand of high-skilled workers increased more in some places,
high-skilled workers concentrated there and their wage premium (or relative wage) increased
(relatively to other places). If it is a supply shift, then no relation should be observed (β not sig-
nificant). High-skilled workers concentrated to some places expecting a higher utility through
amenities but not through wages. Diamond (2015) proposed another approach, also based on a
theoretical model, but, contrary to Moretti (2013), she did not use a reduced form but a structural
econometric specification. In particular, in her empirical implementation, she used estimates of
demand shocks based on the local industrial mix and data on local amenities. Her results are
consistent with Moretti (2013).
For the US, Moretti (2013) shows that the relative wage of high-skilled workers increased
significantly more in those places where they have concentrated more, evidence of a skill-biased
spatial shift in demand. We test this relationship between high-skilled workers relative supply
and wage changes across French local labor markets.
3.6.3 Results : skill-biased spatial shift in demand
So far, we have observed a spatial divergence in high-skilled workers relative supply, but a
spatial convergence in their relative wage. Now, we investigate the spatial dynamics of high-
skilled workers demand relative to low-skilled workers demand in France between 1982 and
2011 with Moretti (2013) approach.
Figure 3.12 relates the change in the share of high-skilled workers between 1982 and 2011
to the change in high-skilled/low-skilled relative wage (equation 3.7). We find a significant
positive relationship, similar to what Moretti (2013) found for the US. The concentration of
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high-skilled workers seems therefore, at least for some part, due to a spatial shift in their relative
demand. An important difference between the US and France is that the concentration of supply
and demand of high-skilled workers occurred in places where the relative wage was already
higher in the US, in contrast to places where it was lower in France. Because of this difference
in initial situations, a spatial divergence in high-skilled/low-skilled relative wages is observed
in the US and a spatial convergence in France. But if trends remain the same in the future, this
may lead to a spatial divergence of high-skilled/low-skilled relative wages in France too.
Figure 3.12: 2011-1982 change in high-skilled/low-skilled relative wage in function of the
change in high-skilled workers share, by employment zone
y = 1,06 (0,52) **x - 0,22 (0,07) ***
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Source : EDP-DADS panel, metropolitan France, private sector, 15-65 year old male wage earners
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by employment zones population size. The relative
supply is the share of high-skilled workers in efficiency units and worked days. The log relative wage is the log of
a fix-weighted ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled predicted LAD wages to adjust for composition by experience
and education changes. LAD wages are computed weighting by the number of worked days. Within a region,
some employment zones are grouped. See the Appendix for details.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
As the unemployment rate is quite high in France compared to the US, we suspect that supply
and demand effects could also be visible through differences in employment. We therefore use
the Censuses to compute composition-adjusted employment rate among the male labor force.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.13 relates the level of the composition-adjusted employment rate of high-
skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers in 1982 and 2011 across local labor markets.
As the coefficient is higher than 1 (although not statistically different than 1), it shows that,
contrary to wages, there is no convergence of employment inequalities by skills between French
local labor markets. We then test whether there is a positive relationship between the change
in high-skilled/low-skilled relative employment rate and the change in the share of high-skilled
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workers. We propose this as another test of a spatial divergence in the relative demand for high-
skilled workers. If the demand for skills increased more in the markets where the relative supply
increased, we expect the differences in employment by skill levels to have increased more in
these markets. We indeed find a positive significant effect (panel (b) of Figure 3.13) , which
reinforces evidence of a skill-biased spatial shift in demand.
Figure 3.13: High-skilled/low-skilled relative employment rate results by employment zone
(a) High-skilled/low-skilled relative employment
rate in 2011 in function of 1982
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(b) High-skilled/low-skilled relative employment
rate 2011-1982 change in function of high-skilled
workers share 2011-1982 change
y = 0,13 (0,03) ***x + 0,003 (0,01)
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Source : EDP-DADS panel, metropolitan France, 15-65 year old male.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by employment zones population size. The relative
supply is the share of high-skilled workers in efficiency units and worked days. The relative unemployment
rate is a fix-weighted ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers predicted OLS employment rates, adjusted for
composition by experience and education changes. Within a region, some employment zones are grouped, see the
Appendix for details.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
So, even if time and space dynamics of wage inequalities have been different from the US
so far, we find evidence of similar dynamics of the demand for high-skilled workers in France.
That may lead to more similar dynamics on wages in the future. In other words, France might
experience an increase in wage inequalities by skills across employment zones, similar to the
one the US have already been experiencing.
Robustness checks
We test here whether results change when we use different measures of relative wages and la-
bor supply. More precisely, since unemployment is higher for low-skilled workers and since the
difference in unemployment rate between high and low-skilled workers might not be constant
over time and space, this might biased our estimations of relative wage and supply dynamics.
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Table 3.4 reports only the coefficient of interest β of equation 3.7, which is the coefficient of
the relationship between the changes in relative wage and supply, in each specification. Column
(1) reports the result of our main specification (displayed in Figure 3.12). In column (3), we
present estimations weighting wages by worker unit instead of job duration. For the supply
measure, we also weight by worker unit and take advantage of the Censuses to compute a
measure including self-employed, unemployed and public employees. We compute in column
(5) alternative measures of relative wage and supply using a data set with imputed workers
when only one year is missing as previously (see previous section for more details). And we
also present estimations including women in the supply measure in column (2), (4) and (6). All
specifications show a significant skill-biased spatial shift in demand.
Table 3.4: Test of skill-biased spatial shift in demand: robustness check
no imputed workers one-year missing imputed workers
weighted by job duration each worker has equal weight each worker has equal weight
supply : men supply : all supply : men supply : all supply : men supply : all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative wage 2011-1982 change
Relative supply 1.057∗∗ 1.185∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
2011-1982 change ( 0.524 ) ( 0.508 ) ( 0.321 ) ( 0.343 ) ( 0.346 ) ( 0.370 )
Nb obs 86 86 86 86 86 86
Source: EDP-DADS Data. 15- to 64-Year-Old male wage earners working in the Private Sector. 1982 and 2011 Censuses, 16-65-year-old labor
force.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by employment zones population size. The log relative supply is the share of
college equivalent workers among college and high-school equivalent workers, weighted in efficiency units (in columns (1) to (2) and worker
units in columns (3) to (6). The log relative wage is the log of a fix-weighted ratio of college to high-school predicted LAD wages to adjust for
composition by experience and education changes. LAD wages are computed weighting observations by the job duration in columns (1) to (2),
and by one for each worker in columns (3) to (6). Within a region, some employment zones are grouped. See the Appendix for details.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The stylized fact of a stronger increase in demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-
skilled workers in large urban areas is thus robust to various ways of measuring supply and
wages.
Conclusion
Over the last forty years at the national level, we have found evidence that, despite trends
on wage inequalities by skills opposite to the US ones, evidence of an increase in the demand
for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers similar to what has been documented
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for the US can be found. This increase has been hidden by the increase in the education level
in France that occurred later than in the US. If the lengthening of studies slows down and the
relative demand for skilled labor keeps rising, wage inequalities by skills may increase in France
as they did in the US.
Next, we have shown that in France high-skilled workers concentrated in large cities over the
last thirty years, and that the demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers
increased there too. Spatial dynamics of the relative labor demand and supply by skills are
therefore also similar to the US. But, these dynamics have not led to the same spatial dynamics
in wage inequalities by skills because of different initial situations in wage inequalities by skills
between local labor markets. In the US, wage inequalities by skills were higher at the begin-
ning of the studied period in the markets where the share of high-skilled workers was initially
higher. In France, wage inequalities by skills were higher where the share was lower. Similar
spatial dynamics of labor supply and demand by skills led thus to a spatial divergence in wage
inequalities by skills in the US but a spatial convergence in France. But, if these spatial trends
continue, a spatial divergence may occur in France.
To determine what are the likely future trends of the relative demand for skilled labor, it is
necessary to investigate its determinants. For instance, if the observed trend is due to technical
change and computerization was slower in France, we could expect that the demand for skilled
labor will keep increasing as computer adoption is completed. In the next chapter, we therefore
test whether ICT dissemination is a driver of the demand for skilled labor.
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Appendices
3.A Technical appendix : relative wage and supply computa-
tions
Relative wage. For each year, we need to compute an estimation of the wage (price) of high-
skilled workers and low-skilled workers for each experience group controlling for composition
effects. We use a Mincer-type model (Mincer, 1974) in which log daily wages are related to ed-
ucation and experience. Education-group dummies are interacted with experience, experience2,
and experience3 to allow heterogeneous effects of experience:
Median(yi|dipi, expi) =
7∑
k=1
(βkθ + γ1kθexpi + γ2kθexp
2
i + γ3kθexp
3
i )1dipi=k, i = 1, . . . , N,
(3.8)
whereMedian(y|dip, exp) denotes the median of the conditional log wage distribution, expi
denotes the experience as a wage earner in the private sector, and 1dipi=k is a dummy variable
equalling 1 if individual i holds the degree k, and 0 otherwise. We use 7 levels of education
which is the most detailed level of education available. We estimate this model year by year.
It is equivalent to a Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimation (or quantile regression at
the median, see Koenker and Bassett (1978) , Buchinsky (1994), Fortin and Lemieux (1998),
Gosling et al. (2000), Autor et al. (2005)).34
For each experience group j (0-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40), we use an estimation of the log
wage at the middle at the interval to control for composition effects by experience. So, for
the 7 education levels, we recover median log wages with 5, 15, 25 and 35 years of real ex-
perience. For each level of experience j, the composition-adjusted log wages for high-skilled
workers (log(wHjt)) is the average of the ones for university and the ones for some college
workers, weighted according to their average share over 1967-2009 of worked days in the total
of the high-skilled group. Similarly, the composition-adjusted wages for low-skilled workers
(log(wLjt)) is the average of the ones for high-school, high vocational, low vocational, junior
high-school and no degree, weighted according to their average share over 1967-2009 of worked
days in the total of the low-skilled group. Using fixed weights computed on the whole period
allows to control for composition effects by education level within the two broader education
34It is preferred to OLS for robustness to extreme values.
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groups (high-skilled and low-skilled). To recover log(wHt) and log(wLt), we need to aggregate
also wages of different experience groups. We average them using fixed weights equal to the
average over 1967-2009 of the experience-group shares in the total of annual full-time working
days.
Relative labor supply. To compute labor supply measures, the number of days worked by
each detailed education (7 levels) and experience (40 levels) group are converted in ”efficiency
units” before aggregation at broader level (2 levels of education , high -and low-skilled, and 4
levels of experience, 0-10, 10-20, 20-30 and 30-40).
More precisely, we first compute the number of days worked in a given year by the 7 educa-
tion × 40 years of real experience groups. These quantities are then converted into efficiency
units by multiplying them with weights fixed over the period. These weights are obtained by
(1) calculating for each cell and each year the median wage for full-time working periods (2)
standardizing them by a reference (the median wage for low vocational degree holders with
15 years of real experience) in the same year, (3) averaging these standardized wages over the
period to obtain 7× 40 fixed efficiency weights.
Efficiency units are then combined to obtain relative labor supply measures. The aggregate
high-skilled labor supply is the sum of the university and some college efficiency units, and
the aggregate low-skilled labor supply is the sum of the other degrees efficiency units. The
log relative labor supply is the log of the ratio between the two. This measure is computed
combining both all experience groups (to obtain log(Ht/Lt)) and per experience groups (to
obtain log(Hjt/Ljt)).
Alternatively, we compute the supply measure using the number of workers having worked
at least one day during the year rather than worked days to take into account unemployment. In
this case, we consider that all workers having worked at least once in the year contribute equally
to labor supply.
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3.B Additional tables
3.B.1 Education categories
Table 3.5: Education categories
French label English label % (pooled sample)
Aucun diploˆme de´clare´ no degree reported 0.30
or CEP, DFEO or completed elementary school
BEPC, BE, BEPS completed junior high-school 0.06
CAP, BEP, EFAA, BAA, BPA basic vocational degree 0.37
Bac technique et professionnel, advanced vocational-technical 0.08
Brevet professionnel, autres brevets degree (high vocational)
BEA, BEC, BEH, BEI, BES, BATA,
Bac ge´ne´ral, brevet supe´rieur, CFES completed high-school 0.03
BTS, DUT, DEST, DEUL, DEUS, DEUG, some college, college degree and 0.09
diploˆme professions sociales ou de la sante´ technical or vocational college
Dip. universitaire de 2e`me ou 3e`me cycle, university degree, engineering 0.07
diploˆme d’inge´nieur, Grandes Ecoles school, Grande Ecole
Source: EDP-DADS Data. 15- to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Men working in the Private Sector.
Note: The information on the degree may differ between Censuses. We favor the one corresponding
to the Census that follows the end of studies or when the person has just passed 27. When no degree
are declared in that Census or when the information is not precise enough to determine the education
category, we use the information reported in the following ones. In the 1968 and the 1990 Censuses,
general high-school and vocational high-school are not distinguished. The same occurs for ”brevet
de technicien” (a vocational high-school degree) and BTS (a post-Bac vocational degree) in the 1968
Census. In the 1968 and the 1975 Censuses, there is no distinction between college and university
degrees. In such cases, we use the following Census information when available and choose the
most frequent category in the population otherwise.
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3.B.2 Labor market trends
Figure 3.14: Minimum Wage (Smic) and Unemployment Trends.
Source: Median Wage: EDP-DADS data, 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector,
weighted by Job Duration. Minimum Wages (Smic 39h and Smic 35h): French Ministry of Labor.
Note: Median Wage reports the Cumulative Changes since 1967 in Daily Median Wage of Full-Time Male
Workers in the Private Sector; Smic 39h (resp. Smic 35h) reports the Cumulative Changes since 1967 in
Daily Minimum Wage based on a 39-hour Workweek (resp. 35-hour Workweek). The three wages series
are in real terms (en euros 2009), deflated by the French CPI. The Male Unemployment Rate is reported on
the right y-axis.
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Figure 3.15: Labor cost trends: Minimum Wage vs Median.
Source: Median Wage: EDP-DADS data, 15 to 64-Year-Old Full-Time Male Workers in the Private Sector,
weighted by Job Duration. Minimum Wage, Labor Costs: French Ministry of Labor.
Note: Median Wage/Labor Cost at Median Wage (resp. Smic/Labor Cost at Smic) reports ratio of Daily
Median Wage (resp. Daily Minimum Wage) on corresponding Daily Firm Total Labor Cost. Smic Labor
Cost/Median Wage Labor cost reports the ratio of the Daily Minimum Wage Labor Cost to the Daily Median
Wage Labor Cost. Series are in real terms, deflated by the French CPI. The Smic Labor Cost Growth Rate
is reported on the right y-axis.
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3.C Employment zones classification
The most relevant scale to study local labor market in France is the employment zone which
is defined by the Insee (French Institute of Statistics) and is equivalent to the US commuting
zones or the UK travel-to-work areas. They are zones where the majority of the labor force live
and work, and their construction is based on work commuting. The 2010 zoning divides the
French metropolitan area (without overseas territories) in 304 zones. Some areas are relatively
little populated and do not have enough observations in the EDP-DADS data set to compute our
indicators of relative wage and supply by skills with sufficient precision. We therefore group
some of the employment zones. This aggregation does not mean that these zones form a unique
local labor market but rather assumes that they behave in a similar fashion for the question
of interest and thus contribute in the same way to the estimations. An ascending hierarchical
clustering is run using the density, the distribution of jobs among industries, the share of retired
people and the female labor force participation. This leads to 5 types of zone :
• high density areas, for which the density criteria is the strongest feature
• touristic areas, where hostelling and catering, retail and personal services are important
• agricultural areas, where the agricultural sector is very important, and the share of retired
people is also strong
• commodities and energy manufacturing areas
• other manufacturing industries
We use this typology to group low population zones within the same region. There are then
86 grouped employment zones.
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Chapter 4
Skills, technical change and local labor
markets : evidence from France 1990-2011
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Introduction1
Similarly to the US, the demand for high-skilled workers relatively to low-skilled workers
has increased in France over the last forty years. The main explanations for the US skill-biased
shift in labor demand fall roughly into two categories, technology and globalization. In this
chapter, we investigate the first one for France.
The technology hypothesis relates the change in demand for skills to the dissemination of
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that are thought to increase the productivity
of high-skilled workers more than that of low-skilled workers. For instance, Beaudry et al.
(2006) and Beaudry et al. (2010) estimate the effect of PC adoption on labor supply and demand
by skills across US metropolitan areas. The effect of technology on jobs has been defined
more precisely by Autor et al. (2003) as an automation of routine tasks. Jobs that consist of
routine tasks disappear as these tasks can be performed by computer and the price of computers
decreases, while abstract or manual tasks remain. Abstract tasks being paid at the top of the
wage distribution and manual tasks at the bottom, it may explain the rise in wage inequalities.
The automation of routine tasks has also been related to the polarization of the labor market
(Autor et al. (2003), Goos et al. (2009) Goos et al. (2014) Michaels et al. (2014) Firpo et al.
(2011) Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). The polarization of the labor market is the rise in the
proportion of the least and most paid occupations, while the medium-paid ones decline. It is
observed in the US and to some extent in Europe and it is important to explain the increase in
wage inequalities.
Another explanation relates the rise of wage inequality to imports competition from low-wage
countries (Autor et al. (2013a), Rigby et al. (2015)). As trade barriers declined, low-skilled jobs
have faced a higher competition than high-skilled jobs, and this could explain a rise in wage
inequality by skills. Indeed, as predicted by trade theory and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
when trading cost decreases, the return on the abundant factor (high-skilled workers relatively
to low-skilled workers in developed economies) increases.2 Another explanation associated to
trade is the offshoring of jobs or tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). If certain jobs
or tasks can be performed in low-wage countries and the cost of offshoring them decreased
(because trade barriers, such as transportation or communication cost, decreased), low-skilled
labor demand might have decreased. Note that this phenomenon can partly be related to ICT, in
the sense that ICT certainly decreases communication costs.
Recent papers used local labor markets to test for these explanations for the US (Autor and
1This chapter is based on a joint work with M. Orand.
2Although the effect might be opposite as shown by Lorentowicz et al. (2005) in the case of Austria and Poland.
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Dorn (2013), Autor et al. (2013a) and Autor et al. (2013b)). They found that imports competi-
tion had an effect on the level of employment at all skill levels. They also found evidence for a
Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors
and showed that, among routine jobs, the share of jobs in production decreased first and the
share of information processing jobs (such as clerical jobs) decreased after.
While these papers used local labor markets mainly as a way to identify a nation-wide phe-
nomenon, another set of papers looked into the spatial component of wage inequalities by skills
(Lindley and Machin (2014), Moretti (2013)). They found that a spatial concentration of high-
skilled workers occurred, and related it to a skill-biased spatial shift in labor demand. Similar
patterns have been documented for France in the previous chapter. Potential explanations for
this spatial demand shift could be the initial local industrial mix that made some local labor
markets more exposed to SBTC, offshoring or imports competition.
Other mechanisms analyzed by economic geography could also explain this spatial shift.
They could be considered as spatial factors as they are related to agglomeration economies and
to the cost of distance between locations. Baum-Snow et al. (2014) showed that there has been
an increase in agglomeration economies for high-skilled workers in the US. They did not study
the cause of this increase, but they relate it to knowledge spillovers, which are often higher for
high-skilled workers and may have increased. This skill-biased rise in agglomeration economies
would explain a higher concentration and higher wages for high-skilled workers in big and
dense cities. Another channel, which in fact links ICT to geography, is the decreasing cost of
communication between locations entailed by ICT. Whereas SBTC is related to the information
part of ICT, the communication part is also a potential channel.3 Duranton and Puga (2005)
model predicts that a fall in communication cost between headquarters and affiliates, leads to a
functional specialization of cities. Some cities specialize in headquarter and business services
and other in production activities. Even though their model does not explicitly encompass
skills, as headquarter and business services employ more skilled workers, this mechanism could
explain that the demand for high-skilled workers have increased more in some cities than other.
Evidence for France is much scarcer than for the US. Aubert and Sillard (2005) and Fontagne´
and D’Isanto (2013) proposed an assessment of the extent of offshoring but not of its effects
on labor wages. Malgouyres (2014) implemented the Autor et al. (2013a) strategy to test for
the effect of imports competition in France. He found a negative effect of imports competi-
tion on employment. This effect is polarized in the manufacturing sector in which it is much
stronger for medium-skilled occupations while it is stronger on low-skilled occupations in the
non-manufacturing sector. It is different from the results of Autor et al. (2013a) and Autor et al.
3As in fact it is in the case of offshoring.
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(2013b) who did not find a polarizing effect of imports competition in the US. As for the SBTC
hypothesis in France, at a national level, Goux and Maurin (2000) provided evidence of tech-
nical change in France, but of a smaller extent than in the U.S. They found that computers and
new production technologies were responsible for a fall of around 15% in the share of unskilled
workers (with less than high-school education) in total employment over 1970-1993. Goos
et al. (2009) studied the distribution of employment between occupations in Europe and fond
evidence of job polarization in France between 1993-2006. Machin and Van Reenen (1998)
used a panel on seven OECD countries between 1973 and 1989, including France, and found
a significant association between skill-upgrading and R&D intensity. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) find evidence of a skill-biased organizational change in France (and in the UK). They
showed that new form of organization of firms, with less layers, are more favorable to high-
skilled workers. One of the potential factor of this delayering could be the decreasing in com-
munication costs induced by ICT. To sum up, for France, there is some evidence regarding the
link between ICT and the demand for high-skilled relatively to low-skilled workers but only
before the 1990’s. For the recent period, there is some evidence that the share of high-skilled
jobs and of the least paid low-skilled jobs increased in France, but it has not been related to ICT
and there is no evidence on the ICT impact at the level of local labor markets.
In this chapter, we document the spatial dynamics in occupations in France since the 1980s
and use local labor markets to test whether there has been a decline in routine tasks and an
increase in manual and abstract tasks that would confirm the routine task automation hypoth-
esis of Autor and Dorn (2013). More precisely, the main purpose of Autor and Dorn (2013)
was to test whether the polarization of jobs observed in the US is due to non-neutral technical
change. The idea is that repetitive and more easily codified jobs have been automated due to
ICT, whereas in-person services such as food services, house cleaning or home care services
have not been much impacted by ICT. They formalized this intuition in a theoretical model. The
production of the final good use abstract and routine tasks. Abstract tasks are complement to
routine tasks, which can be performed by either computer or labor. The production of services
requires only labor performing manual tasks. High-skilled workers perform abstract tasks and
low-skilled workers can perform routine or manual tasks. Because consumers like to consume
both goods and services, when computer capital price falls, computer capital substitutes to low-
skilled workers for routine tasks in the production of the final good and low-skilled workers
switch from the final good sector to the service sector. As these services are non-storable and
non-tradable, low-skilled workers must be located where services are consumed. The idea of
Autor and Dorn (2013) was therefore to use spatial differences in local labor markets to test the
routine task automation hypothesis. They applied their model in a spatial setting in which high-
skilled labor are mobile between labor markets, whereas low-skilled workers are immobile. The
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model gives predictions about the effect of technical change on local labor markets, according
to their initial distribution of routine tasks and they test them on US data. More precisely, the
model predicts four spatial dynamics of labor market outcomes following a fall in computer
capital price :
1. zones where routine jobs are initially more numerous have the largest decreases in routine
jobs;
2. in-person service jobs increases where the share of routine jobs is initially higher as low-
skilled workers are reallocated from routine jobs to in-person service jobs;
3. abstract jobs increase more in the zones with a high initial routine level because of their
complementarity with ICT capital;
4. wages in manual or abstracts jobs increase more in the zones with a high initial routine
level.
Using US data, their empirical analysis focused mainly on the second prediction as it is re-
lated to the polarization of jobs, which is the main stylized fact they documented and wished
to explain. They found that the share of in-person jobs did increase more in the local labor
markets where the share of routine jobs was initially higher. As regards France, evidence of
the polarization of jobs is less strong. This might be due either to the fact that SBTC and rou-
tine task automation are not relevant for the French case or, that the mechanisms are slightly
different. In this chapter, we test the Autor and Dorn (2013) predictions for France. More-
over, Autor et al. (2013b) found that among routine occupations, the decrease in clerical and
low-skilled production jobs did not occur at the same period of time. In other words, the au-
tomation of production tasks and of information-processing tasks did not take place simultane-
ously. Information-processing tasks are performed in clerical jobs, which are mostly support
jobs. It therefore seems that the effects for support and production functions might be different.
This can be related quite straightforwardly to the model of Duranton and Puga (2005), which
describes another potential effect of ICT on spatial disparities, but through the fall in commu-
nication costs rather than in information costs. It shows that this leads to an increase in the
functional specialization of cities, namely some cities specialize in headquarter and business
services, i.e. support functions. If that is the case, technical change might impact local labor
markets differently depending on whether they are specialized in support or production activ-
ities. This might explain different results on production or support routine jobs. Technically,
the automation of clerical and manufacturing functions might also be of a different nature. An
addition of our analysis to that of Autor and Dorn (2013) is to examine whether accounting
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for the differences in the function of routine jobs (production versus support), gives valuable
insights.
Section 1 presents data issues and our empirical strategy. Section 2 depicts some descriptive
statistics. Results are shown in section 3 and some robustness checks are conducted in section
4.
4.1 Data issues and empirical strategy
For our empirical analysis, we need to measure job contents. Therefore, we rely on infor-
mation about the occupations of workers.4 Note that, in this chapter, skills and occupational
classifications refer to jobs while education levels refer to workers : for instance, workers with
different education levels can be found within the high-skilled occupation group.
We define local labor markets similarly to the previous chapter. We use the employment zones
that are based on commuting information.5 This is very similar to the concept of Commuting
Zones used in Autor and Dorn (2013). Note that, in the theoretical model, low-educated workers
are immobile between these zones while high-educated workers are mobile. This seems a strong
assumption, but one can argue that the model is still valid if high-educated workers are more
mobile than low-educated workers, which is a far less strong assumption.
Data sets with detailed information and enough observations at that geographical level are not
very numerous. Moreover, since many in-person service jobs are performed by self-employed,
it is preferable not to rely on wage earners databases such as the one used in the previous
chapters. We therefore use the one fourth samples of the French 1982, 1990 and 1999 Censuses
and the 2006 and 2011 census surveys and in particular detailed information about occupations
(at the 4-digit level) and on unemployment status.
There is also information on the level of education and we separate education levels between
college (post secondary education) and non-college workers (high-school degree or less) to
disentangle between high and low-educated workers. A drawback of the French censuses is
that there is no information on wages or earnings. We therefore focus our analysis on the Autor
and Dorn (2013) model predictions on routine, service and high-skilled jobs. We present next
how we define these occupations on French data and also how we define support and production
functions as needed for our addition to Autor and Dorn (2013) model.
4The information on the industry they worked in is not used, although the local industry mix is used for robust-
ness checks.
5But we do not need to group them as there are enough observations in the data set used in this chapter.
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4.1.1 Tasks and occupations
For the sake of clarity, we group occupations in seven groups. We define high-skilled occu-
pations as managers, executives and engineers (tables 4.19 and 4.20 in appendix) and we split
low and medium-skilled occupations in the following groups : workers in production and craft,
manufacturing workers, clerical jobs, retail jobs, service occupations and workers perform-
ing tasks related to transport, construction or farming.6 More precisely, (low-skilled) service
occupations are occupations in food service, health service (except doctors and pharmacists),
home and personal care (table 4.21 in appendix). At a national level, high-skilled and service
occupations shares increased between 1982 and 2011, the share of manufacturing workers and
transport-construction-farming occupations decreased, while there are no evolutions of the other
occupation groups (table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Evolution of the distribution of major occupation groups
1982 1990 1999 2011
Managers/executives/engineers 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.20
Production/craft workers 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
Transport/construction/farming 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09
Manufacturing workers 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10
Retail 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15
Clerical 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
Service occupations 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.25
Source : French Censuses, metropolitan France
We also characterize occupations according to their routine intensity. We build a transition
matrix between US and French occupations classification (4-digit level 1982 classification).7
Then, we use the database of Autor and Dorn (2013) on task contents by US occupations and
attribute a content in routine, manual and abstract tasks to each French occupation. Doing this,
we assume that the content of jobs is not too much different between France and the US. In a
similar way to Autor and Dorn (2013), we built a Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index (equal to
log(routine task) -log(manual task)-log(abstract task)). Table 4.2 shows the resulting content
in the three types of task and the resulting Routine Task Intensity index by major occupation
group. According to this measure, clerical and manufacturing occupations are the most routine
intensive. These two groups can be related to our two types of functions : support and pro-
duction. Clerical occupations are notably more intensive in routine tasks. Similarly to Autor
and Dorn (2013), we classify the one third of 4-digit level occupations with the highest routine
6It is similar as Autor and Dorn (2013), but we separate clerical from retail occupations.
7For the 2006 and 2011 censuses, we use a transition table between 1982 and 2003 occupations classification.
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index in the 1982 distribution of jobs as routine occupations.8 Note that the classification as
a routine occupation is independent of our previous classification in 7 groups, so they might
slightly overlap.
Table 4.2: Task intensity of major occupation groups in 1982
Abstract tasks Routine tasks Manual tasks RTI index
Managers/executives/engineers + − − −
Production/craft workers − + + −
Transport/construction/farming − − + −
Manufacturing workers − + + +
Retail + − − −
Clerical − + − ++
Service occupations − − + −
Source : 1982 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of task intensity by occupa-
tions.
Note: (+) indicates a task value above average across all occupations in 1982 weighted by employment and (-)
below average.
Last, we classify all occupations in “support” or “production” occupations. We define man-
agement and administrative functions as support occupations (see appendix 4.A for details) and
the remainder as production functions. We then split the routine occupations group in support
routine occupations and production routine occupations. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of the
share of routine occupations in employment by employment zone in 1982. Across employment
zones, the share in routine occupations is higher in the north of France, in the Paris region and
in some cities such as Nantes or Nice. Next columns in table 4.3 distinguishes between support
routine occupations and production routine occupations. They are very differently distributed
across space. The share of support routine occupations is higher in the Paris region, in the
South-East and in large cities. The share of production routine occupations is higher in the
North and the East and in some central areas.
4.1.2 Empirical setting
Our main variables of interest are the share in employment of routine occupations, service
occupations and high-skilled occupations. The Autor and Dorn (2013) model states that, across
local labor markets, when computer price decreases, we should observe an increase in the em-
ployment share of service occupations and high-skilled occupations and that this increase should
8The most frequent occupations in this group are : secretaries, administrative employees, finance and account-
ing employees, public employees.
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Table 4.3: Share of routine occupations by employment zone in 1982
Share of routine occupations
by employment zone
all production support
Mean 30% Mean 17% Mean 13%
Standard Error 5% Standard Error 4% Standard Error 4%
Q3 34% Q3 19% Q3 15%
Median 30% Median 16% Median 13%
Q1 27% Q1 14% Q1 10%
Highest 10 Highest 10 Highest 10
Lille 40% Charolais 25% Poissy 23%
Saint-Die´-des-Vosges 41% Valle´e de la Bresle-Vimeu 27% Roissy - Sud Picardie 24%
Cre´teil 41% Roubaix-Tourcoing 27% Versailles 24%
Saint-Omer 41% Cholet 28% Evry 25%
Marne-la-Valle´e 41% Longwy 28% Saclay 25%
Paris 41% Les Herbiers 30% Orly 26%
Orly 41% Saint-Die´-des-Vosges 30% Cergy 26%
Remiremont 42% Saint-Omer 30% Marne-la-Valle´e 26%
Roubaix-Tourcoing 46% Remiremont 32% Paris 26%
Valle´e de l’Arve 46% Valle´e de l’Arve 35% Cre´teil 27%
Lowest 10 Lowest 10 Lowest 10
Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 12% Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 6% Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 6%
Saint-Flour 16% Corte 8% Saint-Flour 7%
Carhaix-Plouguer 16% Saint-Flour 9% Carhaix-Plouguer 7%
Porto-Vecchio 17% Porto-Vecchio 9% Mauriac 7%
Mauriac 18% Carhaix-Plouguer 9% Segre´ 7%
Loude´ac 19% Lannion 10% Avranches 7%
Calvi-L’Ile-Rousse 20% Loude´ac 10% Brioude 8%
Lannion 20% Mauriac 10% Sable´-sur-Sarthe 8%
Avranches 20% Guingamp 11% Porto-Vecchio 8%
Guingamp 20% Ajaccio 11% La Fle`che 8%
Source : 1982 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of task intensity by occupa-
tions.
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be positively correlated to the initial share of routine occupations. A decrease in routine occu-
pations should occur and should be stronger where the initial share of routine occupations is
higher. Because of the French context of high unemployment, we suspect that low-skilled un-
employment behaves like the employment share in service occupations as low-skilled workers
can switch from routine occupations to either service occupations or unemployment. We may
therefore also find an increase in low-skilled unemployment positively correlated to the initial
share of routine occupations across local labor markets.
We implement our analysis on changes of our variables of interest between 1990 and 2011,
as before that period ICT was not much spread in France. Our main explanatory variable is the
initial share of routine occupations in employment in each employment zone. The initial share
of routine occupations relates in the theoretical framework to the production technology of the
zone, Autor and Dorn (2013) argue that the empirical measure must reflect the ‘long run, quasi-
fixed component of their industrial structure ’. We therefore decide to take the 1982 level of the
share of routine occupations rather than the 1990 one as our “initial share of routine occupa-
tions”. The 1982 measure, anterior to the period of study and to the bulk of ICT dissemination,
is less likely to be correlated to shocks between 1990 and 2011. Autor and Dorn (2013) also
implemented an IV strategy to address this issue and found similar results, sometimes larger.
We cannot implement this strategy as we do not have the same information (they use 1950 local
industry structure). We have therefore to keep in mind that there might be a small downward
bias in our results. Finally, we propose an extension by splitting the 1982 share of routine oc-
cupations between the 1982 employment share of production routine occupations and the 1982
employment share of support routine occupations.
The main issue regarding the interpretation of the results is related to the fact that the share
of routine occupations in 1982 might be correlated to other factors that could explained the
evolutions of the distribution of occupations and are not in the theoretical model. To address
this concern, we provide a robustness analysis to check that our results remain valid when
adding controls for other potential factors.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
4.2.1 Trends in the spatial distribution of occupations
Before testing the effect of the initial share of routine occupations on the changes in our
variables of interest (share of routine occupations, service occupations and high-skilled occu-
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pations) over 1990-2011 across French local labor markets, we describe briefly their dynamics
as they have not been much documented.
Table 4.4: Share of routine occupations by employment zone in 1990 and 2011
Share of routine occupations
by employment zone
1990 2011
Mean 33% Mean 31%
Standard Error 4% Standard Error 2%
Q3 36% Q3 33%
Median 33% Median 31%
Q1 30% Q1 30%
Highest 10 Highest 10
Roissy - Sud Picardie 41% Orly 36%
Cergy 41% Ajaccio 36%
Cre´teil 41% Valle´e de la Bresle-Vimeu 36%
Paris 41% Cre´teil 36%
Valle´e de la Bresle-Vimeu 42% Cergy 36%
Marne-la-Valle´e 42% Marne-la-Valle´e 37%
Orly 42% Roubaix-Tourcoing 38%
Saint-Omer 43% Longwy 38%
Roubaix-Tourcoing 45% Thionville 38%
Valle´e de l’Arve 48% Valle´e de l’Arve 39%
Lowest 10 Lowest 10
Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 19% Saint-Flour 24%
Saint-Flour 20% Loude´ac 24%
Carhaix-Plouguer 21% Mauriac 24%
Loude´ac 21% Carhaix-Plouguer 25%
Mauriac 22% Pauillac 25%
Ploermel 24% Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 25%
Morvan 24% Thie´rache 26%
Pauillac 24% Pontivy 26%
Pontivy 25% Morvan 26%
Brioude 25% Calvi-L’Ile-Rousse 26%
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of task intensity by
occupations.
Figures 4.4, 4.6 and 4.5 show the share of routine, high-skilled and service occupations within
employment zone in 1990 and 2011. A first observation is that routine and service occupations
are not located in the same employment zones. The share of service occupations is high on the
Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and in some rural areas. The share of routine occupations
has decreased over 1990-2011 and seems to be more evenly distributed in 2011 than in 1990.
Indeed, when regressing 1990-2011 change on 1990 level (table 4.7), there is a significant nega-
tive relationship, meaning a convergence in the level of the share of routine occupations among
employment zones. And this is also true when separating between college and non-college em-
ployment. The share of high-skilled occupations is higher in large cities and all the more in 2011
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Table 4.5: Share of service occupations by employment zone in 1990 and 2011
Share of service occupations
by employment zone
1990 2011
Mean 22% Mean 28%
Standard Error 3% Standard Error 3%
Q3 23% Q3 30%
Median 22% Median 28%
Q1 20% Q1 26%
Highest 10 Highest 10
Ussel 27% Le Blanc 33%
Le Blanc 27% Saint-Amand-Montrond 33%
Corte 28% Verdun 33%
Ce´ret 28% Honfleur 34%
Honfleur 28% Saint-Girons 34%
Berck-Montreuil 30% Calvi-L’Ile-Rousse 34%
Calvi-L’Ile-Rousse 30% Ussel 34%
Prades 31% Prades 34%
Brianon 33% Berck-Montreuil 35%
Menton Valle´e de la Roya 34% Menton Valle´e de la Roya 36%
Lowest 10 Lowest 10
Valle´e de l’Arve 13% Valle´e de l’Arve 19%
Morteau 14% Morteau 19%
Saint-Claude 15% Rambouillet 20%
Oyonnax 16% Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines 20%
Les Herbiers 16% Paris 20%
Wissembourg 17% Oyonnax 21%
Thiers 17% Saclay 21%
Valle´e de la Bresle-Vimeu 17% Saint-Claude 21%
Epernay 18% Les Herbiers 22%
Ambert 18% Wissembourg 22%
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of task intensity by
occupations.
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Table 4.6: Share of high-skilled occupations by employment zone in 1990 and 2011
Share of high-skilled occupations
by employment zone
1990 2011
Mean 12% Mean 15%
Standard Error 3% Standard Error 4%
Q3 13% Q3 17%
Median 11% Median 14%
Q1 10% Q1 13%
Highest 10 Highest 10
Cergy 20% Grenoble 26%
Cre´teil 20% Toulouse 28%
Lille 20% Aix-en-Provence 28%
Montpellier 21% Poissy 29%
Aix-en-Provence 22% Lille 29%
Paris 23% Versailles 30%
Versailles 23% Rambouillet 32%
Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines 24% Saclay 35%
Rambouillet 26% Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines 36%
Saclay 28% Paris 40%
Lowest 10 Lowest 10
Mayenne 7% Pe´ronne 9%
L’Aigle 7% Mauriac 10%
Morteau 7% Loude´ac 10%
Louhans 7% Louhans 10%
Ghisonaccia-Ale´ria 7% Chatillon 10%
Wissembourg 8% Saint-Flour 10%
Vitre´ 8% Brioude 10%
Segre´ 8% Jonzac-Barbezieux-Saint Hilaire 10%
Loude´ac 8% Les Herbiers 10%
Nogent-le-Rotrou 8% Valle´e de la Bresle-Vimeu 10%
Source 1990 and 2011 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of task intensity by
occupations.
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than in 1990 (table 4.8). We do not present the results on high-skilled occupations separately
for college and non-college workers as non-college workers in high-skilled occupations are not
very numerous. Lastly, the share of service occupations has increased in most employment
zones over 1990-2011. For non-college employment, there is a negative relationship between
the 1990-2011 change and the 1990 level, meaning also a convergence between employment
zones. For college employment in service occupations, the effect is not significant. For the re-
mainder of the chapter, we focus on the share of service occupations in non-college employment
as Autor and Dorn (2013) prediction on service occupations relates to low-educated workers and
for the sake of comparison with their results.
Table 4.7: 1990-2011 spatial dynamics of the share of routine occupations in employment
1990-2011 change in the share of routine occupations
employment share college empl. share non college empl. share
1990 initial level −0.467∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.098)
Observations 304 304 304
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. For each
outcome, the change between 1990 and 2011 is regressed on its own level in 1990. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. ***
p < 0.01.
Table 4.8: 1990-2011 spatial dynamics of the share of high-skilled and service occupations in
employment
1990-2011 change in
empl. share of college empl. share non-college empl. share
of high-skilled occ. of service occupations
1990 initial level 0.756∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.227∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.146) (0.042)
Observations 304 304 304
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. For each
outcome, the change between 1990 and 2011 is regressed on its own level in 1990. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. ***
p < 0.01.
4.2.2 Routine occupations and ICT
The predictions of Autor and Dorn (2013) model are based on the fact that ICT can be used
to perform routine tasks. Before testing these predictions, we therefore assess whether there is
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a link between the initial routine level of a local labor market and the following dissemination
of ICT in the zone. We do not have access to a local measure of ICT capital or other measures
of ICT dissemination but we have the national evolution of ICT capital stock by industry and
the employment composition by industry for each zone. We therefore build for each zone an
“ICT dissemination exposure” index, with a method similar to the imports competition exposure
index of Autor et al. (2013b). We compute for 1990 and 2011 and each industry the national
level of ICT capital normalized by the 1982 level of employment. We use the 1982 level of
employment rather than the current level as the current level is probably correlated to ICT
capital. For each local labor market and each year, we then apply this national ICT capital per
1982 worker and per industry to the 1982 local employment distribution by industry. This gives
an estimation of what would have been the local level of ICT if the employment structure by
industry have remained the one of 1982 and the local evolution by industry has been the same
as the national one. The change between 1990 and 2011 of this index is a measure of how much
the employment of a zone was exposed to ICT dissemination because of its 1982 employment
distribution by industry (see appendix 4.B for details). Hereafter, we refer to it as the “1990-
2011 change in ICT exposure”. An advantage of this measure is that it is more exogenous than
an actual measure of the local level of ICT. It does not take into account the fact that, within an
industry, some zones might have adopted more or less ICT due to unobservable characteristics
that could be correlated to our variables of interest and thus biasing the estimations.
As the routine task automation hypothesis states that places where many routine tasks were
performed should have adopted ICT more quickly, there should be a positive correlation be-
tween ICT dissemination and initial routine level of employment zones. Column (1) of table
4.9 shows that indeed employment zones with a higher share of routine occupations in 1982
were exposed to a significantly higher 1990-2011 change in ICT exposure. In columns (2)
and (3) of table 4.9, we test this relationship on support and production routine occupations
separately. the 1990-2011 change in ICT exposure is significantly related to the initial share
of support routine occupations, but not to the initial share of production routine occupations.
Given how the measure was built, it means that the industries with a high 1982 share of routine
production jobs did not experience more or less ICT capital development than those with a low
1982 share of routine production jobs. It may be that technical change did not happen under the
form of ICT capital in production activities. On the contrary, industries with a high 1982 share
of support routine jobs, experienced a higher development of ICT capital. This furthermore
justifies the distinction between support and production routine occupations in the analysis we
are conducting afterwards.
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Table 4.9: Initial share of routine occupations in employment and 1990-2011 change in ICT
exposure by employment zone
1990-2011 change in
ICT exposure
1982 share of routine occ. 1.792∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗ −0.427
(0.282) (0.145) (0.388)
Type of routine occ. all support production
Observations 304 304 304
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France, Insee.fr for ICT capital
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ICT in thousand of euros. The change in ICT exposure is computed using
the national change in ICT capital by worker by industry and weighting for each employment zone by the 1982
local employment share by industry. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
4.3 A test of the automation hypothesis on French data
We have found evidence that ICT dissemination might be related to a decrease in routine
jobs. We now turn to tests of the Autor and Dorn (2013) model predictions in the French case.
Table 4.10: Effect of initial share of routine occupations on 1990-2011 change in labor market
outcomes by employment zone
1990-2011 change in
empl. share of empl. share of non college empl. share of non college
routine high-skilled service unemployment
occupations occupations occupations rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1982 share of −0.353∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
routine occ. (0.014) (0.229) (0.025) (0.040)
Observations 304 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
We have seen in the previous section that the share of routine occupations decreased more
over 1990-2011 in zones where it was high in 1990. As we explained previously, we prefer to
use the 1982 level rather than the 1990 one as our initial point for the test of Autor and Dorn
(2013) predictions. We therefore check that the share of routine occupations decreased more
over 1990-2011 for zones where this share was high in 1982 (column (1) of table 4.10). We
next regress the 1990-2011 change in the share of high-skilled occupations in employment and
199
in the share of service occupations in non-college employment on the 1982 share of routine
occupations by employment zones. Results are presented respectively in columns (2) and (3) of
table 4.10. As predicted by the model, the share of high-skilled occupations has increased more
where the share of routine occupations was initially higher, with a positive and statistically
significant link. Similarly, the positive and significant link between change in the share of
service occupations in non-college employment between 1990 and 2011 and the initial share of
routine occupations tends to validate the model of Autor and Dorn (2013).
Lastly, in the theoretical model, the transfer from routine to in-person service jobs relies on
the fact that low-skilled workers are immobile inside their local labor market. In the French
context of high unemployment and higher minimum wage, this hypothesis could translate in
low-skilled workers moving to unemployment rather than to in-person service jobs, in particu-
lar if the demand for in-person services was not strong enough. We therefore test the impact of
the initial share of routine occupations on non-college unemployment rate. Column (4) of table
4.10 shows a significant positive relationship between the initial share of routine occupations
and non-college unemployment. So it seems that in the French case, when routine jobs de-
clined, some low-skilled workers have switched to service occupations and others have become
unemployed.
The hypothesis of a non-neutral technical change leading to routine task automation seems
validated in the French case. We also investigate whether the result holds for the two types of
routine tasks, support and production, to test if the task automation mechanism remains valid,
when we take into account other mechanisms such as those described in Duranton and Puga
(2005). Indeed, using French data to compute the measure of functional specialization used by
Duranton and Puga (2005) for the US, we find that big cities seem to have specialized in support
functions and small cities in production functions which entails that this mechanism is probably
relevant (figure 4.11) for France.
Table 4.12 presents the same estimations as in the previous section but splitting the initial
share of routine occupations into production and support occupations. The share of each type
of routine occupations has decreased more in the zones where it was higher. Our results for the
share of service occupations in non-college employment and non-college unemployment hold :
they have increased more in the zones where the 1982 share of production routine occupations
or the 1982 share of support routine occupations was initially high. The share of high-skilled
occupations has increased more in zones where the initial share of support routine occupations
was higher but not in the zones where the initial share of production routine occupations was
higher. This last result contradicts the predictions of Autor and Dorn (2013). It could mean
that there is no complementarity between routine production tasks and abstract tasks, but an
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Table 4.11: Functional specialization by employment zone in 1990 and 2011
Functional specialization
in management against production
Local population 1990 2011
< 50 000 -0.52 -0.52
50 000-100 000 -0.44 -0.50
100 000-250 000 -0.36 -0.38
250 000-500 000 -0.17 -0.19
500 000-1 000 000 0.04 0.08
1 000 000-2 000 000 0.41 0.57
> 2 000 000 1.36 3.49
Source : 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France
Note: This measure is similar to the ones= used in Duranton and Puga (2005). It is the percentage difference
from the national average of executives and managers per production worker (occupied in precision production,
fabrication or assembly). The last category (more than 2 million people) contains only one employment zone,
Paris.
other credible hypothesis is that this complementarity does not require geographical proximity,
and even less as ICT develops and communication cost decreases. If this is the case, the lack of
geographical proximity requirement seems more valid for production than for support functions.
For non-college workers, the impact of the initial share of routine occupations has been
stronger on unemployment rate than on the share of service occupations. The higher disap-
pearance of routine occupations in zones with a higher initial level of the share of routine oc-
cupations seems to have led to a higher increase of non-college unemployment rather than of
non-college employment in service occupations. Moreover, the effect on the share of services
occupations is stronger for production rather than support routine occupations. So it seems that
the demand for service occupations was less important in zones with routine support jobs than
in zones with routine production jobs. In Autor and Dorn (2013) theoretical model, results
for low-skilled workers are driven by their immobility and the consumer demand for services.
The fact that there is a smaller effect on service occupations in the places where the share of
high-skilled occupations has increased the most, entails that in, France, the demand for service
occupations may not have been due to local workers. In other words, the rise in the demand
for service occupations might not have been driven by local workers consumption.9 Given the
places where the rise in service occupations took place, it is more likely to have been due to
the aging of the population or to tourism. This would be a demand induced by consumers who
were not in the labor force (retired people) or who did not work in theses places (tourists).
9The hypothesis of a skill-biased consumption to explain the skill-biased shift in demand is then less credible.
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Table 4.12: Effect of the initial share of production and support routine occupations on 1990-
2011 change in labor market outcomes by employment zone
1990-2011 change in
empl. share of empl. share of empl. share of non college non college
prod. routine sup. routine high-skilled empl. share of unemployment
occupations occupations occupations service occup. rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of −0.444∗∗∗ 0.028∗ −0.001 0.147∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
production routine occ. (0.022) (0.015) (0.035) (0.023) (0.030)
1982 share of −0.050∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
support routine occ. (0.010) (0.015) (0.213) (0.037) (0.042)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
4.4 Other explanations of the skill-biased spatial shift in la-
bor demand
In this section, we test the robustness of our results to other potential explanations of the
skill-biased spatial shift in labor demand. First we test the results for low-educated workers.
The internationalization of trade is the main alternative explanation to the decrease of demand
for low-educated workers. A first channel is through offshoring : it has become cheaper to
perform some tasks in other countries, in general low-wage countries. The offshorability of an
occupation is possibly correlated to its intensity in routine tasks as easily codified tasks may
also be easily offshored. By way of contrast, service occupations are not easily offshorable :
they have been defined precisely by the need to be performed where the consumer is located.
Autor and Dorn (2013) use a measure of the offshorability of job based on two variables of the
US Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network database : Face-to-Face contact
and On-site job.“The measure captures the degree to which an occupation requires either direct
interpersonal interaction or proximity to a specific work location.” We use their database to
compute a similar measure for French occupations. Table 4.13 shows that the occupations
with the highest level of offshorability are clerical occupations. Low-skilled manufacturing
occupations are not considered much offshorable with this measure. We then average the level
of offshorability in each zone across occupations and we use the 1982 level of this average for
our robustness check. Across employment zones, this measure is positively correlated to the
1982 level of the share of support routine occupations, but not to the 1982 level of the share of
production routine occupations.
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Table 4.13: Offshorability of major occupation groups
Offshorability index
Managers/executives/engineers −
Production/craft workers +
Transport/construction/farming +
Manufacturing workers −
Retail −
Clerical ++
Service occupations −
Source : 1982 French Census, metropolitan France, Autor and Dorn (2013) database of offshorability by occupa-
tions.
Note: (+) indicates a task value above average across all occupations in 1982 weighted by employment and (-)
below average.
A second channel of the impact of globalization on labor demand by skills is through imports
competition. Globalization might have induced higher imports competition for industries em-
ploying low-skilled workers and thus a decrease in the demand for these jobs, that are possibly
routine jobs if imports competition occurred for manufacturing goods for example. We con-
struct a measure of exposure to imports competition for each employment zone, very similarly
to the measure used in Autor et al. (2013a) and to our previous ICT dissemination exposure
index. More precisely, we apply the national level of imports per employment per industry
to the 1982 employment per industry in each employment zone. We then use the 1990-2011
change in this measure of imports competition exposure. It measures how much the 1982 lo-
cal employment structure by industry was exposed to imports competition, given how imports
evolved nationally between 1990 and 2011 (see appendix 4.B for details). Table 4.14 shows
that this measure is positively and significantly correlated to 1982 share of routine occupations,
and more strongly to the share of production routine occupations than to the share of support
routine occupations.
We then add the 1982 offshorability and the 1990-2011 imports competition exposure as con-
trols in our regression of 2011-1990 change in the share of service occupations in non-college
employment and in non college unemployment rate on the initial share of routine occupations
(tables 4.15 and 4.16 when splitting by support and production functions). They are positively
correlated to the share of service occupations in non-college employment and to non-college
unemployment. The effects of the initial share of production and support routine occupations
are lower than previously but still significant. Our results for the test of the task automation
hypothesis are thus still valid when we control for offshoring and imports competition.10
10But we do not rule out that globalization might have an effect too.
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Table 4.14: Initial share of routine occupations and 1990-2011 imports competition exposure
by employment zone
1990-2011 change in imports competition exposure
(1) (2) (3)
1982 share of routine occ. 1.007∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.179) (0.387)
Type of routine occ. all support production
Observations 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France, insee.fr for imports data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
As we mentioned previously, given that the share of non-college service occupations in-
creases more in places where the share of high-skilled occupations decreases, it is not likely
that demand driven by skill-biased consumption is a major driver of our results. But demand for
in-person services could also be driven by demographic changes. Increase female participation
in the labor market may increase the demand for services that were previously home produced
such as cleaning or childcare. The aging of the population may induce a higher demand for
home care services. Although there is no obvious reason why it should be correlated to the
level of the share of routine occupations in the employment zone, a spurious correlation could
bias the estimations. When adding the 1982 female participation rate and the 1982 share of
elderly people (over 75 year old) as control variables, results remain pretty similar for the share
of service occupations in non-college employment and non-college unemployment rate (tables
4.15 and 4.16 when splitting by support and production functions) and for routine occupations
(table 4.22 in appendix).
We then turn to the results on the share of high-skilled occupations. When we control for
imports competition and offshoring, results are pretty similar to our main specification (table
4.17). Other competing explanations to the concentration of high-skilled workers in some zones
are the functional specialization of large cities proposed by Duranton and Puga (2005) or an
increase in the agglomeration economies for high-skilled jobs (Baum-Snow et al. (2014)). If
zones with a high density (and thus potentially high agglomeration economies) are the same as
those with a high initial level of support routine occupations, then it may bias our estimation.
We therefore add the 1982 density as a control variable (table 4.17). First, we see that a higher
density in 1982 is indeed significantly correlated to a higher increase in high-skilled occupations
between 1990 and 2011. As high-skilled jobs are mainly support functions, it is consistent with
the functional specialization of cities modeled by Duranton and Puga (2005). Second, previous
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Table 4.15: Robustness of the effect of initial routine share on 1990-2011 change in low-skilled
labor markets outcomes by employment zone
1990-2011 change in non college empl. share of service occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of 0.105∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
routine occ. (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.029)
1982 female −0.010 −0.018
participation (0.026) (0.026)
1982 share 0.112∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
of 75 year olds (0.052) (0.048)
1982 offshorability 0.001 0.002∗∗
index (0.001) (0.001)
1990-2011 change in 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
import exposure (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
1990-2011 change in non college unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of 0.221∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
routine occ. (0.019) (0.050) (0.024) (0.048) (0.030)
1982 female 0.106∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
participation (0.022) (0.027)
1982 share −0.053 0.008
of 75 year olds (0.064) (0.045)
1982 offshorability 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
index (0.001) (0.002)
1990-2011 change in 0.006∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
import exposure (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.16: Robustness of the effect of initial share of support and production routine occupa-
tions on 1990-2011 change in low-skilled labor markets outcomes by employment zone
1990-2011 change in the share of service occupations in non-college employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of 0.148∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
production routine occ. (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024)
1982 share of 0.084∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.039 0.078∗∗ 0.086∗
support routine occ. (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.038) (0.048)
1982 female 0.006∗ −0.018
participation (0.030) (0.025)
1982 share 0.103∗ 0.214∗∗∗
of 75 year olds (0.057) (0.060)
1982 offshorability 0.003 0.002
index (0.002) (0.001)
1990-2011 change in 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
import exposure (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
1990-2011 change in non college unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of 0.236∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
production routine (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.037)
1982 share of 0.213∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
support routine occ. (0.024) (0.054) (0.036) (0.042) (0.038)
1982 female 0.112∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
participation (0.025) (0.027)
1982 share 0.005
of 75 year olds (−0.0430.067) (0.049)
1982 offshorability 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
index (0.001) (0.002)
1990-2011 change in 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
import exposure (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France, insee.fr for imports data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. ***
p < 0.01.
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results hold. The share of high-skilled occupations increased more in the zones where the
share of support routine occupations was high and not where the share of production routine
occupations was high. So the evidence of a spatial complementarity between support routine
tasks and abstract tasks remains.
Table 4.17: Robustness of the effect of initial share of support and production routine occupa-
tions on 1990-2011 change in the share of high-skilled occupations by employment zone
1990-2011 change in the share of high-skilled occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1982 share of −0.055∗ −0.041 −0.018 −0.075∗∗
production routine occ. (0.029) (0.039) (0.042) (0.032)
1982 share of 0.198∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
support routine occ. (0.065) (0.081) (0.213) (0.059)
1982 density 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
1982 offshorability 0.015∗∗∗ 0.002
index (0.006) (0.003)
2011-1990 change in 0.002 0.002
import exposure (0.003) (0.002)
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France, insee.fr for imports data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
Conclusion
We find evidence of the automation of tasks, both in production and support functions, in
France over 1990-2011. More precisely, we find evidence that with ICT development, low-
skilled workers switch from routine tasks to service occupations (manual tasks), or to unem-
ployment. This could explain the skill-biased demand shift and its spatial component docu-
mented in the previous chapters.
At the same time, a functional specialization of local labor markets seems to have occurred
over the period 1990-2001 and probably contributed to this spatial shift. High-skilled jobs
concentrated in zones where the share of high-skilled occupations was initially higher, and
where support routine jobs were also over-represented.
We show that these results are robust to alternative explanations such as the offshoring of
jobs, imports competition, or agglomeration economies, although we do not exclude that these
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may play a role too. But assessing these other explanations is beyond the scope of this analysis
and left for further research.
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Appendices
4.A Occupations and tasks
We match the French classification of occupations with data published by Autor and Dorn
(2013), itself based on Autor et al. (2003). They compute this data using the US Department
of Labor’s Dictionnary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and obtain measures of task contents
for each occupation that they divide in abstract, routine and manual tasks. We match the US
classification with the 1982 French classification of occupations and thus obtain measures of
abstract, routine and manual tasks for each occupation. Doing this, we assume that the tasks
of jobs with a similar denomination in the French and US classification are similar. Another
important point is that the task contents of occupations may evolve. In particular, tasks of
occupations with high routine contents may be upgraded with the development of computer
without changing denomination. This is not taken into account in the Autor and Dorn (2013)
measure, which is based on 1977 DOT, but this methodology is conservative as it probably
underestimates the decline in routine tasks. Note that we use the task intensity only to classify
occupations in 1982 and then we analyze the variations in the share of different occupations.
We also separate occupations between support and production functions as an application
of Duranton and Puga (2005) theoretical model. Table 4.18 presents the social category in
the 1982 French classification that we define as support functions. We choose management,
administrative functions and medium-skilled commercial functions when the main activity of
the firm is not trade. We consider for the latter that they are a support function to the other main
activity of the firm in that case.
Table 4.18: Occupations defined as support functions
1982 social category Description
23 Heads of firm of more than 10 employees
33 Public managers
37 Administrative and commercial managers
38 Engineers and technical executives
45 Medium qualified administrative jobs in public sector
46 Administrative and commercial medium qualified
except artistic technicians and tourism and catering jobs
and not working in the trade sector
52 Employees in public sector,
except 5216, 5217, 5221, 5222, 5223, 5445 (health and maintenance jobs)
54 Administrative employees
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Table 4.19: Occupations defined as high-skilled (1)
1982 social category Description
2244 Inde´pendants gestionnaires de spectacle ou de service re´cre´atif, de 0 a` 9 salarie´s
2246 Inde´pendants gestionnaires d’e´tablissement prive´ d’enseignement, de sante´, d’action sociale, de 0 a` 9 salarie´s
2310 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
2320 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
2331 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
2332 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
2333 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
2334 Salarie´s chefs d’entreprise
3111 Me´decins libe´raux spe´cialistes
3112 Me´decins libe´raux ge´ne´ralistes
3113 Chirurgiens-dentistes (libe´raux ou salarie´s)
3114 Psychologues, psychanalystes, psychothe´rapeutes (non me´decins)
3115 Ve´te´rinaires (libe´raux ou salarie´s)
3116 Pharmaciens libe´raux
3121 Avocats
3122 Notaires
3123 Conseils juridiques et fiscaux, libe´raux
3124 Experts comptables, comptables agre´e´s, libe´raux
3125 Inge´nieurs conseils libe´raux en recrutement, organisation, e´tudes e´conomiques
3126 Inge´nieurs conseils libe´raux en e´tudes techniques
3127 Architectes libe´raux
3128 Huissiers de justice, officiers ministe´riels et professions libe´rales diverses
3130 Aides familiaux non salarie´s de professions libe´rales effectuant un travail administratif
3311 Personnels de direction de la fonction publique
3312 Inge´nieurs de l’e´tat et des collectivite´s locales
3313 Magistrats
3314 Inspecteurs et autres cadres A des Impoˆts, du tre´sor et des Douanes
3315 Inspecteurs et autres cadres A des PTT
3316 Personnels administratifs supe´rieurs des collectivite´s locales et hopitaux publics
3317 Personnels administratifs de cate´gorie A de l’Etat (sauf Impoˆts, Tre´sor, Douanes, PTT)
3318 Personnes exercant un mandat politique ou syndical
3321 Officiers de l’arme´e et de la gendarmerie (sauf ge´ne´raux)
3411 Professeurs agre´ge´s et certifie´s
3414 Directeurs d’e´tablissement d’enseignement secondaire et inspecteurs
3415 Enseignants de l’enseignement supe´rieur
3421 Chercheurs de la recherche publique
3431 Me´decins hospitaliers
3432 Me´decins non hospitaliers
3433 Psychologues spe´cialistes de l’orientation scolaire et professionnelle
3434 Etudiants hospitaliers, stagiaires internes
3435 Pharmaciens
3511 Journalistes, secre´taires de re´daction
3512 Auteurs litte´raires, sce´naristes, dialoguistes
3513 Bibliothe´caires, archivistes, conservateurs, de la fonction publique
3521 Cadres de la presse, de l’e´dition, de l’audiovisuel et des spectacles
3522 Cadres artistiques des spectacles
3523 Cadres techniques de la re´alisation des spectacles vivants et audiovisuels
3531 Artistes plasticiens
3532 Artistes professionnels de la musique et du chant
3533 Artistes dramatiques, danseurs
3534 Professeurs d’art (hors e´tablissements scolaires)
3535 Artistes de varie´te´s
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Table 4.20: Occupations defined as high-skilled (2)
1982 social category Description
3710 Cadres d’e´tat-major administratifs, financiers, commerciaux des grandes entreprises
3721 Cadres charge´s d’e´tudes e´conomiques, financie`res, commerciales
3722 Cadres spe´cialistes du recrutement, de la formation
3723 Cadres de l’organisation, du controˆle des services administratifs, financiers
3724 Cadres de gestion courante des services financiers, comptables des grandes entreprises
3725 Cadres de gestion courante des services du personnel des grandes entreprises
3726 Cadres de gestion courante des autres services administratifs des grandes entreprises
3727 Cadres administratifs ou financiers des petites et moyennes entreprises
3728 Cadres de la documentation, de l’archivage
3731 Cadres de l’exploitation des magasins de vente
3732 Chefs de produits, acheteurs du commerce et autres cadres de la mercatique
3733 Cadres des ventes des grandes entreprises (hors commerce de de´tail)
3734 Cadres commerciaux des PME (hors commerce de de´tail)
3735 Cadres de la publicite´ ; cadres des relations publiques
3741 Cadres des services techniques et commerciaux de la banque
3744 Cadres des services techniques des assurances
3751 Cadres de l’hoˆtellerie et de la restauration
3810 Directeurs techniques des grandes entreprises
3820 Inge´nieurs, cadres d’e´tudes, de´veloppement de l’agriculture, des eaux et foreˆts
3821 Inge´nieurs, cadres de recherche, e´tudes, essais en e´lectricite´, e´lectronique
3822 Inge´nieurs et cadres de bureau d’e´tudes ou des me´thodes en me´canique
3823 Inge´nieurs, cadres d’e´tudes, me´thodes, controˆles en Baˆtiment et Travaux Publics
3824 Architectes salarie´s
3825 Inge´nieurs et cadres de recherche, de´veloppement en chimie, biologie
3826 Inge´nieurs et cadres de recherche, de´veloppement, controˆles en me´tallurgie
3827 Inge´nieurs et cadres de recherche, e´tudes des industries le´ge`res
3828 Inge´nieurs et cadres spe´cialistes de l’informatique (sauf technico-commerciaux)
3829 Autres inge´nieurs et cadres d’e´tudes
3831 Inge´nieurs et cadres de fabrication en mate´riel e´lectrique, e´lectronique
3832 Inge´nieurs et cadres de fabrication en me´canique
3833 Inge´nieurs et cadres de chantier du baˆtiment et du ge´nie civil
3835 Inge´nieurs et cadres de fabrication en chimie et agroalimentaire
3836 Inge´nieurs et cadres de fabrication en me´tallurgie, verre, mate´riaux
3837 Inge´nieurs et cadres de fabrication des industries le´ge`res
3838 Cadres techniques de l’imprimerie et de l’e´dition
3839 Inge´nieurs et cadres de la production et distribution d’e´lectricite´, gaz, eau
3841 Inge´nieurs et cadres d’entretien, travaux neufs
3842 Inge´nieurs et cadres des achats et approvisionnements industriels
3843 Inge´nieurs et cadres de planning, ordonnancement
3851 Inge´nieurs et cadres technico-commerciaux en mate´riel e´lectrique ou e´lectronique professionnel
3852 Inge´nieurs, cadres technico-commerciaux en mate´riel me´canique professionnel
3853 Inge´nieurs et cadres technico-commerciaux en baˆtiment, ge´nie civil
3854 Inge´nieurs et cadres technico-commerciaux en biens interme´diaires
3855 Inge´nieurs et cadres technico-commerciaux en informatique
3861 Cadres des transports et de la logistique
3862 Personnels navigants techniques de l’aviation civile
3863 Officiers de la marine marchande
4211 Instituteurs
4214 Directeurs d’e´cole primaire ou de maternelle
4215 Instituteurs de l’e´ducation spe´cialise´e
4221 PEGC et matres auxiliaires de l’enseignement ge´ne´ral
4224 Enseignants du technique court
4227 Conseillers d’e´ducation et surveillants
4231 Assistants techniques de la documentation, de l’archivage
4232 Formateurs et animateurs de formation continue
4233 Moniteurs et e´ducateurs sportifs, sportifs professionnels
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Table 4.21: Occupations defined as low-skilled service occupations
1982 social category Description
2101 Artisans boulangers, paˆtissiers, de 0 a` 2 salarie´s
2102 Artisans boulangers, paˆtissiers, de 3 a` 9 salarie´s
2103 Artisans bouchers, de 0 a` 2 salarie´s
2104 Artisans bouchers, de 3 a` 9 salarie´s
2105 Artisans charcutiers, de 0 a` 2 salarie´s
2106 Artisans charcutiers, de 3 a` 9 salarie´s
2107 Autres artisans de l’alimentation
2171 Conducteurs de taxi artisans
2172 Artisans coiffeurs, manucures, esthe´ticiens
2173 Artisans teinturiers, blanchisseurs
2174 Artisans des services divers
2181 Transporteurs routiers Inde´pendants, de 0 a` 3 salarie´s
2182 Bateliers Inde´pendants, de 0 a` 9 salarie´s
2190 Aides familiaux non salarie´s ou associe´s d’artisans effectuant un travail administratif ou commercial
4311 Cadres infirmiers et assimile´s
4312 Infirmiers psychiatriques
4313 Pue´ricultrices
4314 Infirmiers spe´cialise´s (autres que pue´ricultrices)
4315 Infirmiers en soins ge´ne´raux
4316 Infirmiers libe´raux
4321 Sages-femmes
4322 Spe´cialistes de la re´e´ducation et die´te´ticiens
4323 Spe´cialistes de la re´e´ducation et pe´dicures, libe´raux
4324 Techniciens me´dicaux
4325 Spe´cialistes de l’appareillage me´dical
4326 Spe´cialistes de l’appareillage me´dical. Inde´pendants
4327 Pre´parateurs en pharmacie
4331 Assistantes sociales
4332 Educateurs spe´cialise´s
4333 Animateurs socioculturels et de loisirs
4334 Conseillers familiaux
4411 Clerge´ se´culier
4412 Clerge´ re´gulier
5216 Agents de service des e´tablissements d’enseignement
5217 Agents de service de la fonction publique (sauf e´coles, hoˆpitaux)
5221 Aides-soignants
5222 Agents de service hospitaliers
5223 Ambulanciers
5311 Agents de police
5312 Gendarmes
5313 Sergents
5314 Hommes du rang
5315 Pompiers
5316 Agents techniques des eaux et foreˆts
5317 Agents de se´curite´, de surveillance
5445 Agents et hoˆtesses d’accompagnement (transports, tourisme)
5611 Serveurs et commis de restaurant ou de cafe´
5614 Employe´s de l’hoˆtellerie
5621 Manucures, esthe´ticiennes
5622 Coiffeurs
5631 Assistantes maternelles, gardiennes d’enfants, travailleuses familiales
5632 Employe´s de maison et femmes de me´nages chez des particuliers
5633 Concierges, gardiens d’immeubles
5634 Employe´s des services divers
6301 Jardiniers
6351 Bouchers (sauf industrie de la viande)
6352 Charcutiers (sauf industrie de la viande)
6353 Boulangers, paˆtissiers (sauf activite´ industrielle)
6354 Cuisiniers qualifie´s
6411 Conducteurs routiers et grands routiers
6412 Conducteurs de ve´hicule routier de transport en commun
6413 Conducteurs de taxi
6414 Conducteurs de voiture particulie`re
6415 Conducteurs-livreurs, coursiers
6851 Apprentis boulangers, bouchers, charcutiers
6891 Nettoyeurs
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4.B Imports competition and ICT dissemination exposure in-
dex
We compute two other indexes using data from the French National Accounts (insee.fr) for
the years we study (1982, 1990 and 2011).
We compute an index of imports competitions exposure, very similar to Autor et al. (2013a).
We do not use China’s exports as an instrument as the purpose here is not to estimate the effects
of imports competition, but to control for it. Malgouyres (2014) did such an instrumentation
for the French case. We use data on imports in goods and services (chain-linked volumes) and
compute the imports per employment at a national level for each year and each industry. The
finest level common to this data and the Censuses data was of 21 industries, of which 11 are
in manufacturing. For each employment zone, we compute the average across industries of
this measure for each year, weighting by the 1982 employment share of each industry in the
employment zone. Thus this index measures how much the 1982 employment of a zone was
exposed to imports competition given the subsequent national trends of imports and given the
1982 distribution of employment by industry.
We also compute an index to measure ICT dissemination exposure in an employment zone.
We use the end-of the year fixed net capital in ICT (previous year’s prices and chain-linked
volumes) by industry by year. We computed ICT per worker per year at a national level and
then, for each employment zone, we compute the average across industries of this measure
for each year, weighting by the 1982 employment share of each industry in the employment
zone. Thus this index measures how much the 1982 employment of a zone was exposed to
ICT dissemination given the national trends and given the 1982 distribution of employment by
industry.
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4.C Additional table
Table 4.22: Robustness of the effect of initial share of routine occupations on 1990-2011 change
in the share of routine occupations by employment zone
1990-2011 change in the share of
routine occupations in employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of −0.340∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗
routine occ. (0.022) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016) (0.030)
1982 female −0.030 −0.060∗∗
participation (0.024) (0.026)
1982 share −0.059 −0.085∗∗
of 75 year olds (0.038) (0.035)
1982 offshorability 0.000 0.002∗
index (0.001) (0.001)
1990-2011 change in −0.001 −0.004∗∗
import exposure (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
1990-2011 change in the share of
support routine occ. in employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of −0.272∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
support routine occ. (0.019) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.033)
1982 female −0.030∗ −0.027
participation (0.018) (0.017)
1982 share −0.039 −0.020
of 75 year olds (0.027) (0.032)
1982 offshorability −0.001 0.00002
index (0.001) (0.001)
1990-2011 change in 0.001 0.0002
import exposure (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
1990-2011 change in the share of
production routine occ. in employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1982 share of −0.438∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗
production routine occ. (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022)
1982 female −0.045∗∗∗ −0.028∗
participation (0.010) (0.015)
1982 share 0.030 0.013
of 75 year olds (0.024) (0.025)
1982 offshorability −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗
index (0.001) (0.001)
1990-2011 change in −0.001 −0.0005
import exposure (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Source : 1982, 1990 and 2011 French Censuses, metropolitan France, insee.fr for imports data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by 1982 employment zone population. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. ***
p < 0.01.
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Inégalités, qualifications et géographie des emplois sur le marché du travail en France 
 
Cette thèse étudie les déterminants de la localisation des emplois, des travailleurs et des 
entreprises en France. 
 
Le chapitre 1 évalue l’effet des Zones Franches Urbaines sur leurs habitants. Il s’appuie sur 
les données des enquêtes Emploi de 1993 à 2007 et la méthodologie des différences de 
différences. Il montre d’une part que cette politique a réduit de manière significative le 
chômage des résidents dans ces quartiers, du fait notamment de la présence d’une clause 
d’embauche locale et, d’autre part, qu’elle a occasionné à long terme des effets de 
recomposition sociale des quartiers ciblés, dont elle a accru la part de travailleurs qualifiés.  
 
Le chapitre 2 mesure l’impact sur le management des entreprises du temps de trajet entre les 
filiales et leur siège social. Il s’appuie sur des données administratives couvrant l’ensemble 
des entreprises du secteur privé sur le territoire français entre 1993 et 2011, et compare des 
filiales dont le temps de trajet vers leur siège social a été affecté par l’ouverture d’une ligne 
TGV avec des filiales du même marché local dont le temps de trajet vers leur siège social n’a 
pas été affecté. Les résultats montrent que les filiales que le TGV a permis de relier plus 
rapidement à leur siège social ont réduit la proportion de managers dans leur main d’œuvre et 
se sont concentrées sur leurs activités de production. Cela semble s’être traduit aussi par une 
augmentation de la part des managers de l’entreprise localisés au siège social et du taux de 
profit de l’entreprise dans son ensemble. 
 
Le chapitre 3 s’appuie sur des données administratives permettant de décrire les salaires du 
secteur privé par niveau d’éducation depuis 1967 en France et sur l’estimation d’un modèle 
d’offre et de demande de travail déjà testé sur données américaines. Il décrit la baisse du 
salaire relatif des travailleurs qualifiés et l’augmentation parallèle de l’offre relative de travail 
qualifié qui s’est produite en France pour les hommes de 15 à 65 ans entre 1967 et 2009. Il 
montre que l’augmentation du niveau d’éducation a masqué une réorientation de la demande 
de travail vers les plus qualifiés d’une ampleur égale au moins à la moitié de ce qui a été 
observé aux États-Unis. Si la demande continue à évoluer sur cette tendance alors que le 
niveau d’éducation se stabilise, il est probable que la France connaisse une augmentation des 
inégalités salariales similaire à celle observée aux États-Unis. Une analyse complémentaire 
est ensuite conduite au niveau des marchés locaux du travail, afin de décrire les dynamiques 
spatiales de l’offre de travail et des inégalités de salaires par niveau d’éducation en France sur 
la période 1982-2011. Elle montre que les travailleurs les plus diplômés se sont concentrés 
géographiquement et que la demande de travailleurs qualifiés a évolué différemment suivant 
les territoires. Cela a conduit à une convergence spatiale des différences de salaires entre 
travailleurs plus et moins diplômés. Cependant si les dynamiques spatiales de l’offre et la 
demande de travail qualifié se maintiennent, une divergence pourrait se produire comme cela 
est déjà le cas aux États-Unis. 
 
Le chapitre 4 s’appuie sur les dynamiques spatiales des salaires et de l’offre et la demande de 
travail pour tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle le progrès technique et l’informatisation 
biaiserait la demande de travail vers les plus qualifiés. Selon cette hypothèse, le capital 
informatique se substitue aux tâches routinières alors qu’il est complémentaire des tâches 
abstraites. L’impact des nouvelles technologies sur différents marchés locaux du travail 
varierait donc en fonction de l’importance des taches routinières dans l’emploi local avant 
leur diffusion. Plus précisément, ce chapitre montre que les emplois routiniers ont plus décru 
dans les marchés du travail où leur part était initialement élevée, mais que les emplois 
abstraits n’y ont pas augmenté comme c’est le cas aux États-Unis. Cela s’y est aussi traduit 
pour les moins qualifiés par une plus forte part d’emplois dans les services et plus de 
chômage. Il montre ensuite que l’effet des nouvelles technologies sur les emplois routiniers et 
abstraits varie avec le type de fonction occupée : support ou production. Enfin, la prise en 
compte des effets potentiels de la mondialisation, autre candidat à l’explication des 
dynamiques observées, ne remet pas en cause ces résultats. 
